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Abstract
This thesis analyses the effect of retaliation with 
countervailing tariffs and/or production subsidies on the 
strategic argument for export subsidies, and also proves the 
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the standard 
model of international trade under oligopoly. Retaliation 
will be modelled as a multistage game. At the first stage, 
the foreign country sets its export subsidy to maximise 
national welfare. Then, at the second stage, the domestic 
country sets its trade policy, import tariff and/or 
production subsidy, to maximise national welfare in response 
to the foreign export subsidy. The solution concept employed 
is the subgame perfect equilibrium. When the domestic 
country uses a tariff in response to a foreign export 
subsidy, then the optimal domestic response is a partially 
countervailing tariff, and the foreign country does not 
usually gain from an export subsidy. There is usually no 
profit shifting argument for an export subsidy when the 
foreign country faces retaliation with countervailing 
tariffs. When the domestic country uses a tariff and a 
production subsidy in response to a foreign export subsidy, 
then the surprising result is that an export subsidy may 
increase foreign welfare. In this case, the foreign export 
subsidy increases both foreign and domestic welfare. The 
domestic country will always gain from a foreign export 
subsidy when it sets its trade policy optimally.
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"Bounties upon exportation are, in Great Britain, 
frequently petitioned for, and sometimes granted to 
the produce of particular branches of domestick 
industry. By means of them our merchants and 
manufacturers, it is pretended, will be enabled to 
sell their goods as cheap, or cheaper than their 
rivals in the foreign market. A greater quantity, 
it is said, will thus be exported, and the balance 
of trade consequently turned more in favour of our 
own country. We cannot give our workmen a monopoly 
in the foreign as we have in the home market. We 
cannot force foreigners to buy their goods as we 
have done to our own countrymen. The next best 
expedient, it has been thought, therefore, is to 
pay them for buying. It is in this manner that the 
mercantile system proposes to enrich the whole 
country" Adam Smith (1776), An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Book 
IV, Chapter V, Paragraph 1.
Introduction
This thesis analyses the effect of retaliation with 
countervailing tariffs and/or production subsidies on the 
strategic argument for export subsidies, and also proves the 
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the standard 
model of international trade under oligopoly. This chapter 
provides an introduction to the problem of subsidies and 
countervailing duties in international trade.
Since the Second World War, a series of GATT multilateral 
trade negotiations have achieved dramatic tariff reductions. 
The average tariff in the United States has been reduced by 
92%. And, following the implementation of the Tokyo Round of 
tariff reductions, the average tariff is 4.9% in the United
6
States, 6.0% in the European Community, and 5.4% in Japan.1
However, a number of important sectors such as agriculture,
textiles and services have been unaffected by trade
liberalisation, although these sectors are now being
considered in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. As
industrial tariffs have been reduced, non-tariff barriers
and subsidies have become more significant. Industrial
subsidies are widespread in the OECD, and the average
2subsidy rate is about 1.5% of GDP. Subsidies are highest in 
declining industries such as steel and shipbuilding, but 
subsidies are also being used to support new industries such 
as microelectronics. The effect of subsidies is to distort 
international trade, and to harm the domestic industry in 
other countries. Consequently, subsidies and the appropriate 
response to foreign subsidies are important questions in 
trade policy.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was drawn 
up in 1947 to provide a liberal framework for international 
trade. Article XVI of the GATT prohibits the use of export
subsidies, and Article VI allows an importing country to
. . . . . 3impose countervailing duties on subsidised products.
However, these rules were not sufficient to prevent
^Bhagwati (1988), page 3.
20ECD (1990), page 12.
3 . . .The relevant GATT rules on subsidies and countervailing
duties are detailed in Beseler and Williams (1986).
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subsidies and countervailing duties becoming a serious 
problem in international trade. One problem was the trade 
distorting effects of domestic subsidies such as subsidies 
for depressed regions and for research and development. In
the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations from 1973 to 1979,
subsidies and countervailing duties were a controversial 
issue, and these negotiations led to the GATT Code on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. This code confirms that 
countries shall not grant export subsidies on products other 
than certain primary products. And, that they will seek to 
avoid causing injury to the domestic industry in other
countries through the use of domestic subsidies.
Under the GATT Code, a country which is adversely effected 
by a foreign subsidy may take action using Track I and/or 
Track II. Track I allows an importing country to apply
countervailing duties if there is material injury to the 
domestic industry. Definitive countervailing duties may only 
be applied following a formal investigation by the importing 
country. The countervailing duty may not exceed the amount 
of the subsidy, and should be less than the amount of the 
subsidy if this is adequate to remove the injury to the 
domestic industry. A countervailing duty shall not be 
applied for longer than is necessary to counter the damage 
caused to the domestic industry by the subsidy. Track II 
allows a country to apply for authorisation from the GATT to 
apply countermeasures when a foreign subsidy causes injury
8
to its domestic industry. These countermeasures may include
the withdrawal of GATT concessions. This procedure can be
used when a foreign subsidy injures the domestic industry
through its effect on a third market. Both the United States
and the European Community have enacted countervailing duty
4laws in line with the GATT Code.
During the 1980's, there has been extensive use of
countervailing duties in response to foreign subsidies, 
particularly by the United States. According to Finger and 
Nogues (1987), 425 countervailing duty cases were initiated 
by GATT signatories between 1980 and 1985. The United States 
initiated 252 cases, Chile initiated 135 cases, but the
European Community initiated only seven cases. Details of 
the US countervailing duty cases are contained in Destler 
(1986), and details of EC cases are contained in Beseler and 
Williams (1986). A large number of the US countervailing
duty cases resulted from complaints by the US steel industry
. . . . 5in 1982 about the subsidisation of the EC steel industry.
The US Commerce Department determined that the EC industry 
was being subsidised, and calculated subsidy margins of upto 
20-30% for UK, French and Spanish imports. In this case
4 . . .The relevant EC law is Council Regulation (EEC) No. 242 3/88
of 11 July 1988 on protection against dumped or subsidized 
imports from countries not members of the European Economic 
Community, Official Journal of the European Communities. 
L209, 2 August 1988.
5 . . .For details of protectionism m  the world steel industry,
including the countervailing duty cases, see Jones (1986).
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rather than face countervailing duties, the European 
Community agreed to a "voluntary" export restraint (VER) 
with the United States. There is a widespread belief that 
the threat of countervailing duties was misused by the 
United States to bring about a politically expedient VER.
In the United States there has recently been great concern 
about the "unfair" trade practices used by other countries, 
and about how the US should respond. It has become the 
orthodox view in the United States that its industries are 
suffering from the unfair practices of foreign governments. 
There is concern about foreign government intervention in 
key manufacturing industries such as aircraft, steel and 
semiconductors.6 In the aircraft industry, Airbus Industrie 
is alleged to have received large subsidies from European 
governments, and now challenges the dominance of US 
producers such as Boeing. In the semiconductor industry, it 
is argued that the Japanese Government have used industrial 
targeting and a closed domestic market to give its firms a 
competitive advantage in the DRAM (dynamic random access 
memory) chip market at the expense of US firms. It is argued 
in the United States that foreign governments have used 
unfair trade practices to take advantage of liberal US trade 
policies, and there is dissatisfaction about the ability of 
GATT rules to eliminate these practices. A more aggressive
6For details of foreign targeting see Krugman (1984b).
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US response to unfair foreign trade practices has been 
suggested by Goldstein and Krasner (1984). They proposed 
that the US should adopt a strategy of tit for tat 
retaliation against unfair trade practices, and that the US 
should develop its own industrial policy. The Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 allows the United States to 
retaliate against unfair foreign trade practices.
This discussion suggests a number of questions about foreign 
export subsidies and about how the domestic country should 
respond to such subsidies:
r
(1) Will a foreign export subsidy harm the domestic country 
if it pursues a policy of laissez-faire? This question is 
obviously relevant to the United States where it is widely 
believed that the US economy has been harmed by foreign 
subsidies due to its liberal trade policy.
(2) How should the domestic country respond to a foreign 
export subsidy? This question is related to countervailing 
duty law and the optimal response to foreign subsidies. 
Article VI of the GATT allows fully countervailing duties, 
but is such a response optimal?
(3) What is the optimal foreign export subsidy when the 
foreign country is faced with retaliation? When the foreign 
country realises that the domestic country will retaliate,
11
will it be deterred from using an export subsidy?
Export subsidies and countervailing duties could be analysed 
in a perfectly competitive model of international trade. A 
foreign export subsidy will lower the price of the product, 
and hence reduce the output of the domestic industry. 
Resources displaced by the contraction of the domestic 
industry will be employed in other sectors of the economy, 
where they will produce output of equal value to the
country. Therefore, the contraction of the domestic industry 
will not reduce domestic welfare. The price reduction will 
reduce the profits of the domestic industry, but it will 
increase consumer surplus. The gain to consumers will exceed 
the loss to producers, and the net effect is a terms of 
trade gain for the domestic country. Therefore, the domestic
country should welcome the foreign export subsidy, and the
optimal domestic response is to send a note of thanks. If 
the domestic country applied countervailing duties then it 
would reduce the welfare gains from the foreign export
subsidy, and so a countervailing duty is not optimal. For 
the foreign country, an export subsidy will worsen its terms 
of trade, and reduce its welfare. An export subsidy is never 
optimal for the foreign country. If the domestic country 
applied fully countervailing tariffs then the net effect of 
the export subsidy is to transfer income from the foreign to 
the domestic country, and the foreign country will obviously 
be worse off. Therefore, in a perfectly competitive model,
12
it is difficult to explain the use of export subsidies and 
countervailing duties.
Recently, trade theorists have realised that many industries 
are not perfectly competitive, and have started to model 
trade and trade policy under imperfect competition. An 
important feature of these models is that price exceeds 
marginal cost, and firms may earn pure profits. These pure 
profits earned by a country's firms add to its national 
income, and a country may gain from profit shifting trade 
policies. In a Cournot duopoly model, with one foreign and 
one domestic firm, Brander and Spencer (1985) have shown 
that the foreign country can use an export subsidy to shift 
profits from domestic to foreign firms, and hence to 
increase its welfare. The export subsidy will reduce the 
profits of the domestic industry, and it may reduce the 
welfare of the domestic country. Dixit (1988) has shown that 
the optimal domestic response to a foreign export subsidy 
may be countervailing duties. Therefore, models of trade 
policy under imperfect competition may provide a more 
satisfactory analysis of export subsidies and countervailing 
duties than perfectly competitive models.
Many trade theorists have argued, without presenting any 
formal model, that any attempt to use profit shifting trade 
policies is likely to provoke retaliation by other
13
7countries. For example, if the foreign country uses an 
export subsidy then the domestic country is likely to 
retaliate with countervailing duties. And, it is argued that 
retaliation is likely to leave the country which first uses 
profit shifting trade policies worse off. However, Brander 
(1986) has argued that it is naive to believe that the 
possibility of retaliation undercuts any case for 
retaliation. Therefore, there is a need for a formal model 
to assess the effect of retaliation on the profit shifting 
argument for export subsidies.
This thesis will analyse export subsidies and countervailing 
duties using game theoretic models of trade policy under 
Cournot oligopoly. Trade policy will be modelled as a 
multistage game. At the first stage, the foreign country 
will set its export subsidy to maximise its national 
welfare. Then, at the second stage, the domestic country 
will respond by setting its import tariff and/or production 
subsidy to maximise its national welfare. Finally, at the 
third stage, the domestic and foreign firms will set their 
outputs to maximise profits as under Cournot oligopoly. The 
relevant solution is the subgame perfect equilibrium. This 
ensures that any threats of retaliation by the domestic 
country must be credible, and that the foreign country 
correctly anticipates the response of the domestic country.
7
See Grossman (1986), Krugman (1987c) and Bhagwati (1988).
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Using a multistage game in which the foreign country has a 
first mover advantage appears to be the most appropriate 
method to model export subsidies and countervailing duties. 
Under GATT rules the domestic country can only apply 
definitive countervailing duties after a formal 
investigation has established foreign subsidisation, and 
hence a country which is considering the use of an export 
subsidy clearly has a first mover advantage. The alternative 
is to model trade policy as a simultaneous move game as in 
Johnson (1953-54), but this does not really capture the 
essence of retaliation. Since if both governments act 
simultaneously then the domestic country cannot really react 
to the foreign export subsidy. Therefore, modelling trade 
policy as a multistage game in which the foreign country has 
a first mover advantage appears to be the most satisfactory 
approach.
Chapter 1 surveys the literature on the new international 
economics and strategic trade policy. It focuses on trade 
and trade policy under oligopoly, and in particular on the 
profit shifting argument for export subsidies. Also, it is 
shown that Dixit (1988) incorrectly derives the optimal 
tariff in the case when domestic production is uneconomic, 
and this error is corrected. Chapter 2 analyses the effect 
of retaliation on the profit shifting argument for export 
subsidies in a model with linear demand and product 
differentiation. The optimal domestic response to a foreign
15
export subsidy under linear demand and product 
differentiation has been derived by Dixit (1988), and this 
chapter extends his analysis by considering the optimal 
foreign export subsidy when faced with retaliation.
Chapter 3 proves the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium 
in the Dixit (1984) homogeneous product Cournot oligopoly 
model of international trade. Existence is proved without 
the usual assumption that profit functions are concave. And, 
the comparative static results for the effects of trade 
policy are derived. Chapter 4 uses the basic model of 
chapter 3 to analyse the effect of retaliation on the profit 
shifting argument for export subsidies. This extends the 
analysis of Dixit (1988) and chapter 2 by deriving the
optimal domestic response to a foreign export subsidy when
demand is non-linear. And, then uses these results to derive 
the optimal foreign export subsidy when faced with
retaliation. Chapter 5 analyses the effect of retaliation in 
a model where the foreign country can use an export subsidy 
to deter the entry of domestic firms. The optimal domestic 
response to a foreign export subsidy is derived, and then 
the optimal foreign export subsidy when faced with
retaliation is obtained. Chapter 6 is the conclusion.
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Chapter Is Strategic Trade Policy: A Survey
1.1 Introduction
This chapter surveys the literature on the New International 
Economics, which incorporates imperfect competition into 
models of international trade, and Strategic Trade Policy, 
which analyses trade policy under imperfect competition. 
This literature has provided an explanation for 
intra-industry trade, identified additional sources of gains 
from trade, and led to a new rationale for trade policy.
The conventional theory of international trade assumes that
firms are perfectly competitive and that there are constant
returns to scale. Then, international trade is explained by
the principle of comparative advantage. Trade between
countries occurs because of differences in technology in the
Ricardian model, and because of differences in factor
endowments in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. An
important result in conventional trade theory is that the
countries will undoubtedly gain from trade. Although, trade
theorists did realise that economies of scale, product
differentiation and imperfect competition were probably
1important factors m  international trade, these factors 
were not incorporated into formal models until the papers of
^For example Johnson (1967) realises the need to incorporate 
monopolistic competition into models of international trade.
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Krugman (1979), Dixit and Norman (1980), and Lancaster
(1980). They showed how monopolistic competition could 
explain intra-industry trade between similar countries, 
which could not be explained by comparative advantage. And, 
it was shown that economies of scale and product variety 
provided additional sources of gains from trade. Brander
(1981) used a Cournot oligopoly model to explain 
intra-industry trade in identical products, and showed that 
the pro-competitive effect of trade provided another source 
of gains from trade. These models allow trade theory to 
explain intra-industry trade, and strengthen the view that 
there are gains from trade.
In conventional trade theory the first-best optimum policy 
for a small country is free trade, and this is true even if 
foreign competitors protect or subsidise their industries. 
Only for a large country, able to influence its terms of 
trade, is a tariff the first-best optimum policy. Whereas, 
in models with imperfect competition a country may benefit 
from strategic trade policy. The explanation is that with 
imperfect competition there may be pure profits, and a 
country may gain from profit-shifting trade policy. In a 
Cournot duopoly model, Brander and Spencer (1985) show that 
a country can use an export subsidy to give its firm a 
strategic advantage, and thereby allow it to capture a 
larger share of industry profits. Strategic trade policy 
challenges the conclusion of the conventional trade theory
18
that free trade is the optimal policy. This has led to 
numerous criticisms of this new strategic rationale for 
trade policy.
This new literature has been surveyed by, inter alios, Dixit 
(1984, 1987c), Grossman and Richardson (1985), Helpman
(1984), Helpman and Krugman (1985, 1989), Krugman (1983,
1987b) and Venables (1985b). Empirical research on 
international trade under imperfect competition is surveyed 
by Richardson (1989). An informal introduction to strategic 
trade policy is given by Krugman (1986) . The Nev 
International Economics has been heavily influenced by the 
New Industrial Organisation, see Krugman (1989) , and the 
text by Tirole (1988) provides an excellent survey of this 
new theory of industrial organisation.
In order to make the task manageable this survey will 
concentrate on models of international trade under 
oligopoly. A simple duopoly model will be developed which 
will be used to illustrate the basic ideas throughout the 
chapter. Section 1.2 discusses intra-industry trade in 
identical products and the gains from trade. The profit 
shifting argument for export subsidies, and the numerous 
criticisms, are considered in section 1.3. The optimal trade 
policy for the importing country is discussed, and an error 
in Dixit (1988) corrected, in section 1.4. The conclusions 
are in section 1.5.
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1.2 Intra-Industry Trade and the Gains from Trade
Intra-industry trade is usually explained by assuming that
such trade occurs in slightly differentiated products, if
2
consumers demand variety then there will be two way trade. 
Brander (1981) showed that intra-industry trade in identical 
products may occur under Cournot oligopoly. The crucial 
assumption is that markets are segmented. The usual 
assumption in international trade is that markets are 
integrated, arbitrage leads to the same price in each 
country. Then, each firm views the world as one market, and 
its strategic variable is the the total quantity to produce 
for the world market. With segmented markets there is no 
arbitrage, therefore price differences can occur between 
countries, and firms view each country as a separate market. 
The firms' strategic variables are the quantities to be 
produced for each market.
A simple Cournot duopoly model will demonstrate the 
possibility of intra-industry trade. There are two identical 
countries, the domestic and the foreign country, with a 
single firm in each country. The domestic and foreign firm 
both have constant marginal cost c, and the cost of 
transporting the product from one country to another is k.
2
Intra-industry trade and the gains from trade under 
monopolistic competition are analysed by Helpman (1981), 
Krugman (1979, 1980, 1981) and Lancaster (1980).
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The domestic firm sells output Y in the domestic market, and
* • . .exports output Y to the foreign market. The foreign firm
• *exports output X to the domestic market, and sells output X
in the foreign market. Demand in the domestic market is
P = P(Q) , where Q = X+Y, and demand in the foreign market is
* * * *
P = P(Q ) , where Q = X +Y . Hence, the profits of the
domestic and foreign firms are, respectively
7T = (P(X+Y) - c) Y + (P(X+Y ) - c - k) Y
7T = (P (X+Y) - c - k)X + (P (X*+Y*) - c) X*
(1.1)
The first term is profits from the domestic market, and the 
second term is profits from the foreign market. With the
assumption of segmented markets, the strategic variables for
, , * , ,
the domestic firm are Y and Y , and for the foreign firm X
* • . . . .and X . Assuming each firm's profit function is
quasi-concave in its strategic variables, the first order
. . . . . 3conditions for a Nash equilibrium are
dn dn
— - = P(X+Y) + YP' (X+Y) - c  ^0, Y — 0, — - Y = 0
3Y dY
dn dn
— - = P (X+Y) + XP' (X+Y) - C -  k ^ 0 ,  X £ 0, — - X = 0
dX dX
(1.2)
3 . . . . .Little attention has been paid to the question of existence
and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium in models of 
international trade. A proof of existence and uniqueness is 
presented in chapter 3 of this thesis.
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Note that the equilibrium quantities in the domestic market,
Y and X given by (1.2), are independent of the equilibrium
. . .  . * *quantities m  the foreign market, Y and X given by (1.3).
For both the domestic and foreign firm, profits in the
domestic market are independent of profits in the foreign 
market. The two firms are engaged in two independent games, 
one in the domestic market and one in the foreign market, 
which can be analysed separately. This is due to the
assumption of segmented markets, and the assumption that
marginal cost is constant.
Foreign exports to the domestic market will be positive if 
foreign cost, including the transport cost, is less than the 
domestic firm's monopoly price. Then, the market will be 
supplied by imports and domestic production. With Cournot 
competition, high cost firms are not driven out of the 
market by low cost firms. As Cournot (1838) noted the firm 
with the higher marginal cost will have a smaller market 
share, its perceived elasticity of demand is higher and 
hence its price-cost margin is lower. Since the model is 
symmetric, the foreign market will be supplied by both
foreign and domestic firms. Hence, there is intra-industry 
trade, the foreign firm exports to the domestic market and 
the domestic firm exports to the foreign market. Trade 
occurs despite the fact that it is costly, due to the 
transport cost, and that neither country has a comparative 
advantage.
The welfare effects of intra-industry trade have been
4
analysed by Brander and Krugman (1983). They also extend 
the analysis of intra-industry trade to arbitrary demand 
functions rather than the linear demand functions considered 
by Brander (1981). Demand is assumed to be derived from a 
utility function which is additively separable and linear in 
a competitive numeraire good, then consumer surplus is a 
valid welfare measure. Welfare is given by the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus. Firstly, consider the welfare 
effects of a multilateral move to free trade, where both the 
domestic and foreign market are opened up to trade. Since 
the model is symmetric, consider the domestic market. The 
effects are shown in figure 1.1. The domestic price is 
reduced from the monopoly price under autarky, PA, to the 
duopoly price under free trade, PT, the sales of the 
domestic firm are reduced from YA to YT, and imports are XT. 
Trade has a pro-competitive effect, there is an increase in
4 . . .The welfare effects of intra-industry trade m  a common
market are analysed by Neven and Phlips (1985) in a model 
with linear demand functions.
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consumer surplus due to the lower price which is a welfare 
gain. There is also a welfare gain from the profits that the 
domestic firm receives on its exports to the foreign market. 
By symmetry, this is equal to the foreign firm's profits on 
its exports to the domestic market. But, there is a welfare 
loss due to the sales of the domestic firm being displaced 
by imports which incur a transport cost. With positive 
transport costs the overall welfare effect is ambiguous, and 
clearly there could be losses from trade. Obviously, with 
zero transport costs there is an unambiguous welfare gain.
Now consider the welfare effects of a unilateral move to
free trade, the domestic market for the oligopolistic
5product is opened up but not the foreign market. The 
effects are shown in figure 1.2. The domestic price is 
reduced from PA to PT, domestic output from YA to YT, and 
imports are XT. There is a welfare gain due to the increase 
in consumer surplus, and a welfare loss due to the reduction 
in profits of the domestic firm because its output 
decreases. Whereas, in a multilateral move to free trade the 
loss of profits from the domestic market was offset by the 
profits from exports to the foreign market. The overall 
welfare effect is ambiguous, even when transport costs are 
zero, and may clearly be negative. Hence, there are more
5 .Since trade must be balanced, the domestic country imports 
the product of the oligopolistic industry, and exports the 
competitive numeraire good.
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likely to be gains from a multilateral move to free trade 
than a unilateral move.
With Bertrand competition there is no intra-industry trade. 
Since, in the domestic market, the domestic firm would 
undercut the foreign firm by setting a price just below the 
foreign firm's cost, c + k - e. Then, the domestic firm will 
capture the entire market. Similarly, the foreign firm will 
supply the entire foreign market. There is no intra-industry 
trade, but there are gains from trade. The threat of imports 
has a pro-competitive effect on the domestic firm. Under 
autarky the domestic firm sets the monopoly price, but faced 
with competition it reduces its price to just below the 
costs of the foreign firm. Thus, there is a welfare gain due 
to the increase in consumer surplus. There is no welfare 
loss due to wasteful transport costs, since no trade 
actually occurs. Hence, the overall welfare effect is 
positive.
Brander and Krugman (1983) and Venables (1985a) have 
considered intra-industry trade under Cournot oligopoly with 
free entry. This leads to a clear result about the gains 
from trade, even with transport costs. With free entry 
profits are zero in equilibrium, so domestic welfare is 
given by consumer surplus. Hence, if trade results in a 
lower domestic price then it will increase domestic welfare. 
Consider a multilateral move to free trade, the domestic and
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foreign market are opened up to trade, and domestic firms 
have the opportunity to export to the foreign market. 
Domestic firms will export to the foreign market if it is 
profitable. Suppose the domestic price did not fall, then 
profits from the domestic market are the same as under 
autarky, zero with free entry, but profits from exports are 
positive, and so domestic firms make positive profits 
overall. Hence, with free entry, the domestic price must 
fall until profits are zero in equilibrium. There are 
clearly gains from trade. But, note that the gains from 
trade come from the opportunity of domestic firms to export, 
and not from the effect of imports on the domestic market.
Hwang (1984) has modelled intra-industry trade in a 
conjectural variations model of oligopoly. It is claimed 
that the amount of intra-industry trade increases with the 
degree of collusion, as measured by the conjectural 
variation parameter. Obviously, with Cournot oligopoly there 
is more intra-industry trade than with Bertrand oligopoly, 
where there is none. But, if firms are colluding to maximise 
joint profits, they would surely not engage in the costly 
cross-hauling of products. Hwang (1984) clearly demonstrates 
the inadequacies of using the conjectural variation 
approach, which attempts to model dynamic oligopoly in a 
static setting. A better approach to the modelling of 
dynamic oligopoly is to use a repeated game model. This 
method has been used by Pinto (1986) to analyse the Brander
26
and Krugman (1983) model in a dynamic setting. First, Pinto 
shows that the joint profit maximising solution involves no 
trade, and then that it can be supported as a perfect 
equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game, by the threat of 
reversion to the one-shot Nash equilibrium, if the discount 
rate is not too large. With implicit collusion firms refrain 
from exporting to their competitor's market and there is no 
intra-industry trade.
Recently, the assumption of segmented markets has been 
questioned by Ben-Zvi and Helpman (1988) and Venables 
(1988). They argue that it is unrealistic to model firms as 
choosing quantities to be sold in each market. Instead, they 
suggest a multistage game, an extension of Kreps and 
Scheinkman (1983), in which worldwide capacity is chosen at 
the first stage, and then the prices for each market are 
chosen at the second stage.^ Ben-Zvi and Helpman consider 
the case of homogeneous products, and show that in 
equilibrium there is no intra-industry trade. As transport 
costs approach zero, the equilibrium approaches the Cournot 
outcome for integrated markets. Venables (1988) assumes that 
products are differentiated to avoid the the discontinuities 
which occur in capacity constrained price games with 
homogeneous products. He shows that the volume of trade lies 
between that which would occur with integrated markets, and
^Ben-Zvi and Helpman have a third stage where sales are 
allocated between markets.
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that which would occur with segmented markets. Ben-Zvi and
Helpman argue that the results of their model provide a firm
basis for the models of trade under oligopoly with
integrated markets developed in Helpman and Krugman (1985,
chapter 5) . Then, a sufficient condition for gains from
trade is that, on average, the output of the oligopolistic
7industries increases.
Shaked and Sutton (1984) consider the welfare effects of 
trade in a model of natural oligopoly. Competition between 
firms is modelled as a multistage game. At the first stage 
firms decide whether or not to enter, then in the second 
stage firms decide the quality of good to produce, and in 
the final stage decide the price given the quality choices 
of other firms. An important property of natural oligopoly 
models, provided unit variable costs do not rise steeply 
with quality, is that there is a limit to the number of 
firms in equilibrium, and firms that enter can earn positive 
profits even with free entry. Thus, the model provides an 
explanation for the existence of pure profits. The effect of 
opening two countries to trade is to lower prices to 
consumers. In the short run this is due to increased 
competition, and in the long run due to the exit of some 
firms, which enhances the economies of scale of the 
remaining firms. Thus, consumers are obviously better off as
7
Also, see Markusen (1981) for the gams from trade under 
Cournot oligopoly with integrated markets.
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a result of trade. Whether a country gains from trade will 
depend also on the effect on profits, and this is not 
considered by Shaked and Sutton (1984) since it is unknown 
which firms will exit the industry. If all the firms which 
exit were located in one country, then that country may not 
gain from trade due to the loss of profits.
The existence of intra-industry trade in identical products 
can be explained in a Cournot oligopoly model, but the 
assumption that markets are segmented is crucial. Without 
this assumption intra-industry trade can only be explained 
by product differentiation. Intra-industry trade has a 
pro-competitive effect which reduces prices, and increases 
consumer surplus. However, it may have a negative effect on 
welfare if the output of the oligopolistic industry 
contracts, and profits are reduced. With free entry there 
are unambiguous gains form trade.
1.3 Strategic Export Subsidies
The models of intra-industry trade discussed in the previous 
section have been used to analyse the effects of trade 
policy. Compared to conventional trade theory, imperfect 
competition introduces some new aspects into trade policy, 
the most important is the presence of profits. When a 
country's firms earn pure profits this adds to the country's 
real income. Brander and Spencer (1985) have suggested that
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a country may gain from profit shifting export subsidies. 
This possibility is the most significant result in the 
strategic trade policy literature, and has attracted a great 
deal of discussion. This section will consider the profit 
shifting argument for export subsidies, and the numerous 
criticisms of this new strategic rationale for trade policy.
The basic idea is best illustrated using the Cournot duopoly 
model of the previous section. Now let the domestic and 
foreign marginal cost differ. The domestic firm has constant 
marginal cost c , and the foreign firm has constant marginal 
cost c2- The foreign export subsidy is e per unit exported. 
It is assumed that the foreign government can commit itself
to an export subsidy before the firms make their output
decisions. Above, it was shown that equilibrium in the 
domestic market is independent of equilibrium in the foreign 
market, so the domestic market can be analysed separately. 
The profits of the domestic and foreign firm from sales in 
the domestic market are, respectively
7^  = (P - c^Y
(1.4)
71 = (P - c + e)X 
2 ' 2 7
Assuming that each firm's profit function is quasi-concave
in its own output, and that there is an interior
equilibrium, the first order conditions for a Cournot
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equilibrium are
dn
— - = P(X+Y) + YP7 (X+Y) - c = 0 
dY 1
dn
— - = P (X+Y) + XP' (X+Y) - c + e = 0
ax 2
(1.5)
And, the second order conditions for profit maximisation are
a27T
3Y‘
= 2P7 + YP7 < 0
d2n
dX‘
= 2P7 + XP77 < 0
The first equation in (1.5) defines the domestic reaction 
function Y = Y(X), and the second equation defines the 
foreign reaction function X = X(Y). Together they define the 
Cournot equilibrium, which is given by the intersection of 
the domestic and foreign reaction functions in figure 1.3. 
The comparative static results for the effects of a foreign 
export subsidy are obtained by totally differentiating
(1.5), which yields
2P/+YP,/ P7+YP7
P7+XP7 2P7+XP7
dY 0
dX -de
Hence, the effects of an export subsidy are 
ax - (2P7 +YP77)
> 0
ae
dY (P7 +YP77)
ae A
(1.6)
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Where A = P' (3P'+QP") > 0, which is positive for a unique 
Cournot equilibrium. The effect of the export subsidy is to 
increase foreign exports, but the effect on domestic
production is unclear. When domestic output and foreign 
exports are strategic substitutes for the domestic country, 
P'+YP" < 0, the domestic reaction function is downward
sloping, and a foreign export subsidy reduces domestic
o
production. In figure 1.3 the foreign reaction function is 
shifted outwards by a foreign export subsidy, and the
equilibrium shifts from A to B. This is considered to be the 
normal case, and is implied by the Hahn (1961-62) stability 
condition. However, when the domestic reaction function is 
upward sloping, domestic output and foreign exports are 
strategic complements, and an export subsidy will increase 
domestic production. The effect of an export subsidy on 
price is
ap ax ay -(P')2
—  = P' —  + P' —  =------  < 0  (1.7)
3e ae ae A
As expected, an export subsidy reduces the price in the 
domestic market.
Consider the effect of a foreign export subsidy on foreign 
welfare. Since equilibrium in the foreign market is
Q
Strategic substitutes and complements are explained in 
Bulow et al (1985) and Tirole (1988).
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independent of equilibrium in the domestic market, an export 
subsidy has no effect on the foreign market. Hence, foreign 
welfare is the profits of the foreign firm from exports net 
of the export subsidy
W2 = (p - C2)X (1.8)
The effect of an export subsidy on foreign welfare is 
aw ax ap
—  = (P - C  ) —  + X —  (1.9)
de de de
The first term is the profit shifting effect of the export
subsidy: An export subsidy increases foreign exports, which
is a welfare gain since price exceeds marginal cost. The
second term is the terms of trade effect: The export subsidy
reduces the price the foreign firm receives for its exports
which is a welfare loss. In conventional trade theory, price
would equal marginal cost so the profit shifting effect
would be zero, and the only effect of an export subsidy
9
would be the negative terms of trade effect. To evaluate 
the overall effect of the export subsidy on foreign welfare
substitute (1.7) into (1.9) which yields
9
In the two good model of conventional trade theory, an 
export subsidy will never increase welfare, but with many 
goods it is possible that an export subsidy will increase 
welfare. See Feenstra (1986) and Itoh and Kiyono (1987).
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aw ax ay
— - = (P + XP'- c ) —  + x p7 —
ae 2 ae ae
At e = 0, P + XP7- c2= 0 from (1.5). Hence, the overall 
effect of the export subsidy evaluated at e = 0 is
aw ay
— - = XP7 —  (1.10)
de de
This clearly shows that the welfare effect of the export 
subsidy comes from the strategic effect it has on the output 
of the domestic firm. With downward sloping reaction 
functions, an export subsidy will reduce domestic output, 
see (1.6), and increase foreign welfare. This is the case 
considered by Brander and Spencer (1985). An export subsidy 
will increase foreign welfare in a Cournot duopoly if 
domestic output and foreign exports are strategic 
substitutes. However, as Collie and de Meza (1986) have 
shown, if domestic output and foreign exports are strategic 
complements then an export subsidy will increase domestic
output and reduce foreign welfare. This can occur with quite
plausible demand functions."10
The optimal export subsidy is obtained by setting aw^ae = 0 
and solving for e, which yields
For example in a symmetric Cournot duopoly with constant 
elasticity demand functions, domestic output and foreign 
exports will be strategic complements if the elasticity of 
demand is less than unity.
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-XP' (P'+YP")
e = -----------
2P'+YP"
With strategic substitutes (complements) the optimal policy 
is an export subsidy (tax). With an optimal export subsidy 
the equilibrium is the same as would occur if the foreign 
firm acted as a Stackelberg leader, and the domestic firm 
acted as a Stackelberg follower, in the absence of an export 
subsidy. This is shown in figure 1.4. Foreign welfare is 
represented by the iso-profit curves of the zero export 
subsidy foreign reaction function, since these represent 
profits net of the export subsidy. Welfare is maximised at B 
where the iso-profit curve is tangential to the domestic 
reaction function, which is the familiar Stackelberg 
equilibrium. The optimal export subsidy commits the foreign 
firm to produce the Stackelberg leader output, and the 
optimal response of the domestic firm is to produce the 
Stackelberg follower output. The strategic effect of the 
export subsidy comes from the ability of the foreign 
government to commit itself to a policy before the firms 
make their output decisions, it has a first mover advantage.
When the foreign country cannot use export subsidies, 
Spencer and Brander (1983) show that R&D subsidies can have 
the same strategic effect. A subsidy to R&D commits the 
foreign firm to increase expenditure on R&D which reduces 
marginal cost, and this commits the foreign firm to produce
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a larger output.
When the domestic and foreign firm both export to a third 
market, and domestic and foreign exports are strategic 
substitutes, then both the domestic and foreign government 
have an incentive to subsidise exports. In a Nash 
equilibrium in trade policies both governments subsidise 
exports, and de Meza (1986) has shown that the country with 
the lowest cost will have the largest subsidy.11 Both 
countries are likely to be worse off than if they both had 
zero export subsidies, since the strategic effect of one 
country's export subsidy will be offset by the effect of the 
other country's subsidy. But, both subsidies will worsen the 
terms of trade of both countries. The two countries are 
caught in a Prisoner's Dilemma, they would be better off 
agreeing not to subsidise exports. With full cooperation 
they would both tax exports to shift the industry to the 
monopoly output. According to de Meza (1989) price controls 
would be superior to export subsidies. And, Cooper and 
Riezman (1989) show that the use of direct quantity controls 
would be preferred to subsidies in a world of certainty. The 
Nash equilibrium would involve each country setting its 
quantity control at the Cournot output of its firm. Then, 
welfare would be the same as when neither country
This only holds for duopoly, and not when there are many 
domestic and foreign firms. See de Meza (1986) and also 
Hwang and Mai (1988).
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intervenes. With sufficient uncertainty, Cooper and Riezman 
show that governments would use subsidies since they are a 
more flexible policy than quantity controls.
For the Cournot duopoly model an export subsidy will 
generally increase foreign welfare, but even in this case 
the optimal policy may be an export tax. However, this 
result is extremely sensitive to any changes in the model. 
When the number of foreign firms is greater than one, the 
foreign country has to consider the conventional terms of 
trade argument for an export tax, as well as the strategic 
argument for an export subsidy. With a single foreign firm 
there is no terms of trade argument for an export tax, the 
single firm realises fully the effect its decision will have 
on the terms of trade. But with many foreign firms, each 
firm does not take account of the effect its own output 
decision will have on the price received by other foreign 
firms. An export tax allows the foreign country to exploit 
its monopoly power. In oligopolistic industries, with many 
foreign firms, there is both a terms of trade effect and a 
strategic argument for intervention, hence the optimal 
policy is ambiguous. As the number of foreign firms 
increases then the terms of trade argument will dominate the 
strategic argument, and the optimal policy will be an export 
tax. The optimal export subsidy with many foreign and 
domestic firms has been derived by Dixit (1984).
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Obviously, the profit shifting argument for export subsides 
assumes there are pure profits. However, as Dixit (1985) 
argues, profits in high technology industries may be the 
result of success in a race to develop a new product. 
Although one firm may win and earn large profits, there may 
be many losers that have spent large amounts on R&D. If 
there was free entry, then firms would enter the race to 
develop the new product until expected profits were zero. 
When domestic and foreign firms compete in a high technology 
industry, an attempt to use profit shifting export subsidies 
by the foreign country would lead to the increased entry of 
foreign firms so that expected profits in the foreign
industry were zero. Then, an export subsidy does not 
increase foreign welfare. In general, an export subsidy may 
lead to the entry of new firms which will tend to dissipate
industry profits. Also, the profit shifting argument for
export subsidies assumes that the profits of the foreign 
firm accrue to foreign citizens. But, with the growing 
internationalisation of business, this appears to be 
questionable. The foreign industry could include the 
subsidiaries of domestic multinational firms, and foreign 
firms could be partly owned by domestic citizens. And, if 
foreign citizens held shares in domestic firms, then
shifting profits from domestic to foreign firms would be 
less likely to increase foreign welfare. As business becomes 
more international, profit shifting export subsidies are 
less likely to be effective.
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The profit shifting argument for an export subsidy assumes 
that resources for the expansion of the oligopolistic 
industry are made available by a reduction in the output of 
the competitively produced numeraire good. Since, price is 
equal to marginal cost in the competitive sector, a 
reduction in output has no welfare cost. However, if the 
economy consists of several oligopolistic industries, then 
an export subsidy which expands one oligopolistic industry 
may lead to the contraction of another oligopolistic 
industry, which will involve a welfare cost. Dixit and 
Grossman (1986) consider an economy with several identical 
oligopolistic industries, and all use a factor which is in 
fixed supply. Then, a profit shifting export subsidy given 
to one industry will contract the output of the other 
industries, and reduce profits so that the overall profit 
shifting effect is zero. Hence, the optimal policy is a zero 
export subsidy. Although this is an extreme example, it 
shows that the general equilibrium effects of export 
subsidies need to be considered.
For a Cournot duopoly an export subsidy is generally the 
optimal policy, but Eaton and Grossman (1986) have shown
that an export tax is generally the optimal policy in a
12 .Bertrand duopoly. Consider a differentiated product
12Helpman and Krugman (1989) claim that "Whereas export 
subsidies are sometimes desirable in a Cournot market they
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Bertrand duopoly. With segmented markets, the domestic 
market can be analysed independently of the foreign market. 
The price of the domestic product is P f and the price of 
the foreign product is P2- Demand for the domestic product 
is Y = Y(Pj, P2) , and demand for the foreign product is 
X = X(P , P ) . Where Y < 0 and Y >(<) 0 for substitutes
' l' 2 7 1 2
(complements), and X2< 0 and Xi>(<) 0 for substitutes 
(complements). Domestic and foreign profits from domestic 
sales are, respectively
7T = (P - C  ) Y (P , P )1 ' 1 l' ' l' 27
(1.12)
7T = (P - c + e) X(P , P )
2 ' 2  2 1 ' l' 2 7
Assuming that each firm's profit function is quasi-concave 
in its own price, and that there is an interior solution, 
the first order conditions for a Bertrand equilibrium are
dn
— - = (P - c ) Y + Y = 01 i iap1
(1.13)
dn
— - = (P - c + e) X + X = 0
2 2 2ap
2
And, the second order conditions for profit maximisation are
are never desirable in a Bertrand market". But, the 
conclusion of Eaton and Grossman (1986) is that an export 
tax is generally the optimal policy for Bertrand oligopoly.
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a2n
0P‘
(2Y - YY ) < 0' 1 li7
d2n
0P‘
(2X - XX ) < 0
' 2 22
The comparative static results for the effect of a foreign 
export subsidy are obtained by totally differentiating the 
first order conditions (1.13) to obtain
2Y2-YY Y Y -YY dP 0i n 1 2  21 1 _
X X -XX 2X2-XX dP d)
TJ
(MX1
1 2  12 2 22 2 2
(1.14)
The effect of a foreign export subsidy on the domestic and 
foreign price is
0P X (Y Y -YY ) 
1 2 ' 1 2 217
SP -X2(2Y2“YY )2 2' 1 ll7 < 0
Se A7 de A7
(1.15)
Where A7 = (2Y2-YY ) (2X2-XX ) -(Y Y -YY ) (X X -XX ) > 0,
' 1 l l 7 ' 2 2 2 ' 1 2 2 1 1 2 12 '
for a unique equilibrium. A foreign export subsidy will 
reduce the domestic price if the domestic and foreign price 
are strategic complements, Y ^ - Y Y ^  0. For strategic 
substitutes it will increase the domestic price. A foreign 
export subsidy reduces the foreign price.
Foreign welfare is producer surplus from exports, 
W2 = (P2«c2)X. Hence, the effect of an export subsidy on 
foreign welfare is
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aw ap ap
— - = ((P - c )x + x) — - + x — -
2 2 2 1 ae ae ae
At e = 0, (P -c )X + X = 0 from the first order condition 
' v 2 2 7 2
(1.13). Thus, the effect of an export subsidy evaluated at 
e = 0 is
aw ap
— ^ = X (1.16)
de de
When the domestic and foreign products are substitutes,
X^> 0, then domestic and foreign prices are generally
strategic complements, Y ^ - Y Y ^  0, so dPi/de < 0, and the
13welfare effect of the export subsidy is negative. And, when 
the domestic and foreign products are complements, then 
domestic and foreign prices are generally strategic 
substitutes, and the welfare effect of the export subsidy is 
again negative. However, it is possible that an export 
subsidy will have a positive welfare effect, for example if 
the domestic and foreign products are substitutes, and 
domestic and foreign prices are strategic substitutes. The 
optimal export subsidy is derived by setting awJ 3e = 0 and 
solving for e, yields
-X (Y Y -YY )
1 ' 1 2 21 9e = — i — --- —  (1.17)
X (2Y2-YY )2' 1 11'
13 . . .By the symmetry of the substitution matrix X = Y^ ,
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For a Bertrand duopoly, the optimal policy is generally an 
export tax. The optimal export tax, when the domestic and 
foreign products are substitutes and domestic and foreign 
prices are strategic complements, is shown in figure 1.5. 
This shows that the result of Brander and Spencer (1985) 
depends on the form of competition between firms.
It has been assumed that the foreign government has a first 
mover advantage, and can commit itself to an export subsidy 
before the firms make their output or price decision. A 
different game structure, based upon the institutional 
arrangements for export credit subsidies of the 
Export-Import Bank of the United States, is considered by 
Carmichael (1987) and Gruenspecht (1988) . In this model the 
domestic and foreign firm export to a third country. At the 
first stage the two firms set prices, and then in the second 
stage the two governments set their export subsidies. The 
two governments maximise producer surplus from exports, 
profits net of subsidies. Demand for the domestic and 
foreign product depends on the subsidised prices, the prices 
set by the firm less the government subsidies. The Nash 
equilibrium of the second stage is for the two governments 
to provide subsidies so that the subsidised price of exports 
maximises producer surplus. These subsidised prices will be 
the same as the equilibrium prices the two firms would set 
in the absence of subsidies. At the first stage, the firms
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realise how the governments will behave in the second stage. 
If a firm increases its price then its government will 
provide a subsidy so that the subsidised price still 
maximises producer surplus. The higher the price the firm 
charges, the larger will be the subsidy it receives from the 
government and hence the larger will be its profits. In 
theory, there is no limit to the price the firm could 
charge, but Carmichael assumes there is a limit to the size 
of export subsidies. While such models may provide a 
positive explanation for export subsidies, they are not an 
argument for the use of export subsidies since firms are 
basically exploiting the governments. Neary (1989) shows 
that welfare is always higher if governments have a first 
mover advantage, and then an export tax is generally the 
optimal policy.
Brander and Spencer (1985) have shown that a foreign export 
subsidy can increase foreign welfare by shifting profits 
from domestic to foreign firms. However, it has been shown 
that the profit shifting argument is not robust to changes 
in the assumptions of the model.
1.4 Strategic Import Policy
This section considers the effects of domestic trade 
policies, such as import tariffs and production subsidies. A 
tariff can improve the country's terms of trade, and shift
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profits from foreign to domestic firms. Since price exceeds 
marginal cost in the domestic industry, a production subsidy 
can be used to correct this distortion. The effect of a 
foreign export subsidy on domestic welfare, and the optimal 
domestic response to foreign subsidies are also considered.
Again, consider the Cournot duopoly model of the previous 
sections. Let the specific, per unit, domestic import tariff 
be t, and the production subsidy s. Hence, the profits of 
the domestic and foreign firm are, respectively
7T = (P - c + s)Yi \ 1 7
(1.18)
ti2 = (P - c2 - t + e)X
And, assuming an interior solution, the first order 
conditions for a Cournot equilibrium are
P + YP'-c + s = 01
(1.19)
P + XP7 - c - t + e = 0
2
To obtain the comparative static results for the effects of 
the tariff and production subsidy, totally differentiate the 
first order conditions, which yields
dn
dY
dn
ax
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2P7+YP" P7 +YP7 dY -ds
P7 +XP" 2P7 +XP7 dX dt
By matrix inversion
dY 1 2P7+XP" - (P7 +YP77) -ds
dX A -(P7+XP77) 2P7+YP77 dt
An import tariff reduces foreign exports, and increases 
(reduces) domestic production if domestic output and foreign 
exports are strategic substitutes (complements) for the
domestic country. The effects of a tariff are the opposite
of the effects of an export subsidy. A production subsidy 
increases domestic production, and reduces (increases) 
foreign exports if domestic output and foreign exports are 
strategic substitutes (complements) for the foreign country. 
The effects on price are
ap (P')2 SP ~(P')2
—  =   > 0  —  =   < 0 (1.21)
at A as a
A tariff increases the price and a production subsidy lowers 
the price.
Since utility is additively separable and linear in the 
competitive numeraire good, the aggregate indirect utility 
function is of the form V = V(P) + I, where I is national 
income. By Roy's identity av/ap = -Q. Demand for Q is
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independent of income so consumer surplus is a valid welfare 
measure. Domestic welfare is the sum of consumer surplus, 
producer surplus and government revenue
= V(P) + (P - cj)Y + tX (1.22)
Firstly, consider the optimal domestic tariff and production 
subsidy, these will be derived using the method employed by 
Dixit (1984, 1988). Totally differentiating domestic welfare 
yields
dWi = -X(dP-dt) + (P-c^dY + tdX
The first term is the terms of trade effect, the second term
is the domestic distortion effect, and the third term is the 
tariff revenue effect. From (1.19) dP-dt = -P'dX + XP"dQ, 
and dY = dQ-dX. Thus
dWt = (P - Ci+ X2P")dQ + (c^~ c2+ e + 2XP')dX (1.23)
To obtain the optimal policies Dixit (1984, 1988) notes that 
there are two policies, t and s, which jointly determine X 
and Q. Then, provided the Cournot equilibrium is unique, X
and Q can be regarded as independent variables with the
policies that support them implicitly given by the two first 
order conditions in (1.19). There are a number of possible 
solutions depending upon the relative costs of the domestic
47
and foreign firm. The market may be supplied entirely by 
domestic production, entirely by imports, or by domestic 
production and imports.
When c  ^c - e then the coefficient of dX is negative for 
all X  ^0, then it is optimal to set X = 0, and the market 
is supplied entirely by domestic production. With X = 0, the
coefficient of dQ shows that the optimal policy is to set
P = c . When the domestic firm has a lower marginal cost 
than the foreign firm, it is optimal to subsidise domestic 
production until price equals marginal cost. Then, even with 
a zero tariff, there will be no imports since price is below 
foreign marginal cost.
When c - c + e + 2XP' > 0 for all X  ^Q, then the1 2
coefficient of dX is positive for all X ^  Q and it is
optimal to set X = Q. In this case the foreign firm has such 
a cost advantage that domestic production is not worthwhile, 
and the market is entirely supplied by imports. Dixit (1988) 
incorrectly derives the optimal tariff in this case, what he 
does is to set the coefficient of dQ equal to zero ignoring
the term in dX, and then uses the foreign firm's first order
. . . . . 14condition from (1.19) to obtain the optimal tariff.
However, if the market is entirely supplied by imports then 
Q = X so dQ = dX, and the welfare expression (1.23) becomes
i4See Dixit (1988) pp 65-66, and also Collie (1990).
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dWx = (P - c2 + e + 2XP' + X2P")dQ (1.24)
Setting the coefficient of dQ equal to zero, and using the 
foreign firm's first order condition from (1.19) to solve 
for the optimal tariff yields
t = -X(P' + XP")
An alternative expression for the optimal tariff is
t = -XP'(1 + R) (1.25)
Where R = QP"/P' is the relative convexity of demand, which 
is positive (negative) for concave (convex) demand 
functions. This is equivalent to the optimal tariff derived 
by Brander and Spencer (1984a) for a country with no 
domestic production which imports from a foreign 
oligopolistic industry. The tariff improves the terms of 
trade of the domestic country by reducing the price-cost 
margin of the foreign firm. The use of a tariff to improve 
the terms of trade by a country which imports from a foreign 
monopolist was considered by Katrak (1977) and de Meza 
(1979). The optimal policy will be an import subsidy if
R  ^-1, this occurs if demand is sufficiently convex. For
example, with constant elasticity demand functions
-1/77 . . .P(Q) = Q , where tj i s  the elasticity of demand, then
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R =  -(1+1/7)), and the optimal policy is an import subsidy.
When ad valorem tariffs are used instead of specific
tariffs, the optimal ad valorem tariff with constant
elasticity demand functions is zero. An ad valorem tariff is
superior to a specific tariff, when the optimal specific
tariff is positive. Conversely, a specific tariff is
superior to an ad valorem tariff, when the optimal ad
valorem tariff is negative. This has been noted by Hillman
15and Templeman (1985) and Helpman and Krugman (1989).
The cost disadvantage required to make domestic production 
not worthwhile has been analysed by Dixit (1984, 1988) and
Venables (1986). For constant elasticity demand functions it 
can be shown that domestic production is not worthwhile if
C  7)2+ 7) + 1
 —  > -5-------  (1.26)
C  -  e  7) -  7) +  1
The maximum value of the right hand side of this expression 
is three, and occurs when the elasticity of demand is unity, 
7) = 1. In this case, domestic production is worthwhile 
provided domestic marginal cost is less than three times 
foreign marginal cost. As the number of foreign firms 
increases and the foreign industry becomes more competitive, 
the critical cost ratio tends to one.
15 . . .The first best solution cannot be achieved by tariffs, but
can be achieved by a price control as de Meza (1979) has 
noted.
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When 0 < c - c  + e <  -2XP', then there will be an interior 
1 2 '
solution and the market will be supplied by domestic 
production and imports. To obtain the optimal tariff and 
production subsidy, set the coefficients of dQ and dX equal 
to zero in (1.23), and using the first order conditions from
(1.19) yields
t = -X(P'+ XP")
(1.27)
P - c = -X2P" =» s = -YP' + X2P"l
The optimal tariff is usually positive, but an import
subsidy may be optimal if demand is sufficiently convex and 
the market share of imports is high. When demand is concave 
(convex) then price will be above (below) marginal cost of 
the domestic firm, and a production tax may be required if 
demand is extremely concave.
In the same way that Eaton and Grossman (1986) have shown 
that the optimal foreign export policy depends upon the 
nature of competition, Cheng (1988) has shown that the
optimal domestic policy also depends on whether there is
Bertrand or Cournot competition. In a differentiated product 
duopoly model with linear demand functions, using the same 
method as Dixit (1984, 1988), Cheng shows that the optimal 
tariff and production subsidy are larger for Cournot than
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for Bertrand competition. For a homogeneous product Bertrand 
duopoly, when the domestic firm has a cost advantage, the 
optimal policy is a production subsidy to bring price equal 
to marginal cost."16 When the foreign firm has a cost
advantage, the optimal policy is a production subsidy that 
reduces domestic marginal cost to just above foreign
marginal cost, then the foreign firm will set price equal to
marginal cost. There is no import tariff.
The optimal tariff for a Cournot oligopoly when the domestic 
country does not use a production subsidy has been derived 
by Brander and Spencer (1984b). Then, the method used by 
Dixit cannot be used, and the usual method is employed. For 
the Cournot duopoly model, maximising domestic welfare
(1.22) with respect to t yields the first order condition
aw , ap x ay ax
— - = x i  + (P - c ) —  + t —  = o
at  ^ at J 1 at at
Hence, the optimal tariff is
t = - X
, ap x ay
! - + ( p - Ci) _
at
ax
at
(1.28)
The first term is the terms of trade effect, and the second
An alternative policy is an import subsidy to reduce 
foreign marginal cost to just above domestic marginal cost, 
then the domestic firm sets price equal to marginal cost. 
This policy involves no revenue cost.
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term is the profit shifting effect. Using the comparative 
static results from (1.20) and (1.21) yields the optimal 
tariff
-XP7 (2 P7 +QP") -YP7 (P7 + YP77)
t = -------------------------- (1.29)
2P7 +YP77
This is generally positive, but may be negative if demand is 
sufficiently convex. In the absence of a production subsidy, 
a tariff improves the terms of trade and shifts profits from 
foreign to domestic firms.
Consider the effect of a foreign export subsidy on domestic 
welfare when the domestic country pursues a policy of 
laissez-faire. This has been analysed by Dixit (1984, 1987c) 
and Mai and Hwang (1987). In the Cournot duopoly model, the 
effect of a foreign export subsidy on domestic welfare
(1.22) is
aw ap aY
—  = -X —  + (P - C  ) —
de de de
The first term is the terms of trade effect: The foreign 
export subsidy reduces the price of imports which is a 
welfare gain for the domestic country. The second term is
the profit shifting effect: The export subsidy reduces
domestic production and reduces the profits of the domestic
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17firm which is a welfare loss. The overall effect can be 
evaluated using the comparative static results from (1.6) 
and (1.7), and noting that P-c = -YP', yields
SW P' r
— - = --- (X-Y)P' - Y2P" (1.30)
de A L J
A foreign export subsidy will reduce domestic welfare if 
domestic output is large relative to imports. For linear 
demand, domestic welfare will be reduced if the market share 
of domestic production is greater than a half. When domestic 
production has a large share of the market, the gain to 
consumers from lower prices is not sufficient to compensate 
for the lower profits of the domestic firm. As Dixit (1987c) 
has noted the domestic country can always gain by imposing a 
fully countervailing tariff. Then, domestic output, foreign 
exports and price will not be altered, but the domestic 
country will gain tariff revenue. But, a fully 
countervailing tariff is not the optimal response to a 
foreign export subsidy.
Dixit (1984, 1988) has analysed the optimal domestic
response to a foreign export subsidy. When the domestic 
country uses an import tariff and a production subsidy, and 
demand is linear, then from (1.27) and using (1.19) the
17 .Assuming domestic output and foreign exports are strategic 
substitutes. If they were strategic complements then 
domestic production would increase.
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optimal policies are
t = - (c - c + e) P = c (1.31)
2 ' 1 2 7 1 ' 7
The domestic industry is subsidised so that price equals 
marginal cost, and a tariff is used to extract rent from the 
foreign firm. The optimal response to a foreign export 
subsidy is a partially countervailing tariff, dt/de = 1/2, 
and to reduce the production subsidy. For constant 
elasticity demand functions, Dixit (1988) shows that the 
optimal countervailing tariff is less than a half. When only 
a tariff is used by the domestic country, the optimal 
countervailing tariff fraction is one third with linear 
demand.18
When marginal cost is decreasing, a tariff may act as a form 
of export promotion. Then, a tariff expands domestic 
production which lowers the marginal cost of the domestic 
firm, and it gains a strategic advantage exporting to the 
foreign market. This is considered by Krugman (1984a), but 
he does not consider the welfare effects of such a policy. 
Trade policy with learning-by-doing is analysed by Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz (1988).
Trade policy has been analysed by Venables (1985a) in a
18For a discussion about how a country should respond to 
other countries trade policies see Dixit (1987a).
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homogeneous product Cournot oligopoly with free entry of
19domestic and foreign firms, and segmented markets. There 
are assumed to be positive transport costs. The surprising 
result is that a domestic tariff lovers the price in the 
domestic market and raises the price in the foreign market. 
Hence, the domestic country clearly gains from a tariff, 
even ignoring the tariff revenue. The explanation is that 
the tariff induces firms to shift from the foreign country 
to domestic country, where they can produce for the domestic 
market at lower cost since they no longer incur the 
transport cost. Similarly, an export subsidy and a 
production subsidy will also reduce price and increase 
welfare in the domestic country. The assumption of segmented 
markets is crucial. Trade policy with integrated markets has 
been considered by Horstmann and Markusen (1986), with 
nationally differentiated products, then a domestic tariff 
raises the price in the domestic market and lowers the price 
in the foreign market. Markusen and Venables (1988) have 
compared the effects of trade policy when there is a fixed 
number of firms or free entry, and when there is segmented 
or integrated markets. A tariff is more effective when 
markets are segmented than when they are integrated, and is 
more effective when there is a fixed number of firms than 
when there is free entry.
19 . . .Venables (1987b) analyses trade policy under monopolistic
competition with free entry.
The effects of tariffs on cartels has been considered by 
Davidson (1984) and Fung (1987) in an infinitely repeated 
game with discounting. Then, implicit collusion can be 
supported by trigger strategies where if any firm cheats in 
any period then all firms will revert to the single-shot 
Nash equilibrium in subsequent periods. A large tariff may 
then weaken the cartel and make the industry more 
competitive. Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) consider the 
effect of a quota in a similar model. Then, a quota set at 
the free trade level may weaken the cartel and lower the 
price. Whereas, in a static model Krishna (1989) shows that 
a quota, at the free trade level, will facilitate collusion 
and increase price.
The use of protection and subsidies for entry promotion and 
deterrence has been analysed by Dixit and Kyle (1985) . In 
their model, based upon the Airbus example, an incumbent 
firm in the US faces the potential entry of a firm in the 
EC. They model trade policy as a multistage game. The US has 
the choice of free trade or protection, defined as a 
complete prohibition of imports. The US has an incentive to 
use protection to deter the entry of the EC firm, since if 
entry occurs the profits of the US firm will be reduced. 
And, the EC can use protection, or subsidies, to make entry 
profitable for the EC firm. They consider the strategic use 
of trade policy where one government has a first mover 
advantage. Then, the equilibrium of the trade policy game
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depends on the order of play and the ability of governments 
to pre-commit to particular policies. Dixit and Kyle provide 
a useful model with which to start analysing retaliation.
The effects of retaliation are modelled by Gasiorek et al 
(1989) using a numerical model of international trade under 
imperfect competition applied to the motor vehicle and 
computer industries. In their model the world was divided 
into four countries: the EC, North America, Japan and the 
Rest of the World. They calculated the multilateral Nash 
equilibrium in tariffs, and in export subsidies. To model 
countervailing tariffs, they calculated the Nash equilibrium 
of a bilateral game where the exporting country sets its 
export subsidy and the importing country sets its tariff, 
and compare the outcome with the equilibrium when the export 
subsidy is set at zero. They interpret the change in the 
optimal tariff as the countervailing tariff. If the 
exporting country could commit itself not to subsidise 
exports then, in the motor vehicle industry, the 
countervailing tariff deters it from using an export 
subsidy. But, in the computer industry, the countervailing 
tariff may not deter the use of an export subsidy. A 
limitation of this approach is that "it is based on 
examples,... and examples do not generate general 
propositions".20
20 .Gasiorek et al (1989) pp 480-481.
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1.5 Conclusions
The recent literature on strategic trade policy has provided 
a number of surprising results, but the results are often 
not robust to changes in the model. The profit shifting 
argument for export subsidies is particularly sensitive in 
this respect. The effect of retaliation, although often 
discussed, has not been formally modelled. Although, Dixit 
(1988) considers the optimal domestic response to foreign 
export subsidies, he does not consider the optimal policy 
for the foreign country when faced with such a response. 
Dixit and Kyle (1985) consider the interaction of domestic 
and foreign trade policies in a multistage game, and this 
provides a starting point for the analysis of retaliation in 
strategic trade policy.
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XT + y t
Figure 1.1: Gains From Multilateral Trade
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Figure 1.2: Gains From Unilateral Trade
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Figure 1.3 A Foreign Export Subsidy
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Figure 1.4: The Optimal Export Subsidy
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Chapter 2: Strategic Trade Policy and Retaliation
2.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the effect of retaliation on the 
profit shifting argument for an export subsidy. Trade policy 
is modelled as a multistage game, where the foreign country 
sets its export subsidy in the first stage, and the domestic 
country responds with an import tariff and/or production 
subsidy in the second stage. The products of the domestic 
and foreign industry are nationally differentiated, and 
demand is linear. Both Cournot oligopoly and Bertrand 
duopoly are considered. It is shown that when the foreign 
country faces retaliation with countervailing tariffs there 
is no profit shifting argument for an export subsidy.
Brander and Spencer (1985) have shown that a foreign export 
subsidy may increase foreign welfare in oligopolistic 
industries, by shifting profits from domestic to foreign 
firms. It has been argued, by Grossman (1986) and Bhagwati 
(1988), that the use by a government of strategic export 
subsidies to shift profits, at the expense of trading 
partners, is likely to lead to retaliation. And, that 
retaliation would leave the country that first used export 
subsidies worse off. Whereas, Brander (1986) has argued that 
it is naive to believe that retaliation would completely 
undercut the case for strategic trade policy. Until now,
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with the exceptions of Dixit and Kyle (1985) and Dixit 
(1988), there has been no attempt to formally model 
retaliation. Although, Gasiorek et al (1989) have analysed 
the effect of retaliation in a numerical model.
In practice, the likely response of the domestic country to 
a foreign export subsidy, which attempts to shift profits 
from domestic to foreign firms, would be to apply 
countervailing tariffs against the subsidised imports. Such 
a response is allowed under article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT. Dixit (1988) has 
analysed how the domestic country should respond to a 
foreign export subsidy in oligopolistic industries. A 
foreign export subsidy alters the optimal trade policy of 
the domestic country, and Dixit interprets the change in the 
level of the optimal tariff as a countervailing duty. Dixit 
(1988) concludes that the optimal domestic response to a 
foreign export subsidy is a partially countervailing tariff.
In the classic analysis of tariff retaliation by Johnson 
(1953-54) each country imposes its optimum tariff on the 
assumption that the other country's tariff is unchanged.1 
After a reaction process, with successive adjustments of 
tariffs by countries, a Nash equilibrium in tariffs is
For a survey see McMillan (1986). A similar approach is 
taken by Gros (1987a,b) to analyse tariffs in the Krugman 
(1979) model of intra-industry trade under monopolistic 
competition.
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reached, and a country may be better or worse off at this
Nash equilibrium than at free trade. The dynamic process
envisaged by Johnson is not really credible. There is no
reason why the countries should not move immediately to the
Nash equilibrium. The tariff equilibrium presented by
Johnson could be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium in a game
where each country independently and simultaneously sets its
tariff. Such a model does not permit the analysis of
retaliation since neither country can really respond to the
tariff of the other country. However, Johnson also suggested
a Stackelberg type of analysis, where one country sets its
2tariff first and then the second country responds. 
Similarly, in Dixit and Kyle (1985) one country can commit 
itself to a policy before the other country sets its policy. 
Dixit and Kyle modelled trade policy as a multistage game, 
using the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium. Their 
model, based on the Airbus example, considered the use of 
protection and subsidies to deter and promote entry.
Spencer (1988a) considers countervailing tariffs in a model 
where the foreign government gives subsidies to capital, 
which reduce the marginal cost of foreign firms, giving them 
a strategic advantage that allows them to capture a larger 
share of industry profits. In her model the domestic 
government does not set its trade policy optimally, instead
2
This alternative model is discussed by Johnson (1953-54) in 
footnote 5 on page 146.
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the countervailing tariff is assumed to be set at the
maximum level permitted under the GATT , the so called equal
payment tariff. The revenue raised by this tariff must not
exceed the foreign subsidy payments. In proposition seven,
Spencer shows that, for a Cournot duopoly, a small subsidy
to additional capital countervailed by an equal payment
tariff, increases foreign welfare. This is not surprising if
it is noted that there will be no countervailing tariff in
this case, and the result is really just the same as Spencer
3and Brander (1983). When the foreign country uses export 
subsidies, a fully countervailing tariff is the maximum 
permitted under the GATT. It will be shown here that only 
partially countervailing tariffs are optimal, hence the 
maximum permitted by the GATT is not relevant.
Following Dixit and Kyle (1985), and the suggestion of 
Johnson (1953-54), trade policy will be modelled as a 
multistage game in this chapter. At the first stage, the 
foreign country sets its export subsidy, and at the second 
stage the domestic country sets its import tariff and/or 
production subsidy, as in Dixit (1988). The foreign country 
is assumed to be able to commit itself to an export subsidy 
before the domestic country sets its import tariff and 
production subsidy. Such a commitment could be achieved by a
3 . . .When the subsidy is close to zero, the countervailing
tariff and the effect of a foreign subsidy on the 
countervailing tariff are also close to zero. See Spencer 
(1988a) page 60.
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constitutional clause, for example, the United States
. . 4Constitution prohibits export taxes. This game structure
seems to be a reasonable description of the institutional 
arrangements under the GATT. There is a prohibition of 
export subsidies, but if a country does use an export
subsidy then the importing country can respond with 
countervailing duties under Article VI of the GATT. The
prohibition by the GATT of export subsidies could be seen as 
an attempt to commit countries to a policy of not
subsidising exports. The solution concept employed is that 
of subgame perfect equilibrium. Therefore, any threats of 
retaliation by the domestic country have to be credible, and 
when setting its export subsidy the foreign country realises 
the effect its decision will have on the optimal trade
policy of the domestic country.
The effect of a foreign export subsidy on foreign and
domestic welfare when the domestic country pursues a policy 
of laissez-faire is considered. Then, the trade policy games 
when the domestic country can use an import tariff and/or a 
production subsidy in response to the foreign export subsidy 
are analysed. The effect of a foreign export subsidy on
domestic welfare when the domestic country pursues an 
optimal trade policy is considered, and the optimal domestic
4This is noted by Carmichael (1987). Article I, section 8 , 
of the Constitution states: "No tax or duty shall be laid on 
articles exported from any state".
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response to a foreign export subsidy is derived. This is 
used to analyse the effect of a foreign export subsidy on 
foreign welfare when the foreign country anticipates the 
response of the domestic country. Then, the optimal foreign 
export subsidy is derived.
2.2 Cournot Oligopoly
The model used here is basically the same as in section 
three of Dixit (1988). A number of foreign and domestic 
firms compete in a differentiated product Cournot oligopoly. 
The product is nationally differentiated, so the product of 
the domestic industry is not a perfect substitute for the 
product of the foreign industry, but all firms in one 
country produce the same product. In the domestic country 
there are n identical firms each with constant marginal cost 
ci, and in the foreign country there are m identical firms 
each with constant marginal cost c2. The domestic and 
foreign markets are assumed to be segmented. Therefore, 
since marginal cost is constant, the domestic and foreign 
market can be analysed separately. Consider the domestic 
market, where the domestic industry competes with imports 
from the foreign industry. Each domestic firm produces 
output y for domestic consumption, and each foreign firm 
exports output x to the domestic market. Hence, domestic 
production is Y = ny, and foreign exports, or alternatively 
domestic imports, are X = mx. The price of the domestic
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product Y is P , and the price of the foreign product X is 
P2. The domestic import tariff is t per unit imported, and 
the production subsidy is s per unit of domestic production. 
The foreign export subsidy is e per unit exported.
Domestic consumers are assumed to have preferences, for X, Y 
and a competitive numeraire good, that can be represented by 
a utility function which is additively separable and linear
in the numeraire good. Therefore, the aggregate indirect
. . . . 5utility function is of the form
V = V(Pa, P2) + I (2.1)
Where I is national income. So by Roy's identity SV/dP = -Y
and 3V/aP2 = -X. Furthermore, it will be assumed that demand 
is linear and symmetric, the inverse demand functions are
Pi = a - |3Y - yX
/3 * y (2.2)
P2 = a - rY - /3X
If /3 > r then the foreign and domestic products are
imperfect substitutes, the degree of product differentiation 
is given by /3 - r. When /3 = r the domestic and foreign 
products are perfect substitutes and the model reduces to
5 . . . . . .For further details of the quasi-linear utility function,
and the indirect utility function, see Varian (1984).
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the case of homogeneous products.
The profits of domestic and foreign firms from sales in the 
domestic market are
7T — (P - c + s)y1 ' 1 1 72
(2.3)
7T — (P - c - t + e) x
2 ' 2 2 7
Domestic welfare is given by the sum of consumer surplus, 
domestic industry profits and government revenue. Demand for 
X and Y is independent of income therefore consumer surplus 
is a valid measure of welfare. Distributional considerations 
will be ignored. Thus, domestic welfare is
W = V(P , P ) + (P - c + s) Y + tX - sY 
1 1 2 ' 1 1 7
= V(P , P ) + (P - c )Y + tX (2.4)1 2 1 1 ' 7
Where (Pj“ cj)Y is domestic producer surplus and tX is 
tariff revenue. The production subsidy represents a transfer 
from the domestic government to domestic firms, so the net 
income effect of the production subsidy on domestic welfare 
is zero.
Since the foreign and domestic market are segmented and 
marginal cost is constant, the relevant measure of foreign
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welfare is producer surplus from exports, that is foreign 
profits from exports net of export subsidies
W = (P - c - t)X
2 ' 2 2  ' (2.5)
At a Cournot equilibrium firms set their outputs to maximise 
profits taking the domestic and foreign trade taxes and 
subsidies as given. With linear demand each firm's profit 
function is continuous and concave in its own output so a 
Cournot equilibrium exists by the usual existence proofs for 
concave games. And the equilibrium is unique and symmetric. 
At an interior solution the market is supplied by both 
domestic production (Y > 0) and foreign imports (X > 0) . 
Profit shifting arguments for trade policy are only relevant 
if there is an interior solution. Assuming there is an 
interior solution, the first order conditions for a Cournot 
equilibrium are6
i
+ y
i c + s = 0 iay ay
(2 .6)
2
t + e = 0
6It can be shown that there will be an interior solution if
cr  3 < _ si )a + w (V  * " e) (Y > °)
C2+ t - e < (1 - )« + 2§ (C1~ S> (X > °)
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The second order conditions for profit maximisation are
d2n
dy‘
= -2/3 < 0
d27T
dx‘
= -2/3 < 0
The equilibrium of the model is given implicitly by the two 
first order conditions for profit maximisation, as a 
function of domestic and foreign trade policies. To obtain 
the comparative static results for e, t and s totally 
differentiate (2 .6 ), which yields
(n+l)0 my dy ds
ny (m+l)/3 dx de - dt
Inverting this matrix yields
dy 1 (m+1)0 -my ds
dx A -ny (n+l)/3 de - dt
(2.7)
Where A = (n+m+l)/32+ nm(/32- y2) > 0. 
And the effect on prices is
dP
i -1
dP 2 A
n02+ nm(/32-y2)
n0y
m/3y
in/32+ nm(|32-jr2)
ds 
de - dt
(2.8)
The comparative static results all have the expected signs, 
for instance a tariff reduces imports and increases domestic 
production, and prices of both the foreign and the domestic
product increase. The terms of trade, P - t, is the cost of
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imports to the domestic country and also the price the 
foreign country receives for its exports. The effect of a 
tariff on the terms of trade is
ap -(m+l)02
— - - 1 =   < 0
at A
A tariff improves the domestic country's terms of trade and 
worsens the foreign country's terms of trade.
2. 21 Foreign Export Subsidy
This section considers the effect of a foreign export 
subsidy on foreign and domestic welfare in the absence of a 
domestic tariff or production subsidy. Brander and Spencer 
(1985) have shown that a foreign export subsidy may increase 
foreign welfare by committing foreign firms to expand 
output. This leads domestic firms to reduce their output and 
allows foreign firms to capture a larger share of industry 
profits. The effect of a foreign export subsidy on foreign 
welfare (2.5) is
aw ax ap
—  = (P - c ) —  + X —  (2.9)
ae de de
The first term is the profit shifting effect, and the second 
term is the terms of trade effect. An export subsidy 
increases foreign exports, and since price exceeds marginal
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cost, this increases welfare. Profits are shifted from 
domestic to foreign firms. Also, the export subsidy reduces 
the price of the foreign product so the foreign country 
receives a lower price for its exports. This is the terms of 
trade effect which has a negative effect on welfare. The 
overall effect can be obtained by using the foreign firms' 
first order condition from (2 .6 ) together with the
comparative static results from (2.7) and (2.8) to evaluate 
at e = 0 , yields
aw x r
— - = - I (n-m+1)02 - nm(02-72) (2 .1 0)
ae A L J
An export subsidy will increase foreign welfare if the
number of foreign firms is not too large relative to the
number of domestic firms as in Dixit (1984), and the degree
of product differentiation is not too great. For a duopoly, 
with one foreign and one domestic firm, an export subsidy 
will always increase welfare. The optimal export subsidy is 
derived by setting aw^Se = 0 and solving to obtain
x[ (n-m+l)/32 - nm(/32-y2) ] 
e = — 1 1 (2 .11)
(n+l)/3
The effect of the foreign export subsidy on domestic welfare
(2.4) is given by
The first term is the terms of trade effect and the second
term is the profit shifting, or domestic distortion,
7 .effect. The export subsidy reduces the price of the foreign
product which improves the terms of trade of the domestic
country. The export subsidy reduces domestic production, and
since price exceeds marginal cost, this reduces domestic
industry profits. A foreign export subsidy increases
consumer surplus by lowering prices but it reduces the
profits of domestic firms. The overall welfare effect is
ambiguous. The comparative static results (2.7) and (2.8)
together with (2 .6) can be used to evaluate the overall
welfare effect
3W m r 1
—  = - X(0 2+ n((3 -y2)) - y|3Y (2.13)
8e A L -I
Domestic welfare may be reduced by a foreign export subsidy, 
particularly if domestic industry output is large relative 
to imports and the degree of product differentiation is 
small. Comparing (2.10) and (2.13), a foreign export subsidy 
which increases foreign welfare is likely to reduce domestic 
welfare. An export subsidy is basically a 
beggar-my-neighbour policy.
7
Brander and Spencer (1984b) note that this term can be
decomposed into two effects: the effect on industry profits,
and the effect on consumer surplus. Domestic industry profit
is II = (P -c ) Y, therefore (P -c )dY = dTT - YdP . 
i ' i i' ' ' i i7 i i
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Mai and Hwang (1987) claim to show conditions under which a 
foreign export subsidy will not only increase foreign 
welfare but also the welfare of the domestic country, and 
hence the world as a whole. They then go on to suggest a 
relaxation of the GATT prohibition of export subsidies. 
However, their argument is flawed since they only show the 
conditions under which a foreign export subsidy will 
increase domestic welfare. They have implicitly assumed that 
an export subsidy will necessarily increase foreign welfare 
but this is not correct. Mai and Hwang consider the case of 
a symmetric homogeneous product Cournot oligopoly, where 
x = y, in which case the effect on domestic and foreign 
welfare is
aw -x
— - = - (n - m)/32 
ae A
aw x
— - = - (n - m + i)/32 
ae A
(2.14)
Proposition two of Mai and Hwang (1987) states that if the 
number of foreign firms exceeds the number of domestic 
firms, then a foreign export subsidy will increase domestic 
welfare. This is correct, but in this case the export 
subsidy will not increase foreign welfare so the foreign 
country has no incentive to use an export subsidy. And, an 
export subsidy which increases foreign welfare will not
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increase domestic welfare. In this case an export subsidy is 
always a beggar-my-neighbour policy. Therefore, the 
conclusion of Mai and Hwang that there should be a 
relaxation of the GATT prohibition of export subsidies would 
seem to be unsound.
2.22 Foreign Export Subsidy, Domestic Import Tariff and 
Production Subsidy
This section considers the situation when the domestic 
country can respond to the foreign export subsidy with an 
import tariff and a production subsidy. Trade policy is 
modelled as a multistage game. At the first stage of the 
game the foreign government sets its export subsidy to 
maximise its national welfare. In the second stage the 
domestic government sets its tariff and production subsidy 
in response to the foreign export subsidy. In the final 
stage domestic and foreign firms set their outputs given the 
various trade taxes and subsidies set by the two governments 
in previous stages of the game. The equilibrium concept 
employed is subgame perfection which rules out any 
non-credible threats. This means that the foreign government 
will realise the effect its export subsidy will have on the 
optimal domestic tariff and production subsidy. As usual the 
game is solved by backward induction.
In the second stage of the game the domestic government sets
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its tariff and production subsidy to maximise domestic 
welfare. The optimal import tariff and production subsidy 
under oligopoly have been derived by Dixit (1984, 1988) and 
for duopoly by Cheng (1988). Maximising domestic welfare
(2.4) with respect to t and s, assuming there is an interior
p
solution, yields the first order conditions
aw
ds
ap ay ax
= -x — - + ( P  - c )  —  + t —  = o
as 1 1 as as
(2.15)
ap
at
aw ,  ay ax
— i = -x - 1 + (P - c ) —  + t —  = o
at ' t-. / ^at at
The first term is the terms of trade effect, the second term 
is the domestic distortion, or profit shifting, effect and 
the third term is the tariff revenue effect. Using the 
comparative static results from (2.7) and (2.8) yields
n(m+l)|3 -mny P - c i i -nmx/3y
mny -m(n+l)£ t -(n+l)mx/32
Solving for the optimal policies, and using (2.6) yields
Q
It can be shown that there will be an interior solution if:
( 1 \ rc - e < 1 - — a + — c (X > 0)
2 1 P ] P '
( my x my
c < 1 - ------ a +   (c - e) (Y > 0)
1 I (m+2)/3 J (m+2)|3 2
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P - c = 0 => s = y/3 > 01 1  1
t = x/3 =  ^ (P2- c2 + e ) > 0
(2.16)
These correspond to the optimal policies derived by Dixit 
(1984, 1988) and Cheng (1988), although they provide
explicit solutions for t and s. The production subsidy is 
used to eliminate the domestic distortion so that price is 
equal to marginal cost for the domestic industry. And, the 
import tariff is used to extract rent from the foreign firms 
by improving the terms of trade as in Brander and Spencer 
(1984a). The optimal tariff extracts exactly half the 
producer surplus from the foreign industry.
In the previous section it was shown that when the domestic 
country has no tariff or production subsidy a foreign export 
subsidy may reduce domestic welfare. Now consider the effect 
of a foreign export subsidy on domestic welfare when the 
domestic country sets its tariff and production subsidy 
optimally. The effect of a foreign export subsidy on 
domestic welfare (2.4) is
dw aw aw dt aw ds
— - = — - + — - —  + — - —  (2.17)
de ae at de as de
Since the domestic country is setting the tariff and 
production subsidy optimally, awi/at = 3Wi/as = 0, so the 
indirect effect of the export subsidy on domestic welfare
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through its effect on the tariff and production subsidy is 
zero. This is an example of the envelope theorem. The effect 
of the foreign export subsidy on domestic welfare is equal
to the direct effect evaluated at the optimum. Thus
dw aw ap ay ax
— - = — - = -X — - + ( P  - c )  —  + t —  (2.18)
de ae ae 1 1 de de
When the domestic country sets its production subsidy 
optimally so that price equals marginal cost, the profit 
shifting effect of the export subsidy is zero. The export 
subsidy improves the terms of trade and increases tariff 
revenue, so the overall effect on welfare is positive. Using
the comparative static results from (2.7) and (2.8) together
with the optimal import tariff and production subsidy from
(2.16) to evaluate at the optimum yields
dW
— - = X > 0 (2.19)
de
When the domestic country sets its import tariff and 
production subsidy optimally, a foreign export subsidy will 
always increase domestic welfare. Obviously, the domestic 
country would gain if it applied fully countervailing 
tariffs, dt/de = 1, since then the only effect would be to 
increase tariff revenue. And, it can do better by pursuing 
the optimal trade policy. This is analogous to the argument 
that a country which pursues an optimal trade policy will
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not suffer immiserizing growth. Like growth a foreign export
subsidy enlarges the domestic country's opportunity set and
so if it pursues an optimal trade policy it will always 
9gain.
The effect of a foreign export subsidy on the optimal 
domestic tariff and production subsidy can be obtained by 
totally differentiating (2.16) which yields
dx dX dX
dt = /3 —  dt + /3 —  ds + /3 —  de
at ds ae
ay ay ay
ds = /3 —  dt + /3 —  ds + /3 —  de
at as de
(2.20)
Then using the comparative static results from (2.7) yields
A + (n+l)/32 ny/3 dt/de (n+l)<32
-my/3 A - (m+l)/32 ds/de -my/3
(2 .21)
Hence, the optimal domestic countervailing tariff and 
production subsidy responses to a foreign export subsidy are
dt n/3
de 2n/32 + nm(/32- y2)
> 0
(2 .22)
ds -my£
de 2n/32 + nm(/32- y2)
< 0
See Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983).
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The optimal domestic response to a foreign export subsidy is 
to increase the tariff and decrease the production subsidy, 
as Dixit (1988) has shown. The optimal countervailing tariff 
fraction, dt/de, is positive but less than a half when 
domestic and foreign output are imperfect substitutes. For 
identical products it is a half, which is the well known 
result of Dixit (1984). An export subsidy increases the 
foreign rent available for the domestic country to extract 
with its tariff, see (2.16). And, the export subsidy reduces 
the price of the domestic product so that a smaller 
production subsidy is required, to bring price equal to 
marginal cost, and so correct the domestic distortion. 
Hence, the optimal domestic response to a foreign export 
subsidy is to increase the tariff and reduce the production 
subsidy.
It is now possible to analyse the first stage of the game 
when the foreign government sets its export subsidy, 
realising the effect this will have on the optimal tariff 
and production subsidy set by the domestic government. The 
effect of an export subsidy on foreign welfare (2.5) is
dW
de
= (P2- c - t)
ax ax dt ax ds 1
de at de as de
f ap r ap2 i dt ap ds+ X 2 + —  - 1 —  +
d
—
aeI L at > de ds de J
(2.23)
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The first term is the profit shifting effect and the second 
term is the terms of trade effect. The countervailing tariff 
reduces the profit shifting effect of the export subsidy and 
worsens the terms of trade. Whereas, the reduction in the 
domestic production subsidy increases the profit shifting 
effect and improves the terms of trade. Using the 
comparative static results from (2.7) and (2.8) together
with (2.6), and the optimal countervailing responses from
(2.22) to evaluate at e = 0, yields
dW -nm2x(/32- y2)
— - = ---------------  s 0 (2.24)
de 2n£2+ nm(/32- y2)
If the domestic and foreign products are imperfect
substitutes then the overall effect of a foreign export 
subsidy on foreign welfare is negative. For identical
products the effect is exactly zero. When the foreign 
country faces retaliation with countervailing tariffs and 
production subsidies there is no profit shifting argument 
for an export subsidy. The optimal foreign export subsidy 
can be obtained by setting dW2/de = 0, which yields
X(/32- y2)
e  ------------  ^0 (2.25)
/3
The optimal foreign policy is to tax exports, and the tax is 
larger the greater the degree of product differentiation
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between the foreign and domestic products. For homogeneous 
products the optimal export tax is zero.
2. 23 Foreign Export Subsidy and Domestic Import Tariff
In the previous section the domestic country used an import 
tariff and production subsidy to countervail the foreign 
export subsidy, but in practice governments only use import 
tariffs. Now consider the situation when the domestic 
government can only use a tariff. When it could use a tariff 
and a production subsidy it had two instruments to deal with 
two distortions, the import tariff was used to improve the 
terms of trade and the production subsidy to correct the 
domestic distortion. There is now only one instrument to 
deal with both distortions. Without a production subsidy to 
counter the domestic distortion, price will exceed marginal
cost in the domestic industry so the tariff is now used to
shift profits from foreign to domestic firms, as well as 
improving the terms of trade. At the second stage of the 
game the domestic government sets its import tariff to 
maximise national welfare in response to the foreign export 
subsidy. Brander and Spencer (1984b) and Dixit (1988) have
derived the optimal tariff under oligopoly. Maximising
domestic welfare (2.4) with respect to t, assuming there is 
an interior solution, yields the first order condition*0
*°It can be shown that there will be an interior solution if:
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aw , ap  ^ ay ax
—  = -X —  - 1 + (P - c ) —  + t -----0
at  ^at > at at
(2.26)
Rearranging yields the optimal tariff
ax
at
(2.27)
The first term in brackets is the terms of trade effect and 
the second term is the profit shifting effect. This clearly 
shows the dual role of the tariff. The tariff improves the 
terms of trade and expands domestic industry output which 
shifts profits from foreign to domestic firms. Using the 
comparative static results from (2.7) and (2.8) together 
with (2 .6) yields the optimal tariff
In the previous section the domestic country would always 
gain from a foreign export subsidy if it set its production 
subsidy and tariff optimally. The effect of a foreign export 
subsidy on domestic welfare (2.4) when only the tariff is
n
t = x/3 + YTf > 0 (2.28)
n + 1
(n+l)20 (n+l)z(3
c (X > 0)
(c - e) ' 2 7 (Y > 0)(m+2)/3 J (m+2)/3
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set optimally is
dw aw aw dt
— 1 = — - + — - —
de ae at de
Since the tariff is set optimally, aw^at = 0, the overall 
effect is
dw aw ap ay ax
— - = — - = -X — - + (P - c )  —  + t —  (2.29)
de 3e ae 1 1 ae de
The export subsidy improves the domestic terms of trade and 
increases tariff revenue, but reduces domestic industry 
profits. Using the comparative static results from (2.7) and 
(2 .8 ) together with (2 .6), and the optimal tariff from
(2.28) to evaluate at the optimum yields
dW
— - = X > 0 (2.30)
de
When the domestic country sets its import tariff optimally a 
foreign export subsidy will always increase domestic 
welfare.
The effect of a foreign export subsidy on the optimal 
domestic tariff can be obtained by totally differentiating
(2.28) to obtain
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dx n dy dx n dy
0 —  + y ------
at n+i at
0 —  +  i ------------------
ae n+1 ae
Using the comparative static results from (2.7) yields
The denominator is positive so the optimal countervailing 
tariff fraction is clearly less than one, and for a duopoly 
it is exactly one third as Dixit (1988) has shown. But it is 
actually always less than a half as can clearly be seen if 
it is rewritten as
dt (n+1) 20 2-nmy2 1
—  = ----------------------------------------- < - (2.32)
de 2 ((n+1)202-nmy2) +m((2n+l)02+ n2(02-y2)) 2
Also, it may be negative if the number of foreign firms is 
large and the degree of product differentiation is small, if 
m > (n+1) 202/ny2. For example, if the domestic and foreign 
products are perfect substitutes, 0 = y, and there is a 
single domestic firm, n = 1 , then dt/de is negative if there 
are more than four foreign firms, m > 4. The foreign export 
subsidy increases the foreign rent that the domestic country 
can extract with its tariff, and this will tend to increase 
the optimal tariff. But the export subsidy reduces domestic 
price so that price is closer to marginal cost, and this 
reduces the gains from using a tariff to shift profits to 
domestic firms, which will tend to reduce the optimal
dt (n+l)20 2 - nmy2
de (n+1 )A + (n+1)20 2 - nmy2
< 1 (2.31)
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tariff. Hence, the overall effect of a foreign export 
subsidy on the optimal tariff is ambiguous.
At the first stage of the game the foreign country sets its 
export subsidy to maximise its national welfare, realising 
the effect its decision will have on the optimal domestic 
tariff. The effect of a foreign export subsidy on foreign 
welfare (2.5) is
dW
de
- (p - c - t)
' 2  2 7
f ax ax dt 1
de at de
+ X
f ap , av x 
— + —  - 1 de *
p,
at
dt 
de
(2.33)
The first term is the profit shifting effect, and the second 
term is the terms of trade effect. If the countervailing 
tariff fraction is positive then it will reduce the profit 
shifting effect of the export subsidy, and worsen the terms 
of trade. But it is possible that the countervailing tariff 
fraction is negative, in which case it will increase the 
profit shifting effect of the export subsidy and improve the 
terms of trade. Using the comparative static results from 
(2.7) and (2.8) together with (2.6), and the optimal tariff 
fraction from (2.31) to evaluate the welfare effect at 
e = 0 , yields
dW -x(m/32+ (n+2)mn(j32-,ar2) 1 
— - =  1--------------------1—  < 0
de (n+1) A + (n+1) 2/32 - nmy2
(2.34)
90
The overall effect of a foreign export subsidy on foreign 
welfare is negative, even if the optimal countervailing 
tariff fraction is negative. This is because if the foreign 
export subsidy will increase foreign welfare in the absence 
of a countervailing tariff, then the optimal countervailing 
tariff fraction will be positive, and the overall effect of 
the export subsidy on welfare is negative. The 
countervailing tariff fraction will only be negative when an 
export subsidy reduces foreign welfare in the absence of a 
countervailing tariff. The optimal export subsidy is 
obtained by setting dW^de = 0 , which yields
-x(m/32+(n+2)mn(/32-y2))
e = ---------------------- < 0 (2.35)
(n+l)20
The optimal foreign policy is an export tax. When the 
foreign country faces retaliation with a countervailing 
tariff there is no profit shifting argument for an export 
subsidy, even when the optimal domestic response to an 
export subsidy is to reduce its tariff.
2. 24 Foreign Export Subsidy and Domestic Production Subsidy
In this section the domestic country is assumed to use only 
a production subsidy to countervail the foreign export 
subsidy. Dixit (1988) has derived the optimal production 
subsidy under oligopoly. Maximising domestic welfare (2.4)
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with respect to s, assuming there is an interior solution, 
yields the first order condition^
aw ap ay
— - = -X — - + ( P - c )  —  = 0 (2.36)
as as 1 1 as
Using the comparative static results (2.7) and (2.8) yields
-mxy
P - C  =   < 0 (2.37)1 1 m + 1
The optimal policy is to subsidise domestic production so 
that price is below marginal cost. This is because the 
production subsidy improves the terms of trade, and so it is 
worth subsidising domestic production beyond the output 
where price equals marginal cost. Solving for the optimal 
production subsidy using (2 .6) yields
m
s = y/3 +   X7 > 0 (2.38)
m + 1
The effect of a foreign export subsidy on domestic welfare
(2.4), when the domestic country sets its production subsidy
11It can be shown that there will be an interior solution if:
7 \ 7
c - e <
2
C  <  1
2m 7
1 -
(m+1) £
1“
(m+ir/3
(c - e) ' 2 7
(X > 0)
(Y > 0)
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optimally is
dW aw aw ds
— I = — _ + — 1 —
de ae as de
At an optimum awi/as = 0 so the overall effect is 
dw aw ap ay
—  = —  = -X —  + (P - C ) —  (2.39)
de ae ae ae
The export subsidy improves the terms of trade and reduces
domestic industry output, which increases welfare since
price is below marginal cost, so overall it must increase
domestic welfare. Using the comparative static results (2.7) 
and (2.8) together with (2.37) to evaluate at the optimum 
yields
dW m
— - = ----  X > 0 (2.40)
de m + 1
A foreign export subsidy always increases domestic welfare
if the domestic country sets its production subsidy
optimally.
The effect of a foreign export subsidy on the optimal
production subsidy is obtained by totally differentiating 
(2.38), and using the comparative static results from (2.7) 
yields
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ds
de
m (n-m)y/3
n (2m+l)/32+ m 2 (/32-y2)
(2.41)
This is negative if the number of foreign firms exceeds the 
number of domestic firms. For a duopoly it is zero.
At the first stage of the game the foreign country sets its 
export subsidy realising the effect its decision will have 
on the optimal domestic production subsidy. The effect of a 
foreign export subsidy on foreign welfare (2.5) is
aw
ae
r ax ax ds f ap ap ds
CM
01
CM
ftII —  +
, 3e ds de J
+ X — -  + — -  —
de ds de  ^ /
(2.42)
Using the comparative static results (2.7) and (2.8) 
together with (2.6) and (2.41) to evaluate at e = 0 yields
dW2 X(/32- m 2 (/32-y2))
de (2m+l)/32+ m2(/32-r2)
(2.43)
An export subsidy will increase foreign welfare provided the 
degree of product differentiation and the number of foreign 
firms is not too large. With perfect substitutes the welfare 
effect is clearly positive. Setting aw /^de. - 0 gives the 
optimal export subsidy
. _2 2 , n 2 2. . 
x(/3 - m (0 -r ))
(m+l)|3
(2.44)
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The optimal foreign policy is an export subsidy if the 
domestic and foreign products are perfect substitutes. With 
imperfect substitutes an export tax will be optimal if the 
number of foreign firms is large.
2.3 Bertrand Duopoly
This section considers the same trade policy games for the
case of Bertrand duopoly. The basic model is the same except
that there is now only one domestic and one foreign firm,
and the firm's strategic variable is price rather than 
12quantity. From (2.2) the demand facing the domestic and 
foreign firm as a function of prices is
Y = [ « (0 - r> - 0p, + 7P2 ]
/3 * 7  (2.45)
X = [ « (0 - r) + rPt - f5P2 ]
Assuming there is sufficient product differentiation so that
there is an interior solution, the first order conditions
. . . . . 13for a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices are
12 .If there was more than one firm m  each country then
Bertrand competition would lead to price being equal to
marginal cost.
13 . . .It can be shown that there will be an interior solution if:
( 713 a 7P
c - s < 1 ---- — - a + — -— - (c + t - e) (Y > 0)
1  ^ 2/3 -y > 2/3 -r
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dn 3Y
— - = ( P - c  + s)   + Y = 0
ap 1 1 api i
(2.46)
dn ax
— - = ( P - c - t  + e)   + X = 0
ap 2 2 ap
2 2
The comparative static results are obtained by total 
differentiation of (2.46), which yields
2(3 2-r2 7(3
7(3 2/3 2-72
dY /3ds
dX /3de - /3dt
By matrix inversion
dY /3 2/32-y2 -70 ds
dX A' -70 2/3 2-r2 de - dt
(2.47)
Where A' = ((32-72) (4(32-r2) > 0
And the effect on prices is
dP
i 0 -2/3 -7 ds
dP2
. 0 2 2 4/3 -y -7 -2/3 de - dt
(2.48)
The comparative static results all have the expected signs.
c + t - e < 2
r i
f1 " 2(32-72 1“ 2/32-*2
(cr  s) (X > 0)
96
2. 31 Foreign Export Subsidy
This section considers the effect of a foreign export 
subsidy on foreign welfare in the absence of any domestic 
trade policy. Eaton and Grossman (1986) have shown that with 
Bertrand competition there is no profit shifting argument 
for an export subsidy. For a Bertrand duopoly the domestic 
and foreign price are usually strategic complements, then an 
export subsidy commits the foreign firm to a lower price and 
the response of the domestic firm is to lower its price to 
the disadvantage of the foreign country. Whereas, for a 
Cournot duopoly domestic and foreign output are usually
considered to be strategic substitutes, and the domestic 
firm reduces its output in response to the foreign export 
subsidy which is to the advantage of the foreign country. 
The effect of an export subsidy on foreign welfare (2.5) is
aw ax ap
—  = (P - C  ) —  + X —  (2.49)
ae ae ae
The first term is the profit shifting effect and the second 
term is the terms of trade effect. Using the comparative 
static results from (2.47) and (2.48) together with the 
foreign firm's first order condition from (2.46) to evaluate 
at e = 0 , yields
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aw -Xy2
— - = -----  < 0 (2.50)
3e 4/3 2-y2
As Eaton and Grossman (1986) have shown a foreign export 
subsidy has a negative effect on foreign welfare. Setting 
awg/Se = 0 yields the optimal export subsidy
. .  . n2 2 . 2 -X(/3 -y )r
e = ------------ < 0 (2.51)
2 2 (2p -y )£
The optimal foreign policy is an export tax. There is no 
profit shifting argument for an export subsidy under 
Bertrand duopoly.
The effect of a foreign export subsidy on domestic welfare
(2.4) is
aw ap ay
—  = -X —  + (P - c ) —  (2.52)
ae ae ae
The first term is the terms of trade effect which is 
positive and the second term is the profit shifting effect 
which is negative. Consumers benefit from lower prices but 
the profits of the domestic firm are reduced. The overall 
effect is obtained by using the comparative static results 
from (2.47) and (2.48) together with (2.46), which yields
aw /3(2/3X - yY)
— - = -----------  (2.53)
2 2 ae 4/3 - 7
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The domestic country will gain unless domestic production is 
much larger than imports, and is more likely to gain under 
Bertrand than under Cournot competition. But, the optimal 
foreign policy is to tax exports which is likely to reduce 
domestic welfare.
2.32 Foreign Export Subsidy, Domestic Import Tariff and 
Production Subsidy
This section considers the trade policy game when the
foreign country sets its export subsidy at the first stage,
then at the second stage the domestic country sets its
import tariff and production subsidy, and in the final stage
the domestic and foreign firm set their prices. The optimal
tariff and production subsidy for Bertrand duopoly has been
derived by Cheng (1988). At the second stage the domestic
country sets its import tariff and production subsidy to
maximise domestic welfare (2.4) in response to the foreign
export subsidy. Maximising domestic welfare (2.4) with
respect to t and s, assuming there is an interior solution,
. . 14yields the first order conditions
14It can be shown that there will be an interior solution if:
7 \ 7
c - e <
2
r 0 0
1 - — I a + — c
/3 ' /3 1
: < (l -
0
7/3
3/32-272 ]■
7/3
3/3-27
(c - e) 
2 ' 2 '
(X > 0)
(Y > 0)
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aw
at
= -x
at
- 1 ) + (Pt - c,)
dY ax
—  + t —  — 0 
at at
(2.54)
aw ap ay ax
— 1 = -x — 5 + (P - c ) —  + t —  = 0
as as as as
Using the comparative static results from (2.47) and (2.48) 
yields
y0 2 - (2 0 2-y2) 0 P - c 
i i -(2 02-*2) (02-y2)x
(2 0 2-y2) 0 -y02 t -(3y(/32-r2)X
Hence, the optimal policies are
P - cj = 0 => s =
02 2 
0 —Tf
0
(2.55)
o 2 2 0 -1
t = ----  X =
0
 - (P - c + e) 
2 v 2 2 '
As in the case of Cournot oligopoly the production subsidy 
is used to correct the domestic distortion and the tariff to 
extract rent from the foreign firm. Cheng (1988) derives 
explicit solutions for the optimal policies and shows that 
the optimal tariff and production subsidy are smaller under 
Bertrand duopoly than under Cournot duopoly.
Again, if the domestic country sets its import tariff and 
production subsidy optimally it will always gain from a
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foreign export subsidy.
The effect of the foreign export subsidy on the optimal 
domestic tariff and production subsidy is obtained by 
totally differentiating the optimal policies which yields
02 2 
0 -7
dt = ----
0
0 2 2 
0 -7
ds = ----
0
Using the comparative static results from (2.47) gives
2(3/32-r2) r0 dt/de
_ 2 2" 2/3 -7
-70 i
<MCQ.CM ds/de “70
Hence, the optimal countervailing fractions are
dt 1 ds -y
—  = - > 0 —  = —  < 0  (2.56)
de 3 de 3/3
The optimal domestic response to a foreign export subsidy is 
to increase the tariff and reduce the production subsidy. 
The optimal countervailing tariff fraction for Bertrand 
duopoly, dt/de = 1/3, is smaller than for Cournot duopoly, 
1/3 < dt/de < 1/2, from equation (2.22).
At the first stage of the game the foreign country sets its
, 5x 
I flt-
a ax ax
dt + —  ds + —  de
a  as de
, 3y ay ay
—  dt + —  ds + —  de 
I. ai­ ds de )
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export subsidy to maximise national welfare realising the 
effect its decision will have on the optimal domestic tariff 
and production subsidy. The effect of a foreign export 
subsidy on foreign welfare (2.5) is
The countervailing tariff reduces the profit shifting effect 
of the export subsidy and worsens the terms of trade. 
Whereas, the reduction in the production subsidy increases 
the profit shifting effect and improves the terms of trade. 
Using the comparative static results from (2.47) and (2.48) 
together with (2.46), and the optimal countervailing 
responses from (2.56) to evaluate at e = 0, yields
The foreign export subsidy has a negative effect on foreign 
welfare. The optimal export subsidy is obtained by setting
dW ax ax dt ax ds
at de ds de
2 +
de de
ap ds
2 (2.57)
de ' at ' de as de
dW -X
2 < 0 (2.58)
de 3
dW Jde = 0
-X(02-r2)
e (2.59)
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The optimal foreign policy is an export tax. The expression 
for the optimal export tax is the same as under Cournot 
oligopoly, see (2.25). When the foreign country faces 
retaliation with countervailing tariffs and subsidies, there 
is no profit shifting argument for an export subsidy under 
Bertrand or Cournot competition.
2. 33 Foreign Export Subsidy and Domestic Import Tariff
In this section the domestic country is assumed to use only 
an import tariff to countervail the foreign export subsidy. 
At the second stage of the game the domestic country sets 
its tariff to maximise national welfare given the foreign 
export subsidy. Maximising domestic welfare (2.4) with
respect to t, assuming an interior solution, yields the
. . 15first order condition
aw , ap x ay ax
— - = -X — - - 1 + (P - C  ) —  + t —  = 0 (2.60)
at  ^at > 1 1 at at
Rearranging, yields the optimal tariff
15It can be shown that there will be an interior solution if:
7/3  ^ 70
c - e <
2
1 -
2/32-r2 )■ 2/32-72 1
(X > 0)
f ): < 1 ------------ a
1 I* 3/32-272 J
7/3
3/3-27
- (c - e) 
2 ' 2 1
(Y > 0)
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t =
( ap A ay
( — " ” i) " (pi “ ci) - ^at > at
ax
at
(2.61)
The tariff improves the terms of trade and shifts profits 
from foreign to domestic firms. Bertrand competition does 
not alter the profit shifting role of the tariff. Using the 
comparative static results from (2.47) and (2.48) together 
with (2.46) yields the optimal tariff
t =
_2 2 
/3 -r r/3
x +
2/3 2-r2 ) > 0
(2.62)
The optimal tariff is positive. The first term in brackets 
is the terms of trade effect and the second term is the 
profit shifting effect.
Again, when the domestic country sets its import tariff 
optimally it will always gain from a foreign export subsidy.
The effect of a foreign export subsidy on the optimal 
domestic tariff is obtained by totally differentiating 
(2.62)
dt =
/32-72 r , ax
/3 ( =
*/3 ay
+
at 2/32-y2 at
dt +
, ax 7/3 ay ^
-  + — r - 5  —  de ^de 2/3 -7 de ) J
Using the comparative static results from (2.47) yields the 
optimal countervailing tariff fraction
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dt 0 2 2 /3 -7
de /32 + 2 (/32-72)
> 0 (2.63)
The optimal countervailing tariff fraction is positive but 
less than one third, this is smaller than under Cournot 
duopoly, see equation (2.32), where it is exactly one third.
At the first stage of the game the foreign country sets its 
export subsidy to maximise its national welfare realising 
the effect its decision will have on the optimal domestic 
tariff. The effect of a foreign export subsidy on foreign 
welfare (2.5) is
dW
de = <V °a“
f ax ax dt 1
de at de
+ X
( ap f ap , a t
- 2  +  - 2  -  1 _
ae ' at
d  
de
(2.64)
The first term is the profit shifting effect of the export 
subsidy and the second term is the terms of trade effect. 
The countervailing tariff reduces the profit shifting effect 
of the export subsidy and worsens the terms of trade. Using 
the comparative static results from (2.47) and (2.48) 
together with (2.46), and the optimal countervailing tariff 
fraction (2.63) to evaluate at e = 0, yields
dW
de
-Xj32(4|32- 372)
(4/32-72) (/32+ 2 (/32-72))
< 0 (2.65)
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A foreign export subsidy reduces foreign welfare. This is 
not surprising since an export subsidy reduces welfare even 
without a countervailing tariff. The optimal export subsidy 
is obtained by setting dWg/de = 0 which yields
The optimal foreign policy is an export tax, as with Cournot 
oligopoly. So again there is no profit shifting argument for 
an export subsidy under Bertrand or Cournot competition.
2. 34 Foreign Export Subsidy and Domestic Production Subsidy
In this section the domestic country is assumed to use only 
a production subsidy to countervail the foreign export 
subsidy. Maximising domestic welfare (2.4) with respect to 
s, assuming an interior solution, yields the first order 
condition1^
*^It can be shown that there will be an interior solution if:
-X/3(4/32-3y2) (|32-r2)
e < 0 (2.66)
7 } 7c - e < 1 - — I a + — c
2 0 0 1
(X > 0)
y0 % r/3
(c2- e) (Y > 0)
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aw ap ay
— - = -X — - + ( p - c )  —i ias as as
(2.67)
Using the comparative static results from (2.47) and (2.48), 
yields
_ 2 2 /3 - y
P - c  = -Xy -----  < 0 (2.68)1 1 2  2 
1 1 2/3 -y
The optimal domestic policy is to subsidise domestic 
production so that price is below marginal cost because the 
production subsidy improves the terms of trade. Solving for 
the optimal production subsidy using (2.46) yields
£ -y f y/3 \
s = ----  Y + ---— - X (2.69)
/3 L 2/3 -y2 >
Again, when the domestic country sets its production subsidy 
optimally a foreign export subsidy will always increase 
domestic welfare.
The effect of a foreign export subsidy on the optimal 
domestic production subsidy is obtained by totally 
differentiating (2.69), which yields
/32-y2 ay y/3 ax x , ay y/3 ax x
ds = ----  —  + —  ds + _  + —  de
/3 LI as 2/3 -y as >  ^de 2/3 -y de > J
Using the comparative static results from (2.47) yields
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ds 
—  = 0 
de
(2.70)
The optimal domestic response to a foreign export subsidy is 
zero. The optimal domestic production subsidy is independent 
of the foreign export subsidy.
The effect of a foreign export subsidy on foreign welfare is
aw
—  = (P - c ) 
ae ' 2 2 '
r ax ax ds f ap
0
ap
0
ds
—  + — — + X 6 + — —
ae\ dS de ae ds de /
(2.71)
The effect of the export subsidy on foreign welfare is the 
same as when there was no domestic tariff or production 
subsidy. Using the comparative static results from (2.47) 
and (2.48) together with (2.46) and (2.70) to evaluate at 
e = 0 yields
dW -Xy'
de 4/32-y2
< 0 (2.72)
A foreign export subsidy increases foreign welfare. Setting 
dW^de = 0 yields the optimal export subsidy
,r//~2 2. 2 -X(/3 -y )y
e = ----------  < 0 (2.73)2 2
(2p -y ) £
The optimal export subsidy is positive. When the domestic
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country uses a production subsidy to countervail the foreign 
export subsidy, the optimal foreign policy is an export tax 
under Bertrand duopoly.
2.4 Conclusions
This chapter has modelled retaliation as a multistage game, 
where the foreign country sets its export subsidy in the 
first stage, and the domestic country responds with a tariff 
and/or a production subsidy in the second stage. Demand was 
assumed to be linear, with nationally differentiated 
products, and both Cournot oligopoly and Bertrand duopoly 
were considered.
When the domestic country pursues a policy of laissez-faire, 
a foreign export subsidy may reduce domestic welfare. A 
foreign export subsidy is likely to be a beggar-my-neighbour 
policy, increasing foreign welfare at the expense of 
domestic welfare. However, when the domestic country pursues 
an optimal trade policy it will always gain from a foreign 
export subsidy. The optimal domestic response to a foreign 
export subsidy, when the domestic country uses a tariff and 
a production subsidy, is to increase the tariff and reduce 
the production subsidy. When the domestic country uses only 
a tariff, the optimal response is usually to increase the 
tariff, but a reduction may be optimal. The optimal 
countervailing tariff fractions are larger under Cournot
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than Bertrand competition, and are always less than or equal 
to a half. As Dixit (1988) has argued only partially 
countervailing tariffs are justified. When the domestic 
country uses only a production subsidy, the optimal response 
is ambiguous, but for duopoly it should not alter its 
subsidy.
The foreign country realises the effect its export subsidy 
will have on the optimal domestic trade policy, and 
anticipates such a response when it sets its export subsidy. 
When the domestic country uses a tariff and a production 
subsidy, a foreign export subsidy will reduce foreign 
welfare, and the optimal policy is to tax exports. 
Similarly, when the domestic country uses only a tariff, a 
foreign export subsidy will reduce foreign welfare. When the 
domestic country uses only a production subsidy, the effect 
of a foreign export subsidy on foreign welfare is ambiguous. 
Facing retaliation with countervailing tariffs, there is no 
profit shifting argument for an export subsidy, and the 
foreign country should commit itself not to subsidise 
exports.
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Chapter 3: International Trade and Cournot Equilibrium:
Existence, Uniqueness and Comparative Statics
3.1 Introduction
This chapter will prove the existence and uniqueness of 
equilibrium in the Dixit (1984) model of international trade 
under Cournot oligopoly, and will derive the comparative 
static results for the effects of trade taxes and subsidies. 
This basic model will be used in chapter four to analyse the 
effect of retaliation on the strategic argument for export 
subsidies. The existence of the Cournot equilibrium will be 
established using a proof, based on McManus (1962, 1964),
which does not require the usual assumption that profit 
functions are concave. A simple proof will be used to 
establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium. The assumptions 
required to prove existence and uniqueness will be used to 
sign the comparative static results for the effects of trade 
policy. These comparative static results are needed to model 
trade policy as a multistage game in chapter four.
Models of international trade under imperfect competition 
have frequently employed the concept of Cournot equilibrium. 
They have been used to explain intra-industry trade, Brander 
(1981), Brander and Krugman (1983) etc, and to analyse trade 
policy, Brander and Spencer (1984a, 1984b, 1985), Dixit
(1984, 1988) etc. These models usually have two countries,
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the domestic and the foreign country, and in each there are 
a number of firms that compete in both markets. It is 
assumed that marginal costs are constant and that markets 
are segmented, then firms are engaged in two independent 
games, one in the domestic market and one in the foreign 
market. Hence, the game in one market can be analysed 
separately from the game in the other market. Also, the 
models are assumed to be symmetric, in the sense that in 
each country all firms have identical costs. The question of 
the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in these models 
has largely been ignored.
The usual proof of the existence of a Cournot equilibrium, 
assumes that each firm's profit function is concave so that 
a standard proof for the existence of equilibrium in concave 
games can be applied. This approach is adopted by Myles 
(1988) in a model of international trade under oligopoly. An 
alternative proof by McManus (1962, 1964) does not require
the profit functions to be concave, but assumes that all 
firms have identical cost functions. Here, a proof is 
developed which adapts the method used by McManus to exploit 
the symmetry of these models. The existence of equilibrium 
is established under weaker conditions than those required 
to obtain concave profit functions. The usual method to 
prove the uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium is to use 
the Gale-Nikaido theorem on univalent mappings. Recently, 
Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987) have developed a necessary and
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sufficient condition for uniqueness. Here, a much simpler 
proof will be used to establish uniqueness.
In most models of international trade under Cournot 
oligopoly the Hahn (1961-62) stability condition is used to 
sign the comparative static results, despite the irrelevance 
of stability. This requires the reaction functions to be 
downward sloping, which rules out the interesting 
comparative static results which occur with upward sloping 
reaction functions. The comparative static results derived 
here are signed without any assumptions, other than those 
used to establish the existence and uniqueness of the 
equilibrium. The definitions of strategic substitutes and 
complements are introduced and used to discuss the 
comparative static results. Then, the possibility of the 
price overshifting of a tariff, where price increases by 
more than the amount of the tariff, and profit overshifting, 
where profits increase due to a tariff, are discussed.
The Cournot oligopoly model is interpreted as a static, 
single shot, game of complete information, where firms 
simultaneously and independently choose their outputs. At a 
Cournot equilibrium, a Nash equilibrium in quantities, each 
firm chooses an output which is the optimal response to the 
output choices of all other firms. The Cournot equilibrium 
is the only rational solution of this game.^ Any other
1 Johansen (1982) argues that if there is a natural solution
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output choices could not be an equilibrium, since then at 
least one firm would not be using its optimal response to 
the output choices of the other firms, which is not 
rational. It is often argued that a Cournot equilibrium
involves naive or myopic behaviour by firms, they take the 
output of competitors as fixed and do not realise the effect 
their action will have on the output of their competitors. 
But each firm does not know the output of its competitors. 
It must predict their output, given that they are also
maximising profits, so that it can calculate its optimal 
response. This is a complicated problem since the
decision-making of one firm is related to that of all other 
firms. In effect each firm must determine the Cournot 
equilibrium. At the Cournot equilibrium all firms have
correctly predicted the output of their competitors and 
their output is the optimal response to the correctly 
predicted outputs of competitors. Thus, far from assuming 
naive or myopic behaviour, the Cournot equilibrium involves 
sophisticated behaviour by firms. For this reason the 
uniqueness of the equilibrium is an important property. If 
there are two, or more, Cournot equilibrium then firms 
cannot predict the output of their competitors, and it is 
then difficult to argue that the Cournot equilibrium is the 
rational solution of the game.
concept for non-cooperative games then it must be the Nash 
equilibrium.
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Bertrand's criticism of the Cournot equilibrium, that firms
actually choose prices rather than outputs, is a criticism
of the model and not the equilibrium concept. In Bertrand
oligopoly firms choose prices and the rational solution to
the game is the Nash equilibrium in prices. Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) have shown that a two stage game, where
firms choose capacities at the first stage and then prices
in the second stage, yields the Cournot outcome. Therefore,
it can be argued that that the Cournot oligopoly model
2represents a reduced form of this capacity-pnce game.
Oligopoly is often modelled using conjectural variations, 
these are the conjectures of a firm about how its 
competitors will react to a change in its output. And,
Bresnahan (1981) has argued that conjectures should be
consistent, that is a firm's conjecture about how a 
competitor will react should equal the slope of the 
competitor's reaction function. Obviously, as the solution 
to a static oligopoly model such ideas make no sense. In a 
static game, in which firms independently and simultaneously 
choose outputs, firms cannot react to the output choices of 
their competitors. It is often argued that such models 
represent a reduced form of some dynamic oligopoly model, 
but there is no basis for this assertion. Another spurious
2
In international trade, Ben-Zvi and Helpman (1988) and 
Venables (1988) analyse a two stage game where worldwide 
capacity is chosen at the first stage, and then prices for 
each market in the second stage.
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concept is the stability of the Cournot equilibrium, which 
in a static model is obviously meaningless since stability 
is a dynamic property. But, even in a multi-period model it 
is a doubtful concept, since it requires firms to be out of 
equilibrium, and there is no reason for firms to produce any 
output other than the equilibrium output.
3.2 The Model
There are two countries: the domestic and the foreign
country. In the domestic country there are n identical firms
each with constant marginal cost c and in the foreign
country there are m identical firms each with constant
marginal cost cg. The domestic and foreign markets are
segmented so there is no possibility of arbitrage between
them, and so there can be price discrimination. Since
marginal cost is constant and markets are segmented, the
firms are involved in two independent games, one in the
domestic market and one in the foreign market, which can be
analysed separately. Consider the domestic market, where the
inverse demand function is P = P(Q) . The output of the ith
domestic firm, for domestic consumption, is y , the output
of all domestic firms but firm i is Y and total domestic
- 1
industry output is Y, so Y = y + Y t. Similarly, define the 
exports, to the domestic market, of the ith foreign firm as 
x t, the exports of all foreign firms but firm i as X  ^ and 
total foreign exports as X, so X = + X ^. Total domestic
116
consumption is Q = X + Y, foreign exports plus domestic 
production. The profits of domestic and foreign firms from 
sales in the domestic market are
n n (y» X) = (P - cl)yi 1 = 1,.. ,n
(3.1)
X2, (y, X) = (P - cz)xl i =
At a Cournot equilibrium, a Nash equilibrium in quantities, 
each firm's output is an optimal response to the output of 
all other firms. Therefore a Cournot equilibrium is a vector 
of outputs (yc, xc) = (yc,..,yc, xc,..,xc) such that
1 n 1 m
n (yc, xc) = Max w (y®,.. y ,.. y®, x°) i =
y t*o
x (yc» xc) = Max n (y°, x®,.., x ,.. x®) i =
21 _ 21 1 1 m
X  £ 0  1
(3.2)
It will be assumed that the inverse demand function, and 
hence since marginal cost is constant, profits are twice 
continuously differentiable. A necessary condition for a 
Cournot equilibrium is therefore
dn dn
= P + y,P' - c, s 0, y ^  0, —  y =  0 i = l,..,n
ay, ay,
(3.3)
dn dn
— —  = P + X  P' - c ^0, x — 0, — —  x = 0 i = 1,.., m
o  i 2  i o  iax ax
i 1
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For an interior solution, where all firms produce a positive 
output, these reduce to the usual first order conditions. 
Further assumptions will have to be made to ensure the 
existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium.
3.3 Existence and Uniqueness
A Cournot equilibrium is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in 
quantities, so the existence problem is similar to that for 
any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. According to 
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) there are two reasons for the 
possible non-existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium: if 
the payoff function is not continuous or if it is not 
quasi-concave. For Cournot equilibrium the payoff (profit) 
function is continuous but may not be quasi-concave. 
Therefore, it is the profit function not being quasi-concave 
which maybe the cause of non-existence of the Cournot 
equilibrium. If a Cournot equilibrium does not exist it 
should not be concluded that the model has no equilibrium. 
Dasgupta and Maskin have shown that a mixed strategy 
equilibrium exists for most games, even if payoff functions 
are discontinuous.^
There are three methods to prove the existence of a Cournot
3 . . .If payoff functions are continuous, as m  Cournot
oligopoly, then a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists, 
see Theorem 3 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986).
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equilibrium each using different assumptions about demand
and cost functions. One approach by Frank and Quandt (1963)
is to assume that each firm's profit function is concave in
its own output, so that a standard existence proof can be 
4applied. Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1977) assume that the 
inverse demand function is concave, P" < 0, and cost 
functions are convex, which yields concave profit functions. 
The assumption that the demand function is concave, rules 
out many interesting comparative static results which occur 
with convex demand. But, this assumption is stronger than 
required to obtain concave profit functions, from (3.1) the 
second derivatives of the profit functions are
2P'+ y P* i = 1,.. ,n
(3.4)
2P' + x^" i = 1,.. ,m
Therefore, each firm's profit function will be everywhere 
concave in its own output if 2P' + QP" <0, so a Cournot 
equilibrium exists provided demand is not too convex, but 
this is still a fairly strong assumption. The assumption 
that profits are concave could be replaced with the 
assumption that they are quasi-concave, without affecting
4
For example, Theorem 1 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986): There 
exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if the strategy set 
is non-empty, convex and compact, and the payoff function is 
continuous and quasi-concave.
d nli
fly.
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the proof, but it is not clear what this implies for the 
shape of demand functions.
The second approach, due to McManus (1962, 1964), does not
’ . 5require the profit functions to be quasi-concave. It
assumes that all firms have identical and convex costs, but
imposes no restrictions on demand functions, except that it
is a non-increasing function and total revenue is bounded.
Without the assumption of quasi-concavity of profit
functions, the reaction functions need not be continuous so
fixed point theorems cannot be applied in the normal way.
McManus shows that the cumulative reaction correspondence is
non-decreasing, hence any discontinuities must be jumps
upwards, and in this way is able to show that a symmetric
equilibrium exists.
A more recent approach by Novshek (1985) does not require 
cost functions to be convex, in this way it is less 
restrictive than previous approaches, but it assumes that 
the demand function is such that P' + QP" < 0. This 
assumption implies that each firm's marginal revenue be 
everywhere decreasing in the output of other firms, which is 
the same as the Hahn (1961-62) stability condition. And, 
this implies that reaction functions are downward sloping 
for all firms, and rules out the possibility of upward
5Roberts and Sonnenschein (1976) have used the same proof, 
as they acknowledge in Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977).
120
sloping reaction functions. When all firms have constant 
marginal costs, this proof is more restrictive than assuming 
that profit functions are concave.
Proofs that the Cournot equilibrium is unique have generally 
used the Gale-Nikaido (1965) theorem for the univalence of 
mappings. A sufficient condition for uniqueness is that the 
Jacobian, derived from the first order conditions for profit 
maximisation, is a P-matrix, all the principal minors are 
positive. This is restricted to equilibrium in the interior 
of the strategy space, and does not apply to equilibrium 
where some firms produce zero output. This condition for 
uniqueness is equivalent to the Seade (1980a) stability 
condition. A necessary and sufficient condition for 
uniqueness has been obtained by Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987) 
using index analysis.6 If the Jacobian determinant is 
positive at all equilibrium then there is a unique Cournot 
equilibrium, and conversely if the equilibrium is unique 
then the Jacobian determinant is positive at the 
equilibrium.
The existence of the Cournot equilibrium will be proved 
here, without the assumption that profit functions are 
concave. The proof exploits the symmetry of the model, all 
firms in each country have identical costs, so although the
6See Varian (1984) for a discussion of index analysis, and 
an application to the uniqueness of equilibrium in the 
competitive model.
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proof by McManus (1962, 1964) is not directly applicable it 
can be used to show the existence of domestic and foreign 
industry reaction functions. Despite the fact that reaction 
functions of individual firms need not be continuous, it can 
be shown that under certain assumptions the industry 
reaction functions are continuous. And, since the industry 
reaction functions are continuous it is possible to show 
that a Cournot equilibrium exists using a fixed point 
theorem. A simple proof can then be used to show that the 
Cournot equilibrium is unique.
To prove the existence and uniqueness of the Cournot 
equilibrium the following assumptions are required:
(Al) The inverse demand function P(Q) is decreasing, twice 
continuously differentiable and total revenue, P(Q).Q, is 
bounded.
(A2) The following conditions are satisfied:
(n + 1) P'(X+Y) + X P"(X+Y) < 0  V X, Y
(m + 1) P'(X+Y) + Y P" (X+Y) < 0  V X, Y
(A3) The following condition is satisfied:
(n + m + 1) P'(Q) + Q P"(Q) < 0 V Q
Assumption (A2) ensures that the demand function is not too
convex, and it replaces the usual assumption that each
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firm's profit function is concave in its own output. For the 
domestic industry concavity of the profit function requires 
that 2P' + YP" < 0, whereas assumption (A2) requires that 
(n+l)P' + YP" < 0. When there is a single domestic firm (A2) 
is equivalent to the concavity of the profit function, but 
when there is more than one domestic firm it is less 
restrictive than the concavity assumption. Obviously, to 
take advantage of the fact that all domestic firms are 
identical requires that there are at least two firms in the 
domestic industry. Assumption (A2) can be interpreted as an 
"aggregate concavity" condition which ensures that the 
industry reaction functions are continuous, in the same way 
that concavity ensures that the reaction functions of the 
firms are continuous. Assumption (A3) is the necessary and 
sufficient condition for uniqueness of Kolstad and Mathiesen 
(1987) and also the stability condition of Seade (1980a).
Theorem: For a homogeneous product Cournot oligopoly vith
inverse demand function P(Q) and n identical domestic firms 
each ivith constant marginal cost ci > 0 and m identical 
foreign firms each with constant marginal cost c2 > 0. If 
assumptions (Al), (A2) and (A3) are satisfied, then there
exists a unique and symmetric Cournot equilibrium.
Note that (Al) implies that there exists a Q such that price 
is below marginal cost for all firms if Q £ Q, this follows 
from the fact that total revenue is bounded and P(Q) is
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decreasing. Let the strategy set of the firms be [0, Q], 
which is non-empty, convex and compact.
Proof. First it is necessary to show that a domestic
industry equilibrium exists. That is, for any given X, there
. * * • • • •exists a (y ,...y ) such that each domestic firm is setting
its output optimally. The proof closely follows McManus 
(1962, 1964). Define the cumulative reaction coorespondence,
Y = r(Y , X) , as the values of domestic industry output, Y, 
when firm i chooses optimally as a function of the output of 
all other domestic firms, Y for given foreign exports, X.
The cumulative reaction correspondence may not be continuous 
since profit functions need not be concave, so it is not 
possible to prove existence in the usual way. However, it 
can be shown that the cumulative reaction correspondence is , 
non-decreasing, so any discontinuities must be jumps 
upwards. For Y  ^= 0 then Y £ 0 and for Y  ^= Q then Y = Q,
since the optimal output of firm i is zero, y =0. Hence,
• . . n * . .it must intersect the line Y = — =- Y , at say Y in figuren—l -i
3.1. This yields a symmetric domestic industry equilibrium
* *
where each domestic firm produces y = Y /n. Then
* , ,
Y  ^= (n-l)y and the optimal response for each domestic
* *firm is to produce y so that Y = ny .
To prove the cumulative reaction correspondence is 
non-decreasing, in the sense that YB > YA  ^ implies 
min rfY^, X) £ max r(YAi# X), define YA = max r(YAt, X) and
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yA^ = YA- Yai* Then, yAi is a profit maximising output for 
firm i when the rest of the domestic industry produces ya , 
domestic industry output is YA, and price is PA = P(YA+ X) . 
Define YB = min rfY^, X) and y8 = YB- Y^. Then, y8 is a 
profit maximising output for firm i when the rest of the 
domestic industry produces Y , domestic industry output is 
Yb, and price is PB = P(Y8+ X) . If yA = 0 then YB > YA if 
YB t > YA t, and the cumulative reaction correspondence is 
clearly non-decreasing. For yA > 0, let Y8 be such that 
Ya < YBt < Ya. In situation A the ith firm could produce
B A  A BY - Y instead of output y and the price would be P , but 
since yA is a profit maximising output
(PA- Cj) y* a (PB- ct) ( yB - Y*() (3.5)
Similarly in situation B the ith firm could produce YA- Y8 , 
in which case the price would be PA, and since yB is the 
profit maximising output
(PB- ct) yB a (PA- ct) (Ya - YB() (3.6)
Adding together (3.5) and (3.6) and then rearranging yields
(PA - PB) (YBt - YAt) £ 0 (3.7)
B A  A BSince, by assumption, Y i > Y  ^then P  ^P therefore
Y8 £ YA, which proves that the cumulative reaction
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correspondence is non-decreasing, so any discontinuities 
must be jumps upwards.
Let X be such that P(X) = c . Then if X > X, price will be 
below domestic marginal cost for any level of domestic 
output, so the optimal output for all domestic firms is 
obviously zero. For X  ^X, a necessary condition for profit 
maximisation is
It can be shown that any equilibrium is symmetric, all 
domestic firms produce the same output. Consider any two 
firms, say i and j. Subtract the first order condition for 
profit maximisation for firm j from the first order 
condition for firm i yields
Since P7 < 0, it follows that yt = which holds for any i 
and j. Hence, all domestic firms produce the same output in 
equilibrium.
Summing (3.8) over all domestic firms yields the following 
necessary condition for a domestic industry equilibrium
dTl
-  = P + y P' - c = 0 i = 1
i i (3.8)
(3.9)
F (Y, X) = nP(Y+X) + YP7 (Y+X) - nc = 0 (3.10)
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Since P(Q) is twice continuously differentiable, F(Y, X) is 
continuously differentiable. For X * x, F(0, X) £ 0 (since 
P(X) £ c^) , and F(Q-X, X) < 0 (since P(Q) < c^ . F (Y, X) is 
also decreasing in Y since, by assumption (A2)
5F
—  = (n+1) P7 + YP" < 0 (3.11)
3Y
Therefore, for any given X  ^X, there is a unique Y which 
solves F (Y, X) = 0. Since it has already been shown that, 
for any X, there exists a symmetric domestic industry 
equilibrium and (3.10) which is a necessary condition for an 
equilibrium has a unique solution, then it follows that
(3.10) must be a necessary and sufficient condition for an 
equilibrium. Hence F(Y, X) = 0  implicitly defines the 
domestic industry reaction function, Y = f(X). Since F(Y, X) 
is continuously differentiable, and 3F/3Y < 0, then by the 
implicit function theorem f(X) is continuous. Also by the 
implicit function theorem
-3F/3X - (nP7 + YP77)
f7 = ------- =   (3.12)
3F/3Y (n+1) P7 + YP77
The right hand side exists and is continuous, since P(Q) is 
twice continuously differentiable and the denominator is 
non-zero by assumption (A2), hence f(X) is continuously 
differentiable.
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Hence, the domestic industry reaction function is given by 
{ Y I F( Y , X ) = 0 } X * x
f(X) = * (3.13)
{ 0 } X > X
Which is defined for X € [0, Q]. The reaction function is 
shown in figure 3.2.
By similar arguments it can be shown that a foreign industry 
equilibrium exists and the foreign industry reaction 
function is
r { X I G( Y , X ) = 0 } Y * Y
g(Y) = - (3.14)
{ 0 ) Y > Y
Where G(X, Y) = mP(Y+X) + XP'(Y+X) - mc2, and Y is defined 
such that P (Y) = c2. In equilibrium all foreign firms export 
the same output, xt = x for all i and j. The reaction 
function g(Y) is continuous. For Y  ^Y, by the implicit 
function theorem
-SG/3Y - (mP' + XP")
g' = ------- =   (3.15)
dG/dX (m+l)P'+ XP7/
At a Cournot equilibrium the domestic industry's output Yc 
must be the optimal response to the foreign industry's
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exports X°, which itself must be an optimal response to Y°.
That is Yc = f(Xc) and Xc = g(Yc), or equivalently
Y° = f(g(Y°)) = f°g(Yc) (3.16)
A Cournot equilibrium exists if fog(Y) has a fixed point. To 
prove that it does have a fixed point define the function 
h(Y) s f°g(Y) - Y, for Y e [0, Q]. At a Cournot equilibrium 
f°g(Yc) = Yc so h(Y°) = 0. The function h(Y) is obviously 
continuous since a composite function of two continuous 
functions, f and g, is itself continuous. At Y = 0 ,  h(0) £ 0 
and at Y = Q, h(Q) <0. Therefore, by the intermediate value 
theorem, there must exist a Yc, 0  ^Y° < Q, such that 
h(Yc) = 0, which proves that a Cournot equilibrium exists.
The Cournot equilibrium will be unique if h(Y) is decreasing 
in Y, h7 (Y) < 0, since then h(Y) is one-to-one. By the chain
rule the derivative of h(Y) is
h7 (Y) = f'(g(Y)).g7(Y) - 1 (3.17)
For Y  ^Y and g(Y) =s x, using (3.12) and (3.15) yields
-P7 ((n+m+1) P7 + QP")
h7 (Y) =   < 0 (3.18)
((n+1)P7+ YP")((m+1)P7 + XP")
This is negative by assumptions (A2) and (A3) . For Y > Y
then g7 = 0 so h7 = -1 < 0, and for g(Y) > X then f7 = 0 so
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h' = -1 < 0. Therefore, h(Y) is clearly decreasing in Y, and 
hence there is a unique Cournot equilibrium. ■
It has been shown that there exists a unique and symmetric 
Cournot equilibrium.
3.4 Comparative Statics
This section will derive the comparative static results for
the effects of various trade policies in the Cournot
oligopoly model of the previous section. In chapter two,
with linear demand the comparative static results all had
the expected signs, but with non-linear demand a number of
interesting comparative static results may occur. A general
survey of comparative static results under oligopoly is 
. . 7Dixit (1986). The difficult problem with comparative 
statics under oligopoly is to sign the results and often 
stability conditions are used. Brander and Spencer (1984a, 
1984b, 1985) and Dixit (1984) use the Hahn (1961-62)
stability condition, that each firm's marginal revenue is 
decreasing in the output of all other firms. This requires 
reaction functions to be downward sloping and rules out the 
interesting results which occur if they are upward sloping. 
A less restrictive stability condition is provided by Seade 
(1980a). However, since stability is a meaningless idea in a
7Other useful references on comparative static results under 
oligopoly are de Meza (1982), Bulow et al (1985), Katz and 
Rosen (1985), Levin (1985), and Seade (1985).
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static Cournot oligopoly model, it would be theoretically 
more rigorous to use a condition for uniqueness to sign the 
results. And, fortunately, the Seade (1980a) stability 
condition is equivalent to the Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987) 
condition for uniqueness. Here, no assumptions will be made 
to sign the comparative staic results beyond those required 
to prove the existence and uniqueness of the Cournot 
equilibrium.
In order to analyse trade policy, now introduce trade taxes 
and subsidies into the model of the previous section. Let t 
be the specific, per unit, domestic import tariff and s the 
specific domestic production subsidy. And, let e be the 
specific foreign export subsidy. Trade taxes and subsidies 
do not affect the proof of existence since c and c2 could 
be defined to include any taxes or subsidies. Hence, a 
unique and symmetric equilibrium exists. Since the 
equilibrium is symmetric let y = y, n = n^ , = x and
tt2i = tt2 for all i. Then, the profits of domestic and 
foreign firms from sales in the domestic market become
Wj = (P “ Cj + s)y
(3.19)
7T = (P - c - t + e) X
2 v 2 7
Firstly, consider the situation where foreign firms have a 
sufficient cost advantage, c - s > c2+ t - e + x°P' where x°
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is the exports of a foreign firm when there is no domestic
production, so that X > X in equilibrium, and hence there is
no domestic production. Then, the Cournot equilibrium is 
given by the first order condition for profit maximisation 
by foreign firms
571
— - = P + xP' - c - t + e = 0 (3.20)
5x 2
The comparative static results are obtained by total 
differentiation of the first order condition, and noting 
that mx = X = Q, which yields
((m+l)P' + QP") dQ = m dt - m de
Hence, the comparative static results are 
5Q m 5Q -m
—  = ------------ < 0  —  = ------------ > 0 (3.21)
at (m+l) p' + QP" ae (m+l)P' + QP"
A tariff reduces imports and increases the price in the 
domestic market. The effects of an export subsidy are the 
opposite of the effects of a tariff. The terms of trade for 
the domestic country is the cost of imports, net of the 
tariff, P - t. For the foreign country, the terms of trade 
is the price it receives for its exports, net of the 
domestic tariff, P - t. A reduction in P - t will improve 
the domestic country's terms of trade and worsen the foreign
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country's terms of trade. The effect of a tariff on the 
terms of trade is
3P -(P' + QP")
 1 = ------------  (3.22)
at (m+1 )P'+ QP"
For the domestic country a tariff will usually improve the 
terms of trade but it will worsen the terms of trade if 
P' + QP" > 0 , then the price increases by more than the 
amount of the tariff. This is what Seade (1985) has called
Q
price overshifting, and it occurs if the relative convexity 
of demand is less than minus one, R = QP"/P' < -1. A more 
intriguing possibility is that the tariff may actually 
increase the profits of foreign firms. The effect of a 
tariff on the total profits of the foreign industry,
n = (P - c - t)X, is2 2
an ax ap
— I = (P - c - t) —  + x — I
at at at
Using the comparative static results (3.21) yields
an -X(2P' + QP")
— - = ------------  (3.23)
at (m+l)P' + QP"
Foreign industry profits will increase if 2P' + QP" > 0, 
which will occur if price overshifting is sufficiently
Q
The possibility of price and profit overshifting was first 
noted by de Meza (1982).
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9 .large. Profit overshifting occurs if the relative convexity
of demand is less than minus two, R < -2. For constant
elasticity demand functions, R = -(1 + 1/v) where tj is the
elasticity of demand, so there is always price overshifting
of a tariff, and there will be profit overshifting if the
elaasticity of demand is less than unity. With profit
overshifting the tariff moves the foreign industry closer to
the output they would produce under collusion.
A similar analysis could be used to derive the comparative 
staic results at an equilibrium where there are no foreign 
imports. Then, the equilibrium would be given by the first 
order condition for profit maximisation by domestic firms. 
These results will not be derived since they will not be 
required in chapter four.
Now consider the interior solution, where both domestic 
production and foreign exports are positive. There will be
an interior solution if c - s < c + t - e  + x°P' (Y > 0) and1 2
c2+ t - e < c - s + y°P' (X > 0) , where y° is the output of 
a domestic firm when there are no foreign imports. The first 
order conditions for a Cournot equilibrium are
dn
— - = P + yP' - c + s = 0 
ay 1
(3.24)
9 . . . .Profit overshifting cannot occur if profit functions are
concave, since this implies that 2P' + QP" < 0, see (3.4).
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dn
dx
= P + xP7 - c - t + e = 0
2
The second order conditions for profit maximisation are
d2n
fly*
d2n.
dx
= 2P' + yP" < 0
= 2P' + xP" < 0
To obtain the comparative static results for the effects of 
the trade taxes and subsidies on the equilibrium outputs of 
the firms totally differentiate the first order conditions 
to obtain
(n+1) P7+ nyP77 m(P7 + yP77) dy ~ds
n(P7 + xP7/) (m+l)P7+ mxP77 dx dt-de
The solution is obtained by matrix inversion
dy 1
dx A
(m+l)P7 + mxP" -m(P7+ yP") 
-n(P7 + xP77) (n+1) P7 + nyP7
-ds
dt-de
(3.25)
Where A = ((n+m+1) P7+QP7/) P7 > 0.
When discussing the comparative static results for the 
effects of domestic and foreign trade policy the concept of 
strategic substitutes and complements will be particularly
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useful.10 Domestic output and foreign exports are strategic 
substitutes (complements) for the domestic country if an 
increase in foreign exports decreases (increases) the 
marginal profitability of of the domestic firms, that is 
d^/dxdy = P' + yP" < (>) 0. With strategic substitutes 
(complements) aggressive action by the foreign country, 
which increases foreign exports, will reduce (increase) the 
marginal profitability of domestic firms and hence lead to a 
reduction (increase) in domestic output. Similarly, domestic 
output and foreign exports are strategic substitutes 
(complements) for the foreign country, if an increase in 
domestic output decreases (increases) the marginal 
profitability of the foreign firms, that is 
d2n2/dydx - P' + xP" < (>) 0. Strategic complements can only 
occur if demand is sufficiently convex. Domestic output and 
foreign exports need not be strategic substitutes, or 
complements, for both countries. It could be that they are 
strategic substitutes for the domestic country and strategic 
complements for the foreign country. For this to be the case 
foreign exports must exceed domestic output, x > y, and 
demand must be sufficiently convex. They will be strategic 
substitutes for the domestic (foreign) country if the 
domestic (foreign) industry reaction function is downward 
sloping, at equilibrium, and strategic complements if it is 
upward sloping.11 Using the Hahn (1961-62) stability
10See Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) and also 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
11From the definitions of strategic substitutes, and
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condition to sign comparative static results rules out the 
possibility of strategic complements.
The effect of an import tariff on domestic output and 
foreign exports is
dY -mn(P'+yP") 
at A
(3.26)
ax m( (n+1) P'+nyP")
—  =    <  0
at A
The tariff reduces imports, foreign exports, and will 
increase (decrease) domestic industry output if domestic 
output and foreign exports are strategic substitutes 
(complements). With strategic complements a tariff has the 
unexpected effect of reducing domestic industry output. The 
tariff, by reducing imports, shifts the demand curve facing 
domestic firms outwards, and with convex demand it also 
makes the demand curve steeper. Domestic firms now face a 
less elastic demand curve and find it profitable to increase 
their price-cost margin rather than increase output. This 
shows that, under some circumstances, domestic firms may use 
protection with a tariff, to exploit their monopoly power by 
reducing output and increasing their profit margins. The 
effect of the tariff on the domestic price is
complements and the slope of the domestic and foreign 
reaction functions given by (3.12) and (3.15).
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ap m(P')
—  = ----- > 0 (3.27)
at A
As expected the import tariff increases the price in the 
domestic market. The effect of a tariff on the terms of 
trade is
ap -P' ((n+l)P'+QP")
 1 = ----------------  (3.28)
at A
A tariff will usually improve the domestic country's terms 
of trade, but it will worsen the terms of trade if 
((n+1) P'+QP") > 0, then the price increases by more than the 
amount of the tariff. With domestic production there will be 
price overshifting of a tariff if the relative convexity of 
demand, R < -(n+1), whereas with no domestic production it 
occured if R < -1. Hence, with domestic production a tariff 
is more likely to improve the terms of trade. A tax imposed 
on both domestic output and imports would be overshifted if 
R < -1, hence a tariff is less likely to be overshifted than 
a general tax. The effect of a tariff on foreign industry 
profits is
an ax , ap s
— 5 = (P - c - t) —  + X  1
at at  ^ at >
Using the comparative static results yields
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311 -XP'
2
at
£( (n+1) P' + ny P") + ((n+l)P'+ QP")j (3.29)
The first term in square brackets is negative but the second
term will be positive if there is price overshifting. A
tariff will increase the profits of foreign firms if the
price overshifting is sufficiently large. Profit
overshifting is less likely with a tariff than with a
12general tax, when it will occur if 2P' + QP" > 0. Both price 
and profit overshifting of a tariff are less likely when 
there is domestic production than when there is no domestic 
production. This is because the domestic firms are untaxed 
and so are likely to increase rather than reduce output, 
which will reduce the profits of the foreign industry. 
Domestic firms will only reduce output as a result of a 
tariff if domestic and foreign industry output are strategic 
complements.
The effect of a production subsidy on domestic output and 
foreign exports is
3Y -n( (m+1) P'+mxP")
—  =    >  0
3s A
(3.30)
ax nm(P'+xP")
3s A
12For constant elasticity demand curves, there is always 
price overshifting of a general tax and there will be profit 
overshifting if the elasticity of demand is less than unity.
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The production subsidy increases domestic output and will 
decrease (increase) foreign exports if domestic output and 
foreign exports are strategic substitutes (complements) for 
the foreign country. The effect of a production subsidy on 
price in the domestic market is
ap -n(P') 2
—  =   < 0 (3.31)
as a
As expected the production subsidy reduces the price in the 
domestic market.
The effect of a foreign export subsidy on domestic output 
and foreign exports is
ay mn(P'+yP") 
de A
(3.32)
ax -m( (n+1) P'+nyP")
—  =    >  0
de A
The foreign export subsidy increases foreign exports and 
will decrease (increase) domestic industry output if 
domestic output and foreign exports are strategic 
substitutes (complements) for the domestic industry. The use 
by Brander and Spencer (1985) of the Hahn (1961-62) 
stability condition rules out the possibility of strategic 
complements, and hence that a foreign export subsidy may
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increase domestic industry output. And, the effect of the 
foreign export subsidy on price in the domestic market is
ap -m(P')2
—  = -------  < 0 (3.33)
de A
The export subsidy reduces the price in the domestic market. 
The effects of an export subsidy are the opposite of the 
effects of an import tariff.
3.5 Conclusions
A proof of the existence of Cournot equilibrium in models of 
international trade, such as Dixit (1984), has been 
developed, which does not make the usual assumption that 
profit functions are concave. And, a simple proof was used 
to establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium. The 
comparative static results have been signed using only the 
assumptions employed to prove the existence and uniqueness 
of equilibrium. These results will be used in the following 
chapter to analyse trade policy.
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Figure 3.1: Cumulative Reaction Correspondence
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Figure 3.2: Industry Reaction Functions
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Chapter 4: Export Subsidies and Countervailing Tariffs
4.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the effect of retaliation on the 
profit shifting argument for export subsidies. As in chapter 
two trade policy is modelled as a multistage game, where the 
foreign country sets its export subsidy in the first stage, 
and the domestic country responds with an import tariff 
and/or production subsidy in the second stage. Here, the 
basic model is the homogeneous product Cournot oligopoly 
model analysed in chapter three. Surprisingly, it is shown 
that when the domestic country uses a tariff and production 
subsidy, a foreign export subsidy will increase both foreign 
and domestic welfare. When the domestic country uses only a 
tariff, a foreign export subsidy will generally reduce 
foreign welfare.
The effect of a foreign export subsidy on foreign and 
domestic welfare, when the domestic country pursues a policy 
of laissez-faire, is considered in section 4.2. A trade 
policy game when there is no domestic production is 
considered in section 4.3. Then, the trade policy games are 
analysed when there is domestic production. In section 4.4 
the domestic country can use an import tariff and production 
subsidy, an import tariff only in section 4.4, and a 
production subsidy only in section 4.5. In these sections,
144
the effect of a foreign export subsidy on domestic welfare 
when the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy is 
considered, and the optimal domestic response to a foreign 
export subsidy is derived. This is used to analyse the 
effect of a foreign export subsidy on foreign welfare, when 
the foreign country anticipates the response of the domestic 
country. And, then the optimal foreign export subsidy is 
derived. The conclusions are in section 4.7.
The basic model used in this chapter is the same as in 
chapter three, and in Dixit (1984). In chapter three a proof 
of the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium was 
presented, and the comparative static results for the 
effects of a domestic import tariff, production subsidy and 
a foreign export subsidy were derived. The comparative 
static results will be used in this chapter to analyse trade 
policy. In order to derive the optimal trade policies for 
the domestic and foreign country, measures of welfare are 
needed. This requires a further assumption about domestic 
consumer preferences: Domestic consumers are assumed to have 
preferences, for Q and a competitive numeraire good, that 
can be represented by a utility function which is additively 
separable and linear in the numeraire good. Therefore, the 
aggregate indirect utility function is of the form
V = V(P) + I (4.1)
145
Where I is national income. So by Roy's identity 3V/5P = -Q.
Domestic welfare is given by the sum of consumer surplus, 
domestic industry profits and government revenue. Demand for 
Q is independent of income, so consumer surplus is a valid 
welfare measure. Distributional considerations will be 
ignored. Thus, domestic welfare is
W = V(P) + (P - cx+ s)Y + tX - sY
= V(P) + (P -c^Y + tX (4.2)
Where (P -ci)Y is domestic producer surplus and tX is tariff 
revenue.
The foreign and domestic market are segmented and marginal 
cost is constant, hence the only impact exports have on 
foreign welfare is the profits they generate. Therefore, 
foreign welfare can be represented by producer surplus from 
exports, foreign industry profits net of export subsidies, 
that is
W = n - eX
2 2
= (P - C 2 -  t) X (4.3)
With these welfare measures it is now possible to analyse
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trade policy.
4.2 Foreign Export Subsidy
This section considers the effect of a foreign export 
subsidy on foreign and domestic welfare, in the absence of 
any domestic tariff or production subsidy. Firstly, consider 
the effect of a foreign export subsidy on foreign welfare. 
Brander and Spencer (1985) have shown that an export subsidy 
may increase foreign welfare, by committing foreign firms to 
increase output so that the foreign industry captures a 
larger share of total industry profits. The effect of a
foreign export subsidy on foreign welfare (4.3) is
aw ax ap
—  = (P - c ) —  + X —  (4.4)
ae de de
The effect of an export subsidy can be divided into two 
components. The first term is the profit shifting effect, 
the subsidy increases exports and since price exceeds 
marginal cost this has a positive effect on welfare. The 
second term is the terms of trade effect, the subsidy
reduces the price foreign firms receive for their exports 
which has a negative effect on welfare. The overall effect 
can be evaluated using the comparative static results from
chapter three, (3.32) and (3.33), and the first order
condition for profit maximisation by foreign firms, from 
(3.24) P - c2 = —xP/ — e, in equation (4.4). Evaluating at
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e = 0 , yields
aw mxP7
2 ((n-m+l)P'+nyP") (4.5)
de A
An export subsidy will increase foreign welfare if the 
number of foreign firms is not too large relative to the 
number of domestic firms and demand is not too convex. 
Brander and Spencer (1985) consider the case of a Cournot 
duopoly, with one foreign and one domestic firm, they assume 
the Hahn stability condition is satisfied so that domestic 
and foreign output are strategic substitutes, in this case 
an export subsidy always increases foreign welfare. But, if 
domestic and foreign output are strategic complements then 
an export subsidy will reduce foreign welfare, this is the 
case in a symmetric duopoly with constant elasticity demand 
functions with elasticity less than unity.”1 Eaton and 
Grossman (1986) have shown that if there is Bertrand 
competition rather than Cournot competition then an export 
subsidy will reduce welfare. The optimal export subsidy can 
be derived by setting 5WJde = 0 and solving this yields
In the case of a Cournot duopoly, the optimal export subsidy
-xP7 ((n-m+1) P7 +ny P77)
e (4.6)
(n+1) P7 +nyP77
^As Collie and de Meza (1986) have shown.
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shifts the industry equilibrium to where it would be if the 
foreign firm acted as a Stackelberg leader in the absence of 
the export subsidy.
The effect of the foreign export subsidy on the profits of 
the domestic industry, n = (P-ci)Y, is obtained by 
differentiation with respect to e, thus
an ay ap
— 1 = (P - C  ) —  + Y —  (4.7)
ae 3e 3e
Evaluating this expression using the comparative static 
results yields
an -nmyP'
— - = ----- (2P'+yP") < 0  (4.8)
de A
A foreign export subsidy will always reduce domestic 
industry profits, so the domestic industry is always going 
to be concerned about foreign subsidies. However, the effect 
of a foreign export subsidy on domestic welfare is not so 
clear. The effect of a foreign export subsidy on domestic 
welfare has been briefly considered by Dixit (1984) and by 
Mai and Hwang (1987). The effect of a foreign export subsidy 
on domestic welfare (4.2) is given by
aw ay ap
—  = (P-C.) X —  (4.9)
de de de
149
The export subsidy has two effects on domestic welfare. The
first term is the profit shifting effect, an export subsidy
reduces domestic output, in the case of strategic
substitutes, which reduces domestic welfare since price
exceeds marginal cost. With strategic complements the profit
shifting effect is positive. The second term is the terms of
trade effect, an export subsidy reduces the price of imports
thus improving the terms of trade. The reduction in the
price of domestically produced goods is a gain to consumers
but it also represents a loss of profit for domestic firms,
and therefore it has no net effect upon welfare. To evaluate
the welfare effect use the comparative static results from
chapter three and the first order condition for profit
maximisation by domestic firms, from (3.24) P - c = -yP',
2in the above expression (4.9) yields 
aw -mP' r
— - = --- (ny-mx) P' + ny2P" (4.10)
de A L J
The first term in brackets will be positive if imports 
exceed domestic production, that is if the import share is 
over a half. The second term will be positive if demand is 
convex, P" > 0, then an export subsidy shifts the industry 
to a new equilibrium where the demand curve is less steep 
and firms act more competitively. For linear demand an
2This is the same as the result derived by Dixit (1984) , 
equation (19) , but differs from that derived by Mai and 
Hwang (1987), equation (11), which is incorrect.
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export subsidy will increase domestic welfare if the import 
share is above a half. Then, imports take a large share of 
the domestic market so the positive terms of trade effect 
will dominate the negative profit shifting effect. Comparing 
the effect of a foreign export subsidy on foreign welfare 
(4.5) with the effect on domestic welfare (4.10), it is 
apparent that an export subsidy which increases foreign 
welfare is likely to reduce domestic welfare. An export 
subsidy is basically a beggar-my-neighbour-policy.
4.3 Foreign Export Subsidy and Domestic Import Tariff: No
Domestic Production
This section considers the interaction of domestic and
3foreign trade policy when there is no domestic production. 
The domestic country can use a rent extracting tariff to 
improve its terms of trade, as in Brander and Spencer 
(1984). For the foreign country, if there is no domestic 
production, then there is no profit shifting argument for an 
export subsidy. In fact, when there is more than one foreign 
firm the optimal policy is an export tax to exploit the 
foreign country's market power. However, when the foreign 
country has a first mover advantage, an export subsidy may 
be optimal if it brings about a lowering of the domestic
3 . . .It may be that there is no domestic production because the
foreign industry has a large cost advantage, so that 
domestic production is not worthwhile. See Dixit (1988), 
Venables (1986) and chapter 1.
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tariff.
Trade policy will be analysed as a multistage game. At stage 
one, the foreign government sets its export subsidy to 
maximise its national welfare. Then at the second stage, the 
domestic government sets its import tariff to maximise its 
national welfare in response to the foreign export subsidy. 
Finally, in the third stage, of the game firms set their 
outputs to maximise their profits given the foreign export 
subsidy and domestic import tariff. In a subgame perfect 
equilibrium the foreign government realises the effect its 
export subsidy will have upon the optimal domestic tariff 
and takes this into account when setting its export subsidy. 
To obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium the game is solved 
by backward induction.
The equilibrium of the final stage of the game was derived 
in chapter three. The comparative static results, for the 
effects of a domestic tariff and a foreign export subsidy 
when there is no domestic production are given in (3.21) and 
(3.22), and these can now be used to solve the second stage 
of the game.
At the second stage of the game, the domestic country sets 
its tariff to maximise national welfare given the foreign 
export subsidy. Maximising domestic welfare (4.2) with 
respect to t yields the first order condition
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aw , ap  ^ dQ
—  = - Q  i + t —  = o
at v> at J at
(4.11)
Using the comparative static results above to solve for the 
optimal tariff yields
t = -x(P' + QP") (4.12)
This is the same as the optimal tariff derived by Brander 
and Spencer (1984a). The tariff improves the terms of trade 
of the domestic country. An import subsidy, a negative 
tariff, is the optimal policy if the tariff is overshifted, 
see (3.22), and this occurs if the relative convexity of 
demand is less than minus one, R < -1. Then, an import 
subsidy reduces the price of imports by more than the amount 
of the subsidy, and so the gain in consumer surplus exceeds 
the cost of the subsidy.
To obtain the effect of the foreign export subsidy on the 
optimal import tariff totally differentiate the first order 
condition for welfare maximisation (4.11), to obtain
a2w dt a2w
 1 —  + ----   = o
at2 de aeat
Therefore, the effect of the foreign export subsidy on the 
optimal domestic tariff, the countervailing tariff fraction,
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is given by
dt a2w / a2w
de aeat/ at2
(4.13)
To evaluate this expression the second order partial 
derivatives have to be derived. Using the comparative static 
results to evaluate the first derivative of the welfare 
function (4.11), yields
aw.
Q(P7+QP77) + mt
at
Where D = (m+l)P7 + QP77< 0. To obtain a2W j/at2 differentiate 
awj/at with respect to t, and evaluating at an optimum where 
the term in square brackets is zero, yields
a2w 1 r 2 aQ
- = - (P7 + 3QP77+ Q P77 7 ) —  + m
D L at -Iat2
Using the comparative static results from (3.21) yields
a2w mU ¥V III f- -1
 - = - (P7+ 3QP77+ Q2p77/) + ((m+1) P7+ QP77) < 0 (4.14)
at D L J
Which must be negative to satisfy the second order condition 
for welfare maximisation. To obtain a2W i/aeat differentiate 
awi/at with respect to e, and evaluating at an optimum, 
yields
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a w  1 r dQ
   = - (P'+ 3qp77+ q2p777 ) —
aeat D L de
Using the comparative static results from (3.21) yields
 1 = - (p'+ 3QP"+ Q P 777 ) (4.15)
aeat d 2 L J
Hence, using (4.14) and (4.15) in (4.13) yields the optimal 
countervailing tariff fraction
dt (P7+3QP77+Q2P777)
—  = -------------------------------  < 1 (4.16)
de ((m+l)P7+QP7/) + (P7+3QP77+Q2P777 )
This is less than one since the denominator is negative from 
the second order condition for welfare maximisation, and 
(m+l)P7 + QP77< 0 by assumption (A2) . Dixit (1988) claimed 
that a fully countervailing tariff was optimal in this case 
but this is incorrect since he derived the optimal tariff 
incorrectly, see chapter 1 and Collie (1990). It is possible 
that the countervailing tariff fraction is negative if 
P7+ 3QP77+ Q2P777 > 0. For linear demand the countervailing 
tariff fraction is positive, dt/de = l/(m+2 ), which is one 
third when there is a single foreign firm and tends to zero 
as the number of foreign firms becomes large. For constant 
elasticity demand functions the countervailing tariff 
fraction is positive, dt/de = 1/ (m7]2-7)+l) where ri is the
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elasticity of demand, so 0 < dt/de < 1 since urn > 1. And,
for demand functions of the form P = a - blnQ it can be
shown that P7 + 3QP"+ Q2p/77 = o so that the countervailing
tariff fraction is zero, and the optimal domestic tariff is 
independent of the foreign export subsidy. A negative
countervailing tariff fraction does not occur with any of 
the standard functional forms, but it is still possible, in 
theory.
Now consider the first stage of the game when the foreign 
government sets its export subsidy to maximise its national 
welfare realising the effect its decision will have upon the 
optimal domestic tariff. The effect of an export subsidy on 
foreign welfare (4.3) is given by
aw
—  = (P + QP7- c - t)
ae
aQ aQ dt
ae at de
- Q
dt
de
(4.17)
The first term is the terms of trade effect it will be zero 
when there is a single foreign firm, since this firm fully 
exploits the market power of the foreign country. When there 
are many foreign firms, they do not fully exploit the 
foreign country's market power, due to competition among 
themselves, and in this case an export tax can be used 
restrict output to the monopoly position. So with many firms
By assumption (A2) (m+l)+ QP77<0, which for constant
elasticity demand functions implies urn > 1 .
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the terms of trade effect of an export subsidy will be 
negative. The second term is the countervailing tariff 
effect which will be negative (positive) if the 
countervailing tariff fraction is positive (negative). To 
obtain the optimal export subsidy set dlfl^ /de = 0 , then 
solving using the comparative static results (3.21), and the 
foreign firm's first order condition for profit maximisation 
(3.20), together with the optimal countervailing tariff 
fraction (4.16), yields
e = x [ (m-1) P' + (P'+SQP'+qV " )  ] (4.18)
The first term is the terras of trade effect, and the second 
term is the countervailing tariff effect. When there is a 
single foreign firm it acts as a monopolist, so the terms of 
trade effect is zero, and when the number of foreign firms 
is grater than one the terms of trade effect is negative. 
The second term is negative (positive) if the countervailing 
tariff fraction is positive (negative). Therefore, when 
there is a single foreign firm, the optimal foreign policy 
is an export subsidy if the countervailing tariff fraction
is negative. When the number of foreign firms is greater
than one, an export subsidy will be optimal if it reduces
the domestic tariff sufficiently to offset the negative
terms of trade effect. This is an example of where an export 
subsidy increases foreign welfare, not by shifting profits 
from domestic to foreign firms, but by altering the domestic
157
tariff to the advantage of the foreign country. However, 
although a negative countervailing tariff is possible in~ 
theory, it seems unlikely in practice.
Competition policy may also be used by the foreign country 
to alter the domestic import tariff to its advantage. Cowan 
(1989) shows that an increase in the number of foreign firms 
will induce a reduction in the domestic tariff if demand is 
not too convex, R >-1, which increases foreign welfare.
4.4 Foreign Export Subsidy, Domestic Import Tariff and 
Production Subsidy
This section analyses how retaliation effects the profit 
shifting argument for a foreign export subsidy when there is 
domestic production, and the domestic country can respond 
with a countervailing tariff and a production subsidy. In 
chapter two, with linear demand and national product 
differentiation, it was shown that with retaliation there 
was no profit shifting argument for an export subsidy. 
However, with non-linear demand functions there is an 
argument for export subsidies despite retaliation.
Trade policy is analysed as a multistage game, for which the 
appropriate solution is a subgame perfect equilibrium, this 
excludes the possibility of non-credible threats. At the 
first stage the foreign government sets its export subsidy
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to maximise its national welfare. Then in the second stage, 
the domestic government responds to the foreign export 
subsidy by setting its import tariff and production subsidy 
to maximise its national welfare. In the final stage, firms 
set their outputs to maximise profits given the trade 
policies set by the two governments in the previous stages. 
In a subgame perfect equilibrium the foreign government will 
set its export subsidy realising the effect this will have 
on the optimal tariff and production subsidy of the domestic 
country. The subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained by a 
process of backward induction. Firstly, the Nash equilibrium 
of the final stage is obtained then this solution is used to 
derive the Nash equilibrium of the second stage. The 
solution to the second stage is then used to derive the Nash 
equilibrium of the first stage. One thus obtains the subgame 
perfect equilibrium for the entire game.
The Nash equilibrium of the final stage of the game was 
obtained in chapter three. The comparative static results 
for the effects of a domestic tariff, production subsidy and 
a foreign export subsidy, (3.26) to (3.33), can now be used 
to solve for the rest of the game. In the second stage of 
the game, the domestic government sets its import tariff and 
production subsidy to maximise national welfare given the 
foreign export subsidy. Assume there is an interior 
solution, where the market is supplied by both imports and
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5domestic production. Maximising domestic welfare (4.2) with 
respect to t and s yields the first order conditions
aw , ap s ay ax
— - = x i  + ( P - c )  —  + t —  = o
at I* at > 1 at at
(4.19)
aw ap ay ax
— - = - x —  + ( P - c )  —  + t —  = o 
as as 1 as as
The first term is the terms of trade effect, the second term 
is the domestic distortion, or profit shifting, effect and 
the third term is the tariff revenue effect. Using the 
comparative static results from chapter three in (4.19), 
yields
m((n+l)P' + nyP") -nm(P' + yP") 
mn(P'+ xP") -n((m+l)P'+ mxP")
t
P-c
-mxP# ((n+1) P'+ QP") 
-mxP' nP'
Solving for the optimal policies then yields
t = -x(P' + mxP")
(4.20)
This requires the foreign firms to have a cost advantage, 
but not so large that domestic production is not worthwhile: 
0 < c - c2 + e < -2xP' . See Dixit (1988) and chapter 1.
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P - c = -x(mxP") =» s = -yP' + x(mxP")
These correspond to the optimal policies obtained by Dixit 
(1988) using a different method.6 The formula for the 
optimal tariff is a generalisation of the result obtained by 
Brander and Spencer (1984). It is possible that the optimal 
policy is an import subsidy, this will be the case if demand 
is sufficiently convex and import penetration is large. For 
linear demand domestic production should be subsidised until 
price equals marginal cost, but when demand is concave 
(convex) price should be above (below) marginal cost. The 
explanation is that if demand is concave (convex), then a 
decrease (increase) in the subsidy shifts the equilibrium up 
(down) the demand curve making demand less steep, and so 
reducing the price-cost margin of foreign firms thus 
improving the terms of trade. So when demand is non-linear 
the production subsidy has a role in improving the terms of 
trade as well as correcting the domestic distortion. The 
overall level of protection for the domestic industry is 
always positive since t + s = -(x+y)P' > 0.
Now consider the effect of a foreign export subsidy on 
domestic welfare, when the domestic government sets its 
tariff and production subsidy optimally
The method used here allows the second order conditions and 
the comparative static results for the optimal policies to 
be derived.
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awa awi dt awi ds
de de dt de ds de
Since the import tariff and production subsidy are set 
optimally, dVI^ /dt = awyas = 0. Therefore, only the direct 
effect of a foreign export subsidy on domestic welfare has 
to be considered, because any induced changes in the tariff 
and production subsidy will have no effect on welfare since 
at an optimum their effect on welfare is zero. Hence, the 
effect of the foreign export subsidy on domestic welfare 
(4.2) is
dw ap ay ax
— - = -x —  + ( P - c )  —  + t —  
de ae 1 de de
And using the comparative static results from chapter three 
and the optimal policies from (4.20) yields
dW
— - = X > 0 (4.22)
de
A foreign export subsidy always increases domestic welfare 
if the domestic country pursues an optimal trade and 
industrial policy. This is not surprising. If the domestic 
country applied fully countervailing tariffs then the only 
effect would be to increase tariff revenue, and hence to 
increase domestic welfare.
162
To obtain the comparative static results for a change in the 
foreign export subsidy totally differentiate the first order 
conditions for welfare maximisation (4.19), this yields
a2w i a2wi dt a2w i
at2 asat de aeat
a2 w i a2w i ds a2 w i
atas as2 de deds
The second order conditions for a welfare maximum require 
that the above Hessian matrix is negative definite. 
Therefore, the elements in the principal diagonal must be 
negative and the determinant must be positive.
A detailed derivation of the second order partial- 
derivatives, and the comparative static results is providedl 
in Appendix A. The second order partial derivatives* 
evaluated at the welfare maximum are
d2W mP'
1 2^ ((n+1) P' + QP")2+ mZ
at2 A2
a2W n2P'
- = — - [2m(P')2 + z
as2 a
a2w nmP'1UUX" I- 1
- = --- 2P/((n+l)P/+ QP") - Z
s a 2 L Jatas
a2w nmP' 1_ _ ___
asat a 2
2^P' ((n+1) P' + QP") - zj
(4.24)
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a2w -mP' r
   = --- ((n+1)P' + QP") ((n-m+l)P' + QP")
aeat A2 L
+ mxP" ((n+m+1) P' + QP") + mZ
a w  -nmP' r
 - = --- P'((n-m+l)P' + QP") - xP"((n+ m+l)P' + QP7/) - Z
ae3s A2 L
Where Z = [(P')2+ mx2(P/P,,/- 2(P")2)]
The determinant of the Hessian matrix can be shown to be
H =
a2w
at4
a2w
atas
a2 w
asat
a2w
ds‘
2n2mZ
(4.25)
Therefore, the second order conditions for a welfare maximum 
will be satisfied if Z > 0. If Z is positive everywhere, 
then there is a unique welfare maximum, and unique optimal 
policies.
Using these results to solve for the optimal countervailing 
tariff response to a foreign export subsidy yields
dt 1 
de H
a2w
aeat
a2w
deds
a2w
asat
a2w
as'
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dt 1 mxP' P" 
de 2 Z
(4.26)
The optimal response to a foreign export subsidy, when
demand is linear, is to increase the import tariff by half
the amount of the export subsidy as Dixit (1984) has shown.
If demand is convex (concave) then the optimal
countervailing fraction is less (greater) than a half.
Therefore, it is possible that if demand is sufficiently
concave a fully countervailing tariff is optimal. This
. . 7result generalises Dixit (1988). The effect of a foreign 
export subsidy on the optimal domestic production subsidy is
a2w a2w 1_ _  1_
at2 aeat
a2w a2w
 i_ _   i_
atas aeds
ds -m r 1 xP" ((n+1) P'+ QP")
     +   (4.27)
de n L 2 Z J
If demand is linear then, ds/de = -m/2n, and a foreign 
export subsidy reduces the domestic production subsidy. The 
reduction will be larger the greater the number of foreign 
firms and the smaller the number of domestic firms. With
7 . . . . . .Dixit (1988) shows that the optimal countervailing tariff
fraction is a half for linear demand, and less than a half 
for constant elasticity demand functions.
ds 1 
de H
165
non-linear demand a foreign export subsidy will usually 
reduce the optimal domestic production subsidy. It is 
possible, if demand is sufficiently convex, that a foreign 
export subsidy will increase the optimal domestic production 
subsidy. When demand is concave (convex) the increase in the 
tariff and the reduction in the production subsidy are 
greater (smaller) than with linear demand. These results can 
now be used to solve the first stage of the game.
In the first stage of the game the foreign government sets 
its export subsidy to maximise its national welfare,
realising the effect that its decision will have upon the 
optimal tariff and production subsidy set by the domestic 
country in the second stage. The effect of an export subsidy 
on foreign exports is
dx ax ax dt ax ds
de ae at de 3s de
Using the comparative static results from chapter three and
the optimal countervailing tariff and production subsidy
responses, (4.26) and (4.27), yields
dX -m p 1 mx2(P")2
—  =   - + -------  > 0 (4.28)
de P' L 2 Z J
An export subsidy increases exports despite the
countervailing tariff and production subsidy. The effect of
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the export subsidy on foreign welfare (4.3) is
dW
de
= (P-c -t)
f ax ax dt ax ds 1
ae at de as de
+ X
f ap , ap % dt ap ds ]
_  + —  i _  + —
de ' ft*" * flede ds de
(4.29)
The first term is the profit shifting effect, and the second 
term is the terms of trade effect. The countervailing 
tariff, if it is positive, will reduce the profit shifting 
effect of the export subsidy, and worsen the terms of trade 
unless there is price overshifting of the tariff. Whereas, 
the countervailing production subsidy, if it is negative, 
will increase the profit shifting effect of the export 
subsidy, and improve the terms of trade. Using the 
comparative static results from chapter three, and the 
optimal countervailing tariff and production subsidy 
responses from (4.26) and (4.27), to evaluate at e=0, yields
dW2 x(mxP") 
de Z
(4.30)
An export subsidy increases foreign welfare, if demand is 
non-linear, despite the countervailing response from the 
domestic government. The export subsidy will increase 
foreign welfare when there is retaliation even when it would 
not increase welfare in the absence of retaliation. This may 
seem counterintuitive, but it should be remembered that
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although the countervailing tariff will tend to reduce 
foreign welfare, the countervailing production subsidy will 
tend to increase foreign welfare, so it is not surprising 
that the overall effect is positive. In chapter two, with 
linear demand and product differentiation, the overall 
effect was negative. The foreign export subsidy increases 
foreign welfare, and it has been shown, see (4.22), that a 
foreign export subsidy increases domestic welfare. Hence, a 
foreign export subsidy increases the welfare of both 
countries. Setting dW2/de = 0, and solving yields the 
optimal foreign export subsidy
-2mx3P7 (P77)2
e = ----------------  * 0 (4.31)
[ (P7) 2+ mx2P7P7 77 ]
The optimal foreign export subsidy is positive when demand 
is non-linear. In chapter two, with linear demand, the 
optimal foreign policy was an export tax if the domestic and 
foreign products were imperfect substitutes.
A foreign export subsidy has been shown to increase both 
domestic and foreign welfare, when the domestic country 
retaliates with a countervailing tariff and production 
subsidy.
4.5 Foreign Export Subsidy and Domestic Import Tariff
In the previous section the domestic government was able to
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use both an import tariff and a production subsidy to 
countervail the foreign export subsidy, but in practice 
governments tend to use only import tariffs. Article VI of 
the GATT does not mention the possibility of using 
production subsidies to countervail foreign export 
subsidies, although this does not prevent a country from 
using production subsidies. For the EEC, the countervailing 
duty regulations require that foreign export subsidies are 
countered with tariffs and there is no role for production 
subsidies. In this section, the domestic government is 
assumed to use only an import tariff. Therefore, at the 
first stage of the game the foreign government sets its 
export subsidy to maximise its national welfare. Then, in 
the second stage, the domestic government sets its import 
tariff to maximise its national welfare given the foreign 
export subsidy. And, in the final stage, firms set their 
outputs to maximise profits given the export subsidy and 
tariff. In a subgame perfect equilibrium, the foreign 
government realises the effect its export subsidy will have 
on the optimal domestic tariff and takes this into account 
when setting the export subsidy. As usual the game is solved 
by backward induction. The equilibrium of the final stage of 
the game was derived in the chapter three, and the 
comparative static results derived there can now be used to 
solve the second stage of the game.
When the domestic government could use an import tariff and
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production subsidy it had two policies to deal with two 
distortions. The import tariff was used basically to improve 
the terms of trade whereas the production subsidy was used 
to correct the domestic distortion, although for non-linear 
demand the production subsidy had a role in improving the 
terms of trade. With no production subsidy, price will 
exceed marginal cost in the domestic industry, and the 
tariff will be used to shift profits from foreign to 
domestic firms.
At the second stage the domestic government sets its import 
tariff to maximise its national welfare in response to the 
foreign export subsidy. The optimal tariff when there is 
domestic production has been derived by Brander and Spencer
o
(1984b). Assume there is an interior solution. Maximising 
domestic welfare (4.2) with respect to t yields the first 
order condition
aw , ap x ay ax
— - = X I  + ( P - c )  —  + t —  = 0 (4.32)
at  ^ at ' 1 at at
Solving for the optimal tariff yields
O
Venables (1986), for the case of constant elasticity demand 
functions, shows that there may be two local welfare 
maximum. One with a negative tariff and no domestic 
production, and one with a positive tariff and domestic 
production.
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The dual role of the tariff in this case is clear. The first 
term in square brackets is the terms of trade effect, and 
the second is the profit shifting effect. Substitute the 
comparative static results from chapter three into the 
above, and using the profit maximisation condition for 
domestic firms, P-ci = -yP', then yields the optimal tariff
-xP' ((n+l)P' + QP") -yP' (nP'+nyP")
t = ---------------------------------  (4.34)
(n+1)P' + nyP"
The sign of the optimal tariff is ambiguous, for linear and 
concave demand functions it is clearly positive, but for 
convex demand it may be negative. If demand is sufficiently 
convex there will be price over-shifting of the tariff, this 
will occur if the relative convexity of demand, R < -(n+1). 
When this occurs the tariff increases the the price by more 
than the amount of the tariff which worsens the terms of 
trade. In this case the terms of trade effect is negative. 
Also, with convex demand a tariff may actually reduce 
domestic production, this occurs when domestic and foreign 
output are strategic complements nP' + nyP" < 0, and then the 
profit shifting effect of the tariff is negative. So for 
sufficiently convex demand functions it is possible that 
both the terms of trade effect and the profit shifting 
effect may be negative in which case the optimal tariff will
be negative. If the optimal policy is an import subsidy then 
the level of protection for domestic firms will be negative 
whereas when both a production subsidy and a tariff were 
used the overall level of protection was always positive.
An interesting point to note is that the optimal tariff may
exceed the maximum revenue tariff, in contrast to
conventional trade theory where the optimum tariff is always
9less than the maximum revenue tariff. Since the 
conventional optimum tariff maximises welfare, which is the 
sum of consumer surplus and tariff revenue, then an increase 
in the tariff beyond the maximum revenue level will reduce 
both tariff revenue and, since it increases the price, 
consumer surplus. Therefore, the optimum tariff cannot 
exceed the maximum revenue tariff. But, with oligopolistic 
industries there are pure profits which have to be included 
in welfare, and it is possible that an increase in the 
tariff beyond the maximum revenue level will increase 
profits by more than tariff revenue and consumer surplus are 
reduced. So the optimal tariff may exceed the maximum 
revenue tariff. The condition for this to occur can be seen 
from
aw , ax x ap ay
— - = x + t —  - x  —  + (P - c ) —  
at I* at ' at 1 at
9See Johnson (1951-52) . He notes that this result will not 
apply if a tariff causes the price of imports to fall, but 
here a tariff increases the price.
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At the maximum revenue tariff, the first term in brackets is 
zero so the optimal tariff will exceed the maximum revenue 
tariff if awyat is positive at this point. The second term 
is the effect on consumer surplus of the tariff which is 
negative, and the third term is the profit shifting effect 
of the tariff which is positive if domestic and foreign 
output are strategic substitutes. The condition for the 
optimal tariff to exceed the maximum revenue tariff can be 
seen by using the comparative static results in the above 
which yields
aw mP' r
— - = --- (ny-mx) P' + ny2P" > 0 (4.35)
at A L J
If this is positive, when evaluated at the maximum revenue 
tariff, then the optimal tariff exceeds the maximum revenue 
tariff. For linear demand this requires that domestic 
production exceeds imports.10
In section 4.2 it was shown that, in the absence of domestic 
intervention, domestic welfare may be reduced by a foreign 
export subsidy. However, in the previous section it was 
shown that when the domestic government sets its import
For a Cournot duopoly where the domestic and foreign firm 
have identical costs, domestic production will exceed 
imports since the maximum revenue tariff is obviously 
positive.
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tariff and production subsidy optimally then a foreign
export subsidy will always increase domestic welfare. The 
effect of a foreign export subsidy on domestic welfare when 
the domestic country sets its import tariff optimally is 
given by
dwt 5Wt 3Wi dt
de de at de
Since the import tariff is set optimally, SV^/dt = 0. 
Therefore, only the direct effect of the foreign export 
subsidy on domestic welfare has to be considered since any 
induced changes in the tariff will have no effect on
welfare, because at an optimum its effect on welfare is
zero. Hence, the effect of the foreign export subsidy on
domestic welfare (4.2) is
dw aw ap ay ax
— - = — - = -X —  + ( P - c )  —  + t —  (4.36)
de 3e de 1 de de
The first term, the terms of trade effect, is positive since 
an export subsidy reduces the domestic price. The second 
term, the profit shifting effect, is negative if domestic 
and foreign output are strategic substitutes. Then, an
export subsidy reduces domestic production and hence since 
price exceeds marginal cost reduces domestic profits. The 
third term, the tariff revenue effect, is positive if there 
is a positive tariff since the export subsidy increases 
imports and hence tariff revenue.
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To determine the overall effect note that the effect of an 
export subsidy is the negative of the effect of a tariff so
dW 3P
-X —  + (P
at
ay ax
—  + t —
at at
i
de
From the first order condition for the optimal tariff 
(4.32), this reduces to
Whenever the domestic government sets its import tariff 
optimally it will gain from a foreign export subsidy. An 
increase in the foreign export subsidy is equivalent to a 
reduction in the tariff for the domestic country except that 
there is no tariff revenue effect. So if the domestic tariff 
is set optimally then a reduction in the tariff has no 
effect on welfare, but an increase in the export subsidy 
will increase welfare since it does not involve the loss of 
tariff revenue that would occur with a tariff reduction. 
Thus, the welfare gain is equal to this tariff revenue 
effect.
To obtain the effect of a foreign export subsidy on the 
optimal domestic tariff totally differentiate the first 
order condition (4.32) which yields
dW
X > 0 (4.37)
de
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a2w dt a2w
i . i o
at2 de aeat
Therefore, the effect of a foreign export subsidy on the 
optimal import tariff, the optimal countervailing fraction, 
is given by
From appendix B the second order partial derivatives are 
a2W mN mP7 r
 - = —  + ((n-m+1) P7 + nyP77) N 2 + B < 0
at2 A A N L -I
Which must be negative from the second order condition for 
welfare maximisation.
P 2 T*T — •m'D7
where Z, N and B are defined as 
Z = [(P')2+ mx2(P/P///- 2 (P7/)2) ] > 0 
N = (n+1)P7+ nyP" < 0
B = m(n+l) P7 Z+ (mxP") 2(nP7+2N) +3mxP//N2+mny2P/ (P7 P7// -2 (P7/)2)
(4.38)
(“) (-) (-/+) (-/+>
The sign of dt/de will be the same as the sign of a2W i/aeat
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which has the opposite sign to the term in square brackets. 
This cannot be signed from the second order conditions. The 
first term in square brackets will be negative, if a foreign 
export subsidy increases foreign welfare in the absence of 
any countervailing response by the domestic country see 
equation (4.5). This will tend to make dt/de positive. So 
the larger the potential for profit shifting export 
subsidies the larger will be the countervailing tariffs that 
the domestic country applies to foreign exports. The second 
term in square brackets, B, has an ambiguous sign. Looking 
at the definition of B, the first two terms are clearly 
negative, the third term is negative (positive) for concave 
(convex) demand functions and the fourth term is ambiguous. 
For linear demand functions B will be negative, but for 
constant elasticity demand functions both the third and 
fourth terms will be positive so the overall sign is 
unclear. Although there is some ambiguity about the sign of 
B it seems most likely that it is negative. If B is negative 
this will tend to make dt/de positive. The overall sign of 
dt/de is unclear even for linear demand functions and will 
be negative if the number of foreign firms is large relative 
to the number of domestic firms. However, if the export 
subsidy would increase foreign welfare, when there are no 
countervailing tariffs (n-m+l)P' + nyP" < 0 from (4.5), and B 
is negative then the domestic country will respond with 
countervailing tariffs, dt/de is positive. It is possible to 
show that fully countervailing tariffs are never justified,
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from above
dt mN
1 ----= —  > 0  (4.39)
de Aft
Where ft = a2W /at2< 0. Therefore, it follows that dt/de < 1. 
When the domestic government uses only an import tariff then 
the optimal policy is a less than fully countervailing 
tariff. This supports the conclusion of Dixit (1988) that 
only partially countervailing tariffs are justified. And, it 
is even possible that the optimal response to a foreign 
export subsidy is to reduce the tariff.
Now consider the first stage of the game, when the foreign 
government sets its export subsidy to maximise its national 
welfare realising the effect this will have upon the optimal 
tariff set by the domestic government in the next stage of 
the game. The effect of an export subsidy on foreign welfare
(4.3), taking into account the effect it has on the optimal 
domestic tariff, is given by
dW
de
r ax ax dt ' r ap r ap ^ dt ’
t) —  + — — + X -  + I---A —de\ at de J de I at J de / (4.40)
The first term is the profit shifting effect, and the second 
term is the terms of trade effect. The countervailing tariff 
will, if it is positive, reduce the profit shifting effect 
of the export subsidy and worsen the terms of trade, unless
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there is price overshifting of the tariff. To evaluate the 
overall effect, use the comparative static results from 
chapter three, and the optimal countervailing tariff 
fraction from above, in (4.40). Hence, the overall effect, 
evaluated at e = 0 , is
dW -m2xP'B
— 2 = ------ (4.41)
de A2GN
The sign of the welfare effect is the same as the sign of B, 
which although it ambiguous is likely to be negative. For 
linear demand B is certainly negative, but for constant 
elasticity demand functions it is ambiguous. Therefore, the 
effect of a foreign export subsidy on foreign welfare is 
likely to be negative when the domestic government responds 
with countervailing tariffs. This confirms the assertion of 
Bhagwati (1988) that a country which uses profit shifting 
policies is likely to lose if retaliation occurs.
The optimal export subsidy can be derived by setting 
dW^/de = 0 and solving for the optimal e, which yields
xP'B
e = — - (4.42)
N3
The optimal policy will be an export tax if B is negative. 
As in chapter two, the foreign country should tax its 
exports. There is no profit shifting argument for export
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subsidies when the domestic country retaliates with 
countervailing tariffs.
In the numerical model of Gasiorek et al (1989), a Japanese 
export subsidy to the computer industry will increase 
Japanese welfare despite retaliation with a countervailing 
tariff by the EC. Whereas, a Japanese export subsidy to the 
vehicle industry will reduce Japanese welfare when there is 
retaliation. The result for the computer industry contrasts 
with the above proposition that a foreign export subsidy 
will usually reduce foreign welfare when there is 
retaliation with a countervailing tariff. The explanation is 
that in the numerical model of Gasiorek et al marginal cost 
is decreasing, and a Japanese export subsidy will have an 
impact on the Japanese market. An export subsidy will reduce 
the price in the Japanese market and increase consumer 
surplus. The export subsidy is operating like a production 
subsidy, and correcting the distortion in the Japanese 
market, as well as shifting profits to Japanese firms. 
Since, economies of scale are assumed to be larger in the 
computer industry than in the vehicle industry, the domestic 
distortion effect will be more significant in the case of 
the computer industry. If Japan could use a production 
subsidy and an export subsidy, then the production subsidy 
would be used to correct the domestic distortion and the 
export subsidy to shift profits. Then, the optimal Japanese 
policy when faced with retaliation would probably be a
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production subsidy and an export tax. There will be no 
profit shifting argument for an export subsidy when there is 
retaliation with a countervailing tariff.
4.6 Foreign Export Subsidy and Domestic Production Subsidy
In the previous section the domestic government used an 
import tariff to improve its terms of trade and to shift 
profits to the domestic industry. An alternative policy is 
to use a production subsidy, and this section will consider 
the same trade policy game when the domestic government uses 
only a production subsidy. At the first stage of the game, 
the foreign government sets its export subsidy to maximise 
its national welfare. Then, in the second stage, the 
domestic government sets its production subsidy to maximise 
its national welfare given the foreign export subsidy. And, 
in the final stage, the firms set their outputs given the 
foreign export subsidy and domestic production subsidy. 
Again, a subgame perfect equilibrium is required so that any 
threats of retaliation have to be credible. The foreign 
government realises the effect its export subsidy will have 
upon the the optimal production subsidy set by the domestic 
country when it makes its decision. As usual the game is 
solved by backward induction. The equilibrium of the final 
stage of the game was derived in chapter three and the 
comparative static results derived there can now be used to 
solve the second stage of the game.
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At the second stage of the game the domestic government sets 
its production subsidy to maximise its national welfare 
given the foreign export subsidy. So the effect of a 
domestic production subsidy on welfare (4.2) is
aw ap ay
— - = -X —  + (P-c ) —  (4.43)
as as 1 as
The first term is the terms of trade effect, the production 
subsidy lowers the domestic price and so reduces the cost of 
imports to the domestic economy. The second term is the
profit shifting effect, a production subsidy expands the
output of the domestic industry which increases welfare if 
price exceeds marginal cost. To obtain the optimal policy 
set awyas = 0 and solve for P-ci, yields
ap /  ay 
p - c  = x —  / —
1 as/ as
Using the comparative static results from chapter three in 
the above leads to
mx(P')2
P - c = ------------  < 0 (4.44)
1 (m+1)P7 +mxP77
The optimal policy is to subsidise domestic production so 
that price is actually below marginal cost. If price was 
above marginal cost then both the profit shifting effect and
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the terms of trade effect are positive and so the overall 
effect on welfare is positive. Therefore, at the optimum 
price is below marginal cost so that, at the margin, the 
loss of producer surplus is just equal to the terms of trade 
gain. Since the production subsidy improves the terms of 
trade, it pays to subsidise production beyond the point
required to correct the domestic distortion, where price 
equals marginal cost.
In the previous section it was shown that when the domestic 
government sets its import tariff optimally it will always 
gain from a foreign export subsidy. Now consider the effect 
of a foreign export subsidy when the domestic government
sets its production subsidy optimally. The effect of a
foreign export subsidy on domestic welfare (4.2) is given by
dwt dWi aWj ds
de de ds de
Since at an optimum the effect of a change in the production 
subsidy on domestic welfare is zero, awyas = 0 , only the 
direct effect of the export subsidy on domestic welfare, 
evaluated at the optimum, is relevant. Thus
aw ap ay
— - = -X —  + (P-C ) —  (4.45)
de de 1 de
The first term, the terms of trade effect, will be positive
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since the export subsidy reduces the domestic price and so 
lowers the cost of imports. The second term, the profit 
shifting effect, will be positive (negative) if domestic and 
foreign output are strategic substitutes (complements) since 
price is below marginal cost at the optimum. Hence, a 
reduction in domestic output will increase domestic welfare. 
The overall effect can be evaluated by using the comparative 
static results in chapter three and the optimal P-ci from 
above, yields
dW mXP'
— - = ------------  > 0 (4.46)
de (m+l)P'+mxP"
If the domestic government sets its production subsidy 
optimally it will always gain from a foreign export subsidy. 
In the previous sections the gain was equal to X, but here 
the gain will be larger (smaller) than this if P'+mxP" is 
positive (negative).
To obtain the effect of a foreign export subsidy on the 
optimal domestic production subsidy totally differentiate 
the first order condition (4.43), which yields
a2w ds a2w
— _ i —  +  L = o
ds de deds
Therefore, the effect of a foreign export subsidy on the 
optimal production subsidy, the countervailing subsidy
184
fraction, is given by
ds a2w / a2w
—   -----1 /  (4.47)
de deds/ ds
From appendix C the second order partial derivatives 
evaluated at the welfare maximum are
d2Wi n2(!>')2
as2 A2M
M^2 + m2(P')2+ mzj < 0
Which must be negative to satisfy the second order 
conditions for a welfare maximum.
a2W x nm(P')2 
aeas A2M
|y+ m2(P')2+ mZ - (m+1) aJ
Where
M = (m+1)P'+mxP" < 0 
Z = [(P')2+ mx2(P/P///-2(P,/)2) ] > 0
The countervailing subsidy fraction is
ds
de
m
n
(m+1)A
1 -
M2 + m 2 (P')2 + mZ
(4.48)
The sign of this is ambiguous, but for linear demand 
functions it reduces to
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ds m 
de n
n - m
2m + 1
(4.49)
In the case of duopoly, with one foreign and one domestic 
firm, the countervailing subsidy fraction is zero so the 
optimal domestic production subsidy is independent of the 
foreign export subsidy. The countervailing subsidy fraction 
will be positive (negative) if the number of domestic firms 
is greater (smaller) than the number of foreign firms. It 
was shown in section 4.2 that that a foreign export subsidy 
would increase foreign welfare, in the absence of 
retaliation, if n-m+1 > 0. Therefore, if the countervailing 
subsidy fraction is positive then the foreign export subsidy 
would increase foreign welfare in the absence of 
retaliation. And if the export subsidy would reduce foreign 
welfare, in the absence of retaliation, then the 
countervailing subsidy fraction will be negative.
Now consider the final stage of the game when the foreign 
government sets its export subsidy to maximise its national 
welfare, realising the effect its decision will have upon 
the optimal production subsidy set by the domestic 
government in the second stage. The effect of an export 
subsidy on foreign welfare (4.3), taking into account the 
effect it has on the domestic production subsidy is given by
dWn ' ax ax ds r ap ap ds
= (P-c) —  + — — + X —  + — —
de 2 aeI dS de J ae ds de J
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The first term is the profit shifting effect, and the second 
term is the terms of trade effect. If the countervailing 
subsidy fraction is positive (negative) then this will 
weaken (strengthen) the the welfare effect of the foreign 
export subsidy. Using the comparative static results from 
chapter three, and the countervailing subsidy fraction, to 
evaluate the welfare effect at e = 0 , yields
dW
de
= X
(P'+mxP") + mZ + (m-l)mxP/P/
M2 + m2(P')2 + mZ
(4.51)
When demand is concave or there is only one foreign firm, 
the effect of the export subsidy on foreign welfare is 
positive. It may be negative if if demand is convex and the 
number of foreign firms is grater than one. To obtain the 
optimal export subsidy set dW g/de = 0 and use 
P - c2= -xP' - e, yields
e = -xP'
(P'+mxP") + mZ + (m-IJmxP' P" 
(P'+mxP")2+ mZ2+ (m-l)P'M + (m+l)(P')2
(4.52)
The optimal policy will be an export subsidy if demand is 
concave or if there is only one foreign firm. But if demand 
is convex and there is more than one foreign firm then the 
optimal policy may be an export tax.
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4.7 Conclusions
The domestic country may suffer a welfare loss as a result 
of a foreign export subsidy if it pursues a policy of 
laissez-faire. It was shown that export subsidies are 
basically a beggar-my-neighbour policy, they increase 
foreign welfare at the expense of the domestic country. 
However, when the domestic country pursues an optimal trade 
and industrial policy, using an import tariff, production 
subsidy or both, then it will always gain from a foreign 
export subsidy. The optimal domestic response to a foreign 
export subsidy, when the domestic country uses a tariff and 
a production subsidy is generally to increase the tariff and 
reduce the production subsidy. The optimal countervailing 
tariff fraction is greater (less) than a half when demand is 
concave (convex). When the domestic country uses a tariff, 
its optimal response to a foreign export subsidy is usually 
to increase the tariff, but a reduction may be optimal. The 
optimal countervailing tariff is always less than one, so a 
fully countervailing tariff is never justified. The optimal 
domestic response to a foreign export subsidy when the 
domestic country uses a production subsidy is ambiguous.
When the domestic country uses an import tariff and 
production subsidy to countervail foreign export subsidies 
then the foreign country gains from an export subsidy, 
unless demand is linear when the effect is zero, despite the
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retaliation. The optimal foreign policy is to subsidise 
exports. The domestic and foreign country both gain from a 
foreign export subsidy. This is a surprising result. When 
the domestic country uses only a tariff a foreign export 
subsidy will generally reduce foreign welfare. There is 
usually no profit shifting argument for an export subsidy 
when the domestic country retaliates with countervailing 
tariffs. When the domestic country uses only a production 
subsidy, the effect of a foreign export subsidy on foreign 
welfare is ambiguous.
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Chapter 5: Export Subsidies, Entry Deterrence and
Countervailing Tariffs
5.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the effect of retaliation, when the 
foreign country uses an export subsidy to deter the entry of 
domestic firms. Although there is now a large literature on 
strategic trade policy little attention has been paid to the 
formal modelling of trade wars and retaliation. The 
exceptions are Dixit and Kyle (1985) and Dixit (1988). 
Despite this lack of any formal models, Bhagwati (1988) and 
Grossman (1986) have asserted that if retaliation occurs 
then both countries will be left worse off. Hence, it is 
argued that retaliation negates the strategic rationale for 
trade policies such as export subsidies. It seems plausible 
that a foreign export subsidy is likely to result in the 
domestic country retaliating with countervailing tariffs 
which will leave the foreign country worse off. This chapter 
follows Dixit and Kyle (1985) and models trade policy as a 
multistage game. The results are that when the domestic 
country retaliates with countervailing tariffs the optimal 
foreign policy is a zero export subsidy. However, if the 
domestic country retaliates with countervailing tariffs and 
production subsidies then the optimal foreign policy may be 
an export subsidy.
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Dixit and Kyle (1985) analysed the use of protection and 
subsidies for entry promotion and deterrence. In their 
model, based upon the Airbus example, an incumbent firm in 
the US faces the potential entry of a firm in the EC. They 
model trade policy as a multistage game in which the two 
countries have the choice of free trade or protection: a
complete prohibition of imports. The US has an incentive to 
use protection to deter the entry of the EC firm since if 
entry occurs the US firm will earn duopoly profits rather 
than monopoly profits. The EC can use protection to make 
entry profitable for the EC firm. The equilibrium of the 
trade policy game depends on the order of play and the 
ability of governments to pre-commit to particular policies. 
One possibility is that the US may gain by committing itself 
to free trade which makes it unnecessary for the EC to use 
protection to promote entry. Dixit (1988) analyses the 
optimal trade policy in an oligopoly, and derives the 
domestic country's optimal countervailing tariff and subsidy 
response to a foreign export subsidy. He shows that only 
partially countervailing tariffs are justified. Chapter four 
extended this analysis to derive the optimal export subsidy 
for the foreign country when the domestic country retaliates 
with countervailing tariffs and/or production subsidies.
In this model a number of incumbent foreign firms face the 
potential entry of domestic firms in a homogeneous product 
Cournot oligopoly. The foreign country can use an export
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subsidy to deter the entry of domestic firms. When there is 
no domestic tariff the optimal foreign policy is to 
subsidise exports so that no domestic firms enter the 
industry. An example of subsidies being used to deter entry 
is the semiconductor industry. The US semiconductor industry 
has accused MITI of protecting the Japanese market and of 
giving subsidies to favoured Japanese firms. This industrial 
targeting encourages investment by the favoured Japanese 
firms and discourages investment by US firms. Such subsidies 
may have deterred US firms from entering the market for the 
latest generation of memory chips."1
As in Dixit and Kyle (1985) trade policy will be modelled as 
a multistage game for which the appropriate solution is the 
subgame perfect equilibrium which ensures that any threats 
of retaliation must be credible. When the foreign country 
uses an export subsidy, and the domestic country uses an 
import tariff, the Nash equilibrium in trade policies has a 
foreign export subsidy and a fully countervailing domestic 
tariff. In a Stackelberg equilibrium the foreign country has 
a first mover advantage so it can commit itself to an export 
subsidy before the domestic country sets its tariff. .This 
seems the appropriate method to model retaliation and 
countervailing tariffs, since it allows the domestic country
For details see the Semiconductor Industry Association 
(1983), "The Effects of Government Targeting on World 
Semiconductor Competition: A case history of Japanese
industrial strategy and its costs for America".
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to respond to the foreign export subsidy. At a Stackelberg 
equilibrium the foreign country realises that the domestic 
country will retaliate with a countervailing tariff and its 
optimal policy is to set a zero export subsidy. With 
retaliation there is no strategic rationale for an export 
subsidy.
When the domestic country can use a production subsidy as 
well as a tariff the Nash equilibrium in trade policies has 
a foreign export subsidy which is fully countervailed by a 
domestic tariff and a production subsidy or tax. The optimal 
policy is a production subsidy (tax) if demand is convex 
(concave), this shifts domestic firms down their average 
cost curve. At the Stackelberg equilibrium the foreign 
country realises the effect its export subsidy will have on 
the optimal domestic tariff and production subsidy. If 
foreign firms have a lower marginal cost than domestic 
firms, then an export subsidy is optimal despite the 
countervailing tariff and production subsidy. This is a case 
where retaliation does not remove the strategic rationale 
for an export subsidy.
The effect of product differentiation can be studied using 
linear demand functions. In a Nash equilibrium in trade 
policies there is a foreign export subsidy or tax and a 
domestic tariff. The effect of competition policy on the 
Nash equilibrium of the trade policy game can be studied as
193
in Cowan (1989) . An increase in the number of foreign firms 
results in a reduction in the domestic tariff and the 
foreign export subsidy. The effect of the lower tariff is to 
increase foreign welfare. Competition policy can shift the 
equilibrium of the trade policy game in favour of the 
foreign country. At a Stackelberg equilibrium in trade 
policies there is a foreign export tax and a domestic 
tariff. Again, with retaliation there is no strategic 
rationale for an export subsidy.
5.2 Basic Model
Consider a homogeneous product Cournot oligopoly in which a 
number of foreign firms have already entered the industry 
incurring a sunk fixed cost. They are faced with the entry 
of domestic firms who will enter if they can earn positive 
profits so if there is free entry the profits of domestic 
firms will be zero in equilibrium. It is assumed that the 
domestic and foreign markets are segmented, that domestic 
firms sell only in the domestic market, and that marginal 
cost is constant. These assumptions allow the analysis of 
the domestic market to be undertaken independently of the 
foreign market thus making the analysis much simpler. The 
foreign government is assumed to maximise its national 
welfare which in this case is producer surplus from exports. 
It can use an export subsidy to deter the entry of domestic 
firms. The subsidy is assumed to be given only to incumbent
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firms, and not to new entrants, hence the number of foreign 
firms can be regarded as fixed. If subsidies were given to 
new entrants as well as incumbent firms then free entry of 
foreign firms would lead to zero profits and no role for 
export subsidies. In Japan MITI appears able to pursue a 
policy of selective subsidies to "favoured” firms in a way 
which does not seem to occur in the U.S.A. and Western 
Europe. The domestic government is assumed to maximise its 
national welfare which is given by the sum of consumer 
surplus, producer surplus and government revenue, but with 
free entry producer surplus is zero in this model. The 
domestic government can use an import tariff and a 
production subsidy to extract rent from foreign firms, and 
to encourage the entry of domestic firms.
The assumptions made here may seem stronger than in other 
models of trade policy, but it should be remembered that the 
equilibrium of the trade policy game is being analysed. To 
do this the optimal policies and the effect of a change in 
one country's trade policy on the other country's optimal 
policy is required. Many other models of trade policy only 
provide the welfare effects of small policy changes, often 
evaluated at the free trade position. The assumptions made 
here make a difficult problem tractable, which is the reason 
for making any assumption.
There are m foreign firms that have already incurred a sunk
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fixed cost F2 with constant marginal cost c2 each producing 
output x for export to the domestic market. Domestic firms 
must incur a sunk fixed cost F before entering the 
industry, the number of domestic firms that enter the market 
is n, they have constant marginal cost c and produce an 
output y. Demand for the homogeneous product in the domestic 
market is given by the inverse demand function P = P(Q)
where Q is total consumption, imports are X = mx and 
domestic production is Y = ny so Q = X + Y. The specific, 
per unit, domestic import tariff is t, the domestic 
production subsidy is s, and the foreign export subsidy is 
e. Domestic consumers are assumed to have preferences, for Q 
and a competitive numeraire good, that can be represented by 
a utility function which is additively separable and linear 
in the numeraire good. Therefore, the aggregate indirect
utility function is of the form: V = V(P) + I, where I is
national income. By Roy's identity av/SP = -Q. Domestic 
welfare is given by the sum of consumer surplus, domestic 
industry profits and government revenue. Demand for Q is 
independent of income, hence consumer surplus is a valid 
measure of welfare. Distributional considerations will be
ignored. Thus, domestic welfare is
W = V(P) + nn + tX - sY 
1 ' 7 i
= V(P) + tX -sY (5.1)
With free entry, domestic industry profits are zero, tti = 0. 
Unlike chapters two and four, subsidy payments have a direct 
income effect on domestic welfare. Foreign welfare is 
producer surplus from exports, that is profits of the 
foreign industry net of export subsidies
W2= (P -c2- t)X (5.2)
The following assumptions will be made to ensure the 
existence and uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium:
(Al) The inverse demand fuhction P(Q) is decreasing, twice 
continuously differentiable and total revenue, P(Q).Q, is 
bounded.
(A2) The following conditions are satisfied:
(n + l)P' + nyP" < 0
(m + 1)P' + mxP" < 0
(A3) The following condition is satisfied:
(n + m + 1)P' + QP" < 0
Then, there exists a unique and symmetric Cournot 
equilibrium, for a proof see chapter three.
At a Cournot equilibrium firms maximise profits with 
quantity as their strategic variable, they take the number 
of domestic firms that have entered the market, and domestic
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and foreign trade policies as given. The profits of domestic 
and foreign firms are
n, = (P - + s)y -
(5.3)
7T = (P - c - t + e) x - F
2 ' 2 7 2
The first order conditions for a Cournot equilibrium are
dn
— - = P + yP7 - c + s = 0 
ay 1
(5.4)
dn
— - = P + xP' - c - t + e = 0
2ax
And, the second order conditions for profit maximisation are
a2n a2n
   = 2P7 + yP" < 0    = 2P7 + xP7/ < 02 2 ay ax
Domestic firms will enter the industry if they can earn
positive profits and so with free entry profits will be
driven to zero in equilibrium. This will determine the
2
number of domestic firms that enter the industry. The zero 
profit condition is
2
The number of domestic firms n is assumed to be a 
continuous variable. This ignores the integer problem, but 
see Seade (1980b) for a justification of this approach.
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71 = (P - c + s)y - F = 0
1 v i 11 i
(5.5)
The two first order conditions (5.4) together with the zero 
profit condition for domestic firms (5.5) define the 
equilibrium of the model given the domestic and foreign 
trade policies. To obtain the comparative static results 
totally differentiate the first order conditions and the 
zero profit condition, which yields
(m+1)P7+mxP77 n (P7 +xP") 
m(P' +yP77) (n+1) P7 +nyP7
myP7 (n-l)yP7
y (P7 +xP77) 
y(P7+yP77) 
y2P7
dx
dy
dn _
1 -1
0 0
0 0
0
-1
-y
dt
de
ds
(5.6)
The minors of the matrix above are
D
n
= y2P7 (2P7+yP77) > 0
D
12
= 0
D
13
= -myP7 (2P7+yP77) < 0
D
21
= y2P7 (P7+xP77)
D
22
= y2(P7)2 > 0
D
23
= yP7 [ (n-1) P7 - m ( P 7+xP77)]
D
31
= -yP7 (P7+xP77)
D
32
= yP7 (P7 +yP77)
D
33
= P7 ((n+m+l)P7+QP77) > 0
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And the determinant is
D = y2(P' )2(2P7+yP77) < 0
Hence, using Cramer's rule the comparative static results 
can now be obtained. The effects of an export subsidy or 
tariff are
5e at D P7
an an -D m
ae at D yP7
ax ax -m
ae at p7
ap ap
ae at
ae at d
(5.7)
ay ay m
ae at p7
dQ dQ
ae at
An export subsidy increases the exports of foreign firms but
does not alter the scale of domestic firms that enter the
industry, however there is a reduction in the number of
domestic firms that enter. The exports of the foreign
industry increases while the output of domestic industry
3contracts by the same amount to leave the price unaltered. 
The effects of a tariff are the opposite of the effects of
3In Nakao (1989) a foreign export subsidy does not affect
the price in the domestic market, when there is free entry
of domestic firms. In this model price is set by the
domestic oligopoly and, foreign firms act as price takers.
2 0 0
an export subsidy, note that a tariff has no effect on 
4price. The effects of a production subsidy are
dx D - yD 2(P7+xP77)
21 31 ' '
ds D
ay -D + yD yP7
J 22 32
as D A
an D - yD -[2m(P7+xP77) + (2P7+nyP77) ]
—  =  11 =   (5.8)
as D Ay
ax 2m(P/+xP,/) ay -2 ((m+l) p7+mxP77)
> o
ds A ds A
dQ —2P7 ap -2 (P7)2
—  =   > 0  —  =   < 0
ds A ds A
Where A = P7 (2P7+yP77) >0. A domestic production subsidy 
reduces (increases) the exports of the foreign industry if 
domestic output and foreign exports are strategic 
substitutes (complements). Domestic output and foreign 
exports are strategic substitutes (complements) for the 
foreign country if an increase in domestic output reduces 
(increases) the marginal profitability of foreign firms,
4 . . . . . .The result that a tariff does not increase price is similar
to the result obtained by Brander and Spencer (1981) where a 
foreign monopolist is faced with the potential entry of a 
domestic firm and produces the entry deterring "limit" 
output. A tariff then does not increase price if the 
monopolist continues to produce the limit output to deter 
the entry of the domestic firm.
2 0 1
2 5d nJdydx = P'+xP" < (>) 0. The scale of production of
domestic firms will increase (decrease) as demand is convex
(concave). The effect on the number of domestic firms is
ambiguous, it is possible that if there is a large increase
in the scale of domestic firms then the number of domestic
firms may actually fall. The production subsidy increases
domestic industry output and lowers the price.
Before examining the trade policy game involving the two 
governments consider the effect of a foreign export subsidy 
in the absence of any domestic trade policy, t = s = 0. The 
effect of an export subsidy on foreign welfare, from (5.2) 
is
aw ax ap
—  = (P - C  ) —  + X —  (5.9)
ae ae ae
The first term is the profit shifting effect: exports are 
increased and since price exceeds marginal cost this 
increases foreign welfare. The second term is the terms of 
trade effect: an export subsidy usually results in a fall in 
the price of exports which reduces foreign welfare. In this 
model an export subsidy does not affect the price so the 
terms of trade effect is zero, therefore only the positive 
profit shifting effect is present. Using the comparative
5 .Strategic substitutes and complements are explained m
Bulow et al (1985) and chapter three.
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static results the overall effect is
aw -m
—  - (P - o )   > 0  (5.10)
ae P'
An export subsidy is unambiguously welfare improving for the 
foreign country. The export subsidy commits foreign firms to 
produce a larger output which reduces the number of domestic 
firms that can profitably enter the industry.^ This reduces 
domestic industry output by an amount equal to the increase 
in foreign industry exports so that price does not fall. The 
optimal policy is to subsidise exports so that no domestic 
firms will enter the industry and foreign firms capture the 
entire market. This argument for an export subsidy is 
stronger than the profit shifting argument of Brander and 
Spencer (1985), discussed in chapters two and four.
Brander and Spencer (1985) consider a Cournot duopoly 
consisting of a foreign firm and a domestic firm. A foreign 
export subsidy commits the foreign firm to produce a larger 
output then, if domestic and foreign output are strategic 
substitutes, the domestic firm will reduce output. The 
result is to shift profits from the domestic to the foreign 
firm. It has been shown by Eaton and Grossman (1986) that if 
there is Bertrand rather than Cournot competition then the
This is similar to firms deterring entry by using 
investment to commit themselves to a larger output, as in 
Dixit (1980).
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optimal policy is generally an export tax. This argument
does not apply to the use of export subsidies to deter
entry. Consider a single foreign firm faced with the
potential entry of a domestic firm. The product is
homogeneous and there is Bertrand competition. The foreign
firm has a constant marginal cost cg and the domestic firm
has a constant marginal cost c where c < c2, so the
domestic firm has a cost advantage. To enter the industry
the domestic firm must incur a sunk cost F > 0. With no1
foreign export subsidy the domestic firm will enter the 
industry, if Fj is not too large, and take the entire market 
with a price c - e. The domestic firm will make positive 
profits and the foreign firm will make zero profits. If the 
foreign government gives an export subsidy e such that 
c - e < ci then it will not be profitable for the domestic 
firm to enter since it would be undercut by the foreign firm 
on price. Therefore, the foreign firm will have a monopoly 
and earn positive profits. The foreign country will gain if 
profit net of the export subsidy is positive as in figure 
5.1.
In the absence of any domestic trade policy, the optimal 
foreign policy is to subsidise exports so that no domestic 
firms will enter the industry, and the foreign firms capture 
the entire market. There is a strong strategic argument for 
an export subsidy when there is no retaliation.
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5.3 Export Subsidies and Countervailing Tariffs
This section considers the interaction of domestic and 
foreign trade policies when the domestic country uses an 
import tariff and the foreign country uses an export 
subsidy. The model is analysed as a multistage game. At the 
first stage the domestic and foreign government set their 
trade policies to maximise national welfare. Then, in the 
second stage domestic firms decide whether to enter the 
industry given the foreign and domestic trade policies. In 
the final stage the foreign firms and any domestic firms 
which enter set outputs to maximise profits given the 
foreign and domestic trade policies. A subgame perfect 
equilibrium is required which rules out any non-credible 
threats. As usual the equilibrium is obtained by backward 
induction. First, the Nash equilibrium of the final stage of 
the game is obtained and then this is used to solve the 
penultimate stage and so on until one obtains the subgame 
perfect equilibrium for the entire game. The Nash 
equilibrium of the final two stages of the game was derived 
in the previous section and the comparative static results 
obtained there can now be used to solve the first stage of 
the game. At a Nash equilibrium in trade policies both 
countries independently and simultaneously choose their 
trade policies to maximise their national welfare. The first 
order conditions for a Nash equilibrium in trade policies 
are
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aw ap ax
— - = -Q —  + t —  + x = o
at at at
(5.11)
aw ax ap
— - = (P-c -t) —  + x —  = o
ae 2 ae ae
Using the comparative static results from (5.7), and noting 
that an export subsidy or tariff has no effect on price, 
together with the first order conditions for profit
maximisation from (5.4) yields the optimal trade policies
eN = tN = -xP' = (P - c2) > 0 (5.12)
At the Nash equilibrium in trade policies there is a foreign 
export subsidy and a fully countervailing domestic tariff. 
The domestic country extracts all the rent from the foreign
country since P - c - t = 0 so all the gains from trade are
7 . . .captured by the domestic country. If the Nash equilibrium
is viewed as the outcome of a trade war then the foreign 
country has obviously lost.
The situation is shown in figure 5.2. The foreign reaction 
function can be derived from equation (5.11). If the
domestic tariff is set such that P - c - t > 0, then the
2
optimal foreign policy is to subsidise exports so that no
7
In Brander and Spencer (1981) the domestic country may 
extract all the rent from the foreign monopolist.
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domestic firms enter the industry. An increase in the 
domestic tariff will increase the export subsidy, required 
to deter the entry of all domestic firms, by the same amount 
so de/dt = 1. When P - c - t = 0 then the foreign country is 
indifferent about any export subsidy between zero and the 
level required to deter the entry of all domestic firms, 
since its payoff is zero regardless. And when P - c - t < 0 
then obviously a zero export subsidy is optimal, in fact, 
any export subsidy or tax is optimal provided it results in 
zero exports. The slope of the domestic reaction function 
can be derived by totally differentiating the formula for 
the optimal tariff, t = -xP7, which yields dt/de = 1/2. And 
the optimal tariff is positive when the foreign export 
subsidy is zero. The Nash equilibrium (NE) is given by the 
intersection of the foreign and domestic reaction curves.
Now consider how a parameter change alters the equilibrium
of the trade policy game. By totally differentiating the 
optimal policies in (5.12) it can easily be shown that
Se St
Sc Sc
2 2
Se St 2P7
Sc Sc 2P7 + yP"l i  J
St P7
—  =    >  0
SF y (2P7+ yP77)
Se
SFl
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The higher is foreign marginal cost then the lower is the 
optimal export subsidy and tariff, and the higher is 
domestic marginal and fixed cost the larger is the optimal 
export subsidy and tariff in the Nash equilibrium. For the 
Cournot duopoly model of Brander and Spencer (1985) it has 
been shown by de Meza (1986) that the country with the 
lowest cost will have the largest export subsidy. Here, the 
optimal foreign export subsidy will be larger the greater 
the relative cost advantage of foreign firms.
To model retaliation the structure of the game will be 
altered so that the foreign country has a first mover 
advantage. At the first stage of the new game, call it the 
Stackelberg game, the foreign country sets its export 
subsidy to maximise its national welfare. Then, in the 
second stage the domestic country sets its tariff, in 
response to the foreign export subsidy, to maximise its 
national welfare. In the third stage the domestic firms make 
their entry decision and in the final stage domestic and 
foreign firms set their outputs to maximise profits. The 
equilibrium of the final two stages of the game was derived 
in section 5.2 and the comparative static results derived 
there can now be used to solve the second stage.
At the second stage the domestic country sets its tariff 
given the foreign export subsidy. The first order condition
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aw ap ax
— - = - Q  —  + t —  + X = 0 (5.13)
at at at
Using the comparative static results from (5.7) together
with (5.4) yields the optimal tariff
t = i(P - c2+ e) > 0 (5.14)
The effect of a change in the foreign export subsidy on the 
optimal tariff is obvious from above, if it is noted that an 
export subsidy or tariff have no effect on price, hence
dt 1
—  = - (5.15)
de 2
The optimal response to a foreign export subsidy is to 
increase the tariff by half the amount of the subsidy. A 
foreign export subsidy should only be partially 
countervailed. Dixit (1988) shows that for a Cournot duopoly 
with one domestic and one foreign firm and linear demand the 
optimal countervailing tariff fraction is one third.
At the first stage of the game the foreign country sets its 
export subsidy to maximise national welfare realising the
effect its decision will have on the optimal domestic
tariff. The first order condition for welfare maximisation
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IS
dW
de
'ax ax dt' 'ap r ap x dt'
t) —  + — — + X —  + -  ~ 1  —ae at deJ aeV I* at ' dei
= 0 (5.16)
The first term is the profit shifting effect, and the second 
term is the terms of trade effect. The profit shifting 
effect of the export subsidy is reduced by the effect of the 
countervailing tariff on foreign exports. The terms of trade 
effect is negative, since both an export subsidy and a 
tariff have no effect on the domestic price, but foreign 
firms are faced with a higher tariff. The countervailing 
tariff reduces the profit shifting effect and worsens the 
terms of trade. The optimal foreign export subsidy is 
derived by using the comparative static results from (5.7) 
together with the optimal countervailing tariff from (5.15) 
in (5.16), and noting from (5.4) that P - c - t = -xP'- e. 
The optimal domestic tariff is obtained by substituting the 
optimal export subsidy into (5.14). Hence, the optimal trade 
policies at a Stackelberg equilibrium are
e = 0 f  = |(P - C 2 ) > 0 (5.17)
When the foreign country is faced with retaliation by the 
domestic country with a countervailing tariff its optimal 
policy is a zero export subsidy. The foreign country gains 
by committing itself to a zero export subsidy, since then 
producer surplus is positive P - c - t = ^(P - c2) . Half of
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the producer surplus accrues to the foreign country, and 
half is captured as tariff revenue by the domestic country. 
The foreign country is better off and the domestic 
country is worse off at the Stackelberg equilibrium 
compared to the Nash equilibrium. In figure 5.2, the foreign 
iso-welfare locus is tangential to the domestic reaction 
function at the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE).
The Stackelberg equilibrium yields the same outcome as the 
consistent conjecture equilibrium. The foreign country's 
consistent conjecture is for the domestic country to
increase its tariff by half the amount of any increase in
the foreign export subsidy. And, the domestic country's 
consistent conjecture is that a change in its tariff will
have no effect on the export subsidy set by the foreign
country. But, consistent conjecture equilibrium are of 
questionable value.
If the domestic country could commit itself to a tariff 
before the foreign country sets its export subsidy, then its 
optimal policy is to set a tariff just below the Nash 
equilibrium tariff. Then, the foreign country will subsidise 
exports until foreign firms capture the entire market since 
profits are positive. And both domestic and foreign welfare
Q
Turnovsky (1986) considered the consistent conjecture 
equilibrium of the Johnson (1953-54) tariff game. Tanaka 
(1989) considers the consistent conjecture equilibrium of 
the Brander and Spencer (1985) export subsidy game.
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are higher than at the Nash equilibrium. Domestic welfare is 
higher since imports have increased so tariff revenue is 
higher. Foreign welfare is higher since it now has positive 
producer surplus.
When the domestic country can retaliate with a 
countervailing tariff, the optimal foreign export subsidy is 
zero, and there is no strategic argument for an export 
subsidy.
5.4 Export Subsidies, Production Subsidies and Tariffs
In the previous section the domestic government only used an 
import tariff, in this section the domestic government can 
use a production subsidy and an import tariff. The domestic
production subsidy is paid to all domestic firms that enter
9 . . . . .the industry. Firstly, consider the the Nash equilibrium in
trade policies. The first order conditions for a Nash
equilibrium are
aw ap ax ay
— - = -q —  + t —  + x - s —  = o
at at at at
aw ap ax ay
— - = -Q —  + t  s  Y = 0 (5.18)
as as as as
9The first best policy would be to pay the subsidy to one 
firm, and prevent other firms from entering the industry. 
Then the model would be as in chapter four.
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aw ax ap
— - = (P- c - t) —  + x —  = o 
ae 2 ae ae
Using the comparative static results from (5.7) and (5.8) 
together with the first order conditions from (5.4) to solve 
for the optimal policies yields
tN + sN = -xP' > 0
sN = (mx2 + niy2)P" (5.19)
eN = -xP' > 0
In the Nash equilibrium in trade policies there is an export 
subsidy which is fully countervailed by a domestic tariff 
and a production subsidy (tax). The optimal policy will be a 
production subsidy (tax) when demand is convex (concave), 
this increases domestic welfare by shifting firms down their 
average cost curve.10 If demand is sufficiently convex then 
an import subsidy may be optimal. As in the previous section 
the domestic country extracts all the rent from the foreign
country since P - c - t = 0. It is often argued that a
production subsidy is preferable to a tariff to protect the
In a closed economy de Meza (1982) shows that a production 
subsidy or tax can shift firms down their average cost curve 
and hence improve welfare. See also Horstmann and Markusen 
(1986).
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domestic industry, but with concave demand the optimal 
policy is a tariff and a production tax. The explanation is 
that with free entry and fixed costs inefficient entry will 
occur. Also, the tariff is not being used to protect the 
domestic industry but to extract rent from foreign firms.
Now consider the Stackelberg game where the foreign 
government sets its export subsidy at the first stage. Then 
at the second stage the domestic government sets its import 
tariff and production subsidy to maximise national welfare 
taking the export subsidy set by the foreign country at the 
first stage as given. The first order conditions for the 
optimal policies are
aw ap ax ay
— - = -q —  + t —  + x -  s —  = o
at at at at
(5.20)
aw ap ax ay
— - = —q —  + t  s ------ y = o
as as as as
Using the comparative static results (5.7) and (5.8) to 
solve for the optimal policies yields
t + s = -xP' > 0
(5.21)
s = (mx2+ ^ny2)P"
The effect of a foreign export subsidy on the optimal
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domestic tariff and production subsidy can be obtained by 
totally differentiating the first order conditions for 
welfare maximisation (5.20) which yields
a2w i a2 w i dt a2 w i
at2 asat de aeat
a2 w i a2w i ds a2w i
atas as2 de ae a s
(5.22)
Where all the partial derivatives are evaluated at the 
welfare optimum. The second order conditions for welfare 
maximisation require that the above Hessian matrix is 
negative definite, so
a2 w
at'
< o
a2w
as'
< o
H =
a2w
at'
a2w
atas
a2 w
asat
a2w
as'
> o (5.23)
To obtain the second order partial derivatives use the 
comparative static results from (5.7) in (5.20), this yields
aw l
— - = ---  ( XP" + mt + ms) (5.24)
at P'
Differentiate aw^at with respect to t, and evaluating at
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the welfare maximum, yields using (5.7)
a w  1 r ax x 2m
   = --- IP' —  + ml = —  < 0
at2 p7  ^ at > p7
(5.25)
Differentiate aw^at with respect to s, and evaluating at 
the welfare maximum, yields using (5.8)
a2w
asat
, l ( dQ ax x m
- = ---1 XP" —  + P7 —  + ml = -
h p7 v as as '
' 4P7+yP" ' 
2P7+yP"
< 0 (5.26)
Differentiate aw/at with respect to e, and evaluating at 
the welfare maximum, yields using (5.7)
a2 W
aeat
l ( ax x -m
- =  fp' —  1 = - < 0 
 P7 ^  ae > P7
(5.27)
Using the comparative static results from (5.8) in a w/8s 
from (5.20) yields
2Q(P')2+ 2tm(P7+xP77) + 2s((m+1) P7 +mxP77)
- YP7 (2P7+yP77)J (5.28)
Differentiate 3Wi/as with respect to t, and evaluating at 
the welfare maximum, yields
a2w. 1 r
atas a *-
ax ax ay
2tP77 —  + 2sP77 —  + 2m(P7+xP77) - P7(2P7+yP77) —
at. Jat at
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Using the comparative static results from (5.7) and the 
optimal policies from (5.21) yields
a2w m
atas p'
r 4P'+yP" ' 
2P'+yP"
< 0 (5.29)
Differentiate awj/as with respect to e, and evaluating at 
the welfare maximum, yields
a2W 1 r
deds A L
ax ax ay
2tP" —  + 2sP" P'(2P'+yP") —
Jde de
Using the comparative static results from (5.7) and the 
optimal policies from (5.21) yields
a m ( 2P' + (y-2x) P7/ '
aeas P' 2P'+yP"
(5.30)
The second order partial derivative a^/as2 is not required 
to evaluate the comparative static results, and so need not 
be derived.
These can then be used to evaluate the comparative static 
results. The effect of a foreign export subsidy on the 
optimal domestic tariff is by Cramer's rule
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dt 1 
de H
a2w
dedt
a2w
deds
a2w
asat
a2w
as'
(5.31)
To evaluate this note that from (5.25), (5.27), (5.29) and
(5.30)
a2w i 1 a2wi a2w i 1 a2w 1l m(4x-y)P"
aeat 2 at2 deds 2 atas 2 A
Using these in (5.31) yields
a2w a2 w a2w
0
dt 1 1 at2 asat 1 asat
—  =  —  — + -
de 2 H a2w i a2w i H -m(4x-y)P" a2w i
atas as2 2A as2
Using (5.26) it can be shown that
dt 1 m (4P'+ yP") (4x-y)P" 
de 2 2A2H
(5.32)
It will be assumed that (4x-y) > 0, this will hold unless 
the domestic firms have a significant cost advantage. Hence 
if demand is convex (concave), then the optimal 
countervailing tariff fraction will be smaller (greater) 
than a half. For linear demand the countervailing tariff 
fraction is a half. Dixit (1988) has shown that, for a
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homogeneous product Cournot oligopoly with a fixed number of 
domestic and foreign firms, the optimal countervailing 
tariff fraction is a half for linear demand and less than a 
half for constant elasticity demand functions. In chapter 
four it was shown that the optimal countervailing tariff 
fraction is less (greater) than a half if demand is convex 
(concave), which is similar to the result obtained here. A 
fully countervailing tariff could be optimal if demand was 
sufficiently concave but, in general, only partially 
countervailing tariffs are justified.
From (5.26), the effect of a foreign export subsidy on the 
optimal domestic production subsidy is by Cramer's rule
ds
de
1
H
a2w
at*
a2w
atas
a2w
aeat
a2w
deds
Using (5.25), (5.27), (5.29) and (5.30) in (5.33) yields
ds 1 
de H
2m
P'
m (4P'+yP")
m
P'
m 2P' + (y-2x)P"
P'(2P'+yP") P' (2P' +yP")
Therefore, it can be shown that
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ds -m (4x-y)P" 
de AHP'
(5.34)
When demand is convex (concave) an increase in the foreign 
export subsidy will increase (decrease) the optimal domestic 
production subsidy. This differs from the result of chapter 
four where a foreign export subsidy would usually reduce the 
optimal domestic production subsidy.
It is now possible to analyse the first stage of the game 
when the foreign country sets its export subsidy to maximise 
national welfare realising the effect its decision will have 
on the optimal domestic tariff and production subsidy. The 
effect of an export subsidy on foreign welfare is
dW
de
= (P-c2-t)
ax ax dt ax ds 1
de dt de ds de
+ X
[ dp , ap xdt ap ds 1
_  + _  - i _  + -----
Q q  v  ) H o  r\c: H ede as ds
(5.35)
Note that the export subsidy and tariff have no effect on 
price. Using the comparative static results to evaluate this 
expression when e = 0 so that P - c2~ t = -xP' yields
dW2 m2X(4x-y)(2x-y)(P")2
de A2H
(5.36)
The effect of an export subsidy on foreign welfare will be
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zero if demand is linear but with non-linear demand it will 
be positive if (2x-y) > 0. The conditions under which this 
will occur can be seen by subtracting the domestic firm's 
first order condition for profit maximisation from that of 
the foreign firm (5.4) and noting that t + s = -xP7 from
(5.21) yields
c - c + e + (2x-y) P7 = 0 (5.37)
Therefore at e = 0, (2x-y) > 0 when foreign marginal cost is 
lower than domestic marginal cost. So an export subsidy will 
increase foreign welfare if foreign firms have a lower 
marginal cost than domestic firms. In this case the export 
subsidy increases foreign welfare, despite retaliation from 
the domestic country with countervailing tariffs and 
subsidies. The optimal export subsidy can be derived by 
setting dWg/de = 0 and using (5.37) yields
2m2x(4x-y) (c -c ) (P77)2
e = -------------- - -    (5.38)
A2H + m2 (4x-y) (2x-y) (P77)2
With linear demand the optimal export subsidy is zero. When 
foreign firms have a cost advantage and demand is non-linear 
the optimal policy is an export subsidy despite the 
countervailing tariffs and subsidies. This shows that, in 
theory, an export subsidy can increase foreign welfare even 
when there is retaliation.
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5.5 Product Differentiation
In the previous sections the domestic and foreign outputs 
were perfect substitutes in this section it will be assumed 
that the domestic and foreign output are not perfect 
substitutes, also it will be assumed that demand is linear. 
The assumption of national product differentiation, where 
domestic and foreign output are not perfect substitutes but 
the output of a firm is a perfect substitute for the output 
of another firm in the same country, may not seem realistic 
but the main impact that product differentiation has on the 
model comes from the fact that domestic and foreign output 
are not perfect substitutes. Assuming that all firms produce 
a differentiated product would make the arithmetic more 
tedious but would offer no additional insight.
The prices that domestic and foreign firms face are now 
different, let be the price for domestic output and P2 
the price for foreign output. Consumer preferences are given 
by the indirect utility function V = V(PifP2) + I, so by 
Roy's identity dV/dP^ = -Y and dV/dP^ = -X. Domestic 
welfare is given by Wi = V(PifP2) + tX - sY. Foreign welfare 
is producer surplus from exports W 2 = (P2* c - t)X. Demand 
is assumed to be linear and symmetric. The domestic and 
foreign inverse demand functions are
Pt = a - j3Y - yX
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P2 = a - yY - |3X
|3 > y (5.39)
The degree of product differentiation is measured by /3 - y, 
if /3 = y then domestic and foreign output are perfect 
substitutes. Domestic and foreign profits are given by
tt = (P - c + s ) y - F
1 v 1 i 72 i
(5.40)
7i = ( P  - c - t + e )x - F
2 ' 2 2 7 2
The first order conditions for a Cournot equilibrium given 
the number of domestic firms that have entered and given the 
domestic and foreign trade policies are
du ap
— - = P + y — - - c + s = 0 i iay 3y
dn ap
— - = P + y — - - c - t + e = 02 2 
ax ax
(5.41)
Domestic firms will enter if they can earn positive profits 
so free entry will lead to zero profits in equilibrium
7T = (P - c + s)y - F = 0 (5.42)l ' l l 71 l ' 7
The two first order conditions and the zero profit condition 
determine the equilibrium as a function of the domestic
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tariff and production subsidy and the foreign export 
subsidy. The comparative static results for the effect of 
the trade policies, and the effect of an increase in the 
number of foreign firms, are obtained by totally
differentiating the two first order conditions (5.41) and 
the zero profit condition (5.42), to obtain
(m+l)/3
mr
myr
n r 
(n+i)/3 
(n-l)ye
yr
yp
y 2P
dx 1 -1 -x/3
i
a rt
__
__
_
i
dy = 0 0 -xy de
dn _ 0 0 -xyr dm
(5.43)
The minors of the above matrix are 
Du = 2yZp >0
D = 0
12
D = -2my/3y < 0
D 21 =  _ y 2 p r  <  0
D22 = y2(pZ + HOUS2-*2)) > 0
°23 = (m “ n + 1)YP2~ mny(02-r2)
D31 = -yPr < 0
°32 = _y(^2+ m(/32-r2)) < 0 
D = (n + m + 1)(S2+ nm(/32-y2) > 0
And the determinant of the matrix is
D = 2y2/3 (|32+ m(^ V)) > 0
The comparative static results for the effect of a foreign 
export subsidy or a domestic import tariff are
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3x dX /3
ae at 02+ m(/32-y2)
ay ay
—   -----= 0  (5.44)
ae at
an an -my
ae at £2+ m(/32-y2)
An export subsidy increases the output of foreign firms but, 
as in the case of homogeneous products, it has no effect on 
the scale of domestic firms. The number of domestic firms 
which enter the industry decreases. The effect of an export 
subsidy on domestic and foreign output is
ay ay an -my
—  = n —  + y —  = ------------ < 0
3e ae ae /32+ m(/32-y2)
(5.45)
ax m/3
—  =   > 0
ae |32+ m(/32-y2)
Foreign industry output increases as a result of the export 
subsidy and domestic industry output decreases, but the 
decrease in domestic output is less than the increase in 
foreign output. The effect on prices is
ap ay ax
—  = - p  H —  = 0
ae ae ae
(5.46)
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ap dY ax -m(/3 -y )
— - = - y  —  - /3 —  = ------------ < 0
ae 3e ae |32+ m(/32-y2)
The export subsidy has no effect on the price of the 
domestic product but reduces the price of the foreign 
product.
At the Nash equilibrium in trade policies both countries 
independently and simultaneously choose their trade 
policies, tariff and export subsidy, to maximise their 
national welfare. The first order conditions for a Nash 
equilibrium in trade policies are
aw ap
— - = -Y — - -X
at at
f ap.
at
- l
ax
+ t —  = o 
at
aw ax ap
— - = (P - c -t) —  + x — - = o
ae 2 2
Using the comparative static results to solve for the 
optimal policies yields
tN = x/3 > 0
(5.47)
x (IS2- m(/32-r2))
e = ---------------
/3
The optimal tariff is positive but the export subsidy may be 
positive or negative. When the products were perfect
226
substitutes the Nash equilibrium had a foreign export 
subsidy which was fully countervailed by a domestic tariff, 
and the domestic country extracted all the rent from the 
foreign country. Here the foreign export subsidy is smaller 
than the domestic tariff and the foreign country earns 
positive producer surplus on exports since 
p2“c2~ t = m(/32-y2)//3 >0. If there is only a single foreign 
firm then
tN = x/3 > 0
(5.48)
xy2
eN = --  > 0
0
Then the optimal foreign export subsidy and domestic tariff 
are both positive.
Cowan (1989) analysed how competition policy could alter the 
equilibrium of the trade policy game. In his model an 
extension of Brander and Spencer (1984), there is no 
domestic production and the domestic country uses a tariff 
to extract rent from the foreign firms while the foreign 
country uses an export tax to improve the terms of trade. At 
the first stage of the game the foreign country sets the 
number of foreign firms, its competition policy, then at the 
second stage the foreign country sets its export tax and the 
domestic country sets its import tariff. Cowan shows that if 
demand is not too convex then an increase in the number of
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foreign firms will result in a lowering of the domestic 
tariff which increases foreign welfare. The foreign country 
can use competition policy to alter the equilibrium of the 
game in its favour.
From (5.43), the comparative static results for the effects 
of foreign competition, an increase in the number of foreign 
firms m, are
dx -x(/32-r2)
am /32+ m(/32-r2)
< 0
ay
—  = 0  (5.49)
dm
an —x r/3
—  = ------------------ < o
am y /32+ m(/32-y2)
An increase in the number of foreign firms reduces the 
exports of foreign firms, but has no effect on the scale of 
domestic firms. And, there is a reduction in the number of 
domestic firms that enter the industry. The effect on 
domestic output and foreign exports is
aY x/32
—  = -----------  > o
am /32+ m(/32-y2)
(5.50)
ax -x r i3
dm j32+ m(/32-y2)
> 0
228
An increase in the number of foreign firms increases foreign 
exports and reduces the output of the domestic industry. The 
effect on the prices is
ap ay ax
—  = - /3 r —  = o
am am am
(5.51)
ap ay ax -x/3(/32-y2)
— - = -  7 --------- |3 —  =   < o
am am am |32+ m(/32-r2)
An increase in the number of foreign firms reduces the price 
of the foreign product, but has no effect on domestic price.
Now consider how foreign competition policy alters the Nash 
equilibrium in trade policies in this model. The Nash 
equilibrium policies are given by (5.47). To obtain the 
effect of foreign competition policy on the foreign export 
subsidy and domestic tariff totally differentiate (5.47) and 
using the comparative static results yields
2/32+ m(|32-y2)
i(M00.i dt/dm - x / 3 ( / 3 2 - 7 2 )
/32- m(/32 - y 2 ) 2m(f32-r2) de/dm -2x/3(fJ2-r2)
This yields
dt -2xj3 (/32 —*ar2) 
dm /32 + 2m(/32-y2)
de -3x/3(/32-y2) 
dm /32 + 2m(/32-*2)
< 0
< 0
(5.52)
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An increase in the number of foreign firms results in a 
reduction of the foreign export subsidy and the domestic 
tariff. The reduction in the foreign export subsidy is 
larger than the reduction in the domestic tariff. The effect 
of competition policy on foreign welfare is
dw aw aw dt aw de 2 _  2  2    2 __
dm am at dm ae dm
(5.53)
But since the foreign country is setting its export subsidy 
optimally at the Nash equilibrium awg/de = 0, so the change 
in the export subsidy has no effect on welfare. Hence the 
overall welfare effect is
dW
dm
= (Pa-ca-t)
f ax ax dt 1
am at dm
+ X
f ap
am
, ap x dt
~  ~  1  —  V. at > Hm
l
d
= 0 (5.54)
Using the comparative static results it can be shown that 
the overall effect is just the direct tariff revenue effect
dW dt
— 2 = -x —  
dm dm
2mx2/3 (/32-y2) 
|32 + 2m(/32-y2)
> 0 (5.55)
As in Cowan (1989) an increase in the number of foreign 
firms can, by reducing the domestic tariff, increase foreign
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welfare. This ignores the sunk costs of entry. Competition 
policy will increase foreign welfare if the gain from the 
reduction in the domestic tariff exceeds the sunk costs of 
entry.
Now consider the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game where 
the foreign country has a first mover advantage and sets its 
export subsidy before the domestic country sets its tariff. 
At the second stage the domestic country sets its tariff 
taking the foreign export subsidy as given. The first order 
condition for the optimal tariff is
aw
at
= -Y
ap
at
-x
f ap
at
- 1
ax
+ t —  = o 
at
(5.56)
Hence using the comparative static results yields the 
optimal domestic tariff
t = x/3 > 0 (5.57)
To obtain the effect of the foreign export subsidy on the 
optimal domestic tariff, totally differentiate the above and 
using the comparative static results yields
dt /3
de 2/32 + m(/32- y2)
> 0 (5.58)
The optimal countervailing tariff fraction is positive but
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less than a half.
In the first stage of the game the foreign country sets its 
export subsidy realising the effect its decision will have 
upon the optimal domestic tariff. The first order condition 
for welfare maximisation for the foreign country is
dW
de =
ax ax dt 1
de dt de
+ X
ap , dP x dt
—  +  ( —  - 1  —
ap,
at
l
de
= 0 (5.59)
Using the comparative static results, and noting that 
P2~c2- t = -e + x|3, yields the optimal export subsidy
e =
-mx(/32- y2)
/3
< 0 (5.60)
When the foreign country can commit itself to an export 
subsidy, before the domestic country sets its tariff, the 
optimal policy is an export tax. The foreign country 
realises that an export subsidy will result in a 
countervailing tariff so it taxes exports to bring about a 
lower tariff. The export tax is larger the greater the 
degree of product differentiation. This result is similar to 
those obtained in chapter two.
The situation where the domestic country uses an import
tariff and a production subsidy will not be considered since 
with linear demand the optimal production subsidy is zero, 
and the results would be the same as when the domestic 
country only uses a tariff.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter has considered retaliation by the domestic 
country when the foreign country uses an export subsidy to 
deter the entry of domestic firms. For a homogeneous product 
Cournot oligopoly, in the absence of any domestic trade 
policy, an export subsidy unambiguously increases foreign 
welfare. The optimal foreign policy is to subsidise exports 
so that no domestic firms enter, and the foreign firms 
capture the entire market. This is a more robust argument 
for an export subsidy than the profit shifting argument of 
Brander and Spencer (1985).
However, retaliation with countervailing tariffs negates the 
argument for an export subsidy. At a Nash equilibrium in 
trade policies, when the domestic country uses an import 
tariff, there is a foreign export subsidy and a fully 
countervailing tariff. The domestic country extracts all the 
rent from the foreign country. And, the foreign country is 
better off committing itself not to subsidise exports. At a 
Stackelberg equilibrium, where the foreign country has a 
first mover advantage, the domestic country responds to a
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foreign export subsidy with a partially countervailing 
tariff, and the optimal foreign export subsidy is zero. When 
the foreign country faces retaliation with countervailing 
tariffs it should not subsidise exports.
When the domestic country uses an import tariff and 
production subsidy, the Nash equilibrium in trade policies 
has a foreign export subsidy which is fully countervailed by 
a domestic tariff and production subsidy. And, the domestic 
country extracts all the rent from the foreign country. A 
production subsidy (tax) is used to shift domestic firms 
down their average cost curve as demand is convex (concave). 
At a Stackelberg equilibrium, the domestic country responds 
to a foreign export subsidy with a countervailing tariff and 
production subsidy, and the optimal foreign policy is an 
export subsidy if foreign firms have a cost advantage. This 
shows that, in theory, a country may gain from an export 
subsidy despite retaliation. But, in practice, governments 
only use tariffs to countervail foreign export subsidies.
With product differentiation the results are less dramatic. 
In the absence of any domestic trade policy, an export 
subsidy will increase foreign welfare if the number of 
foreign firms is not too large. At a Nash equilibrium in 
trade policies, when the domestic country uses a tariff, 
there is a foreign export subsidy or tax and a partially 
countervailing tariff. The domestic country cannot extract
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all the rent from the foreign country in this case. At a 
Stackelberg equilibrium the optimal foreign policy is an 
export tax.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions
This thesis has analysed the effect of retaliation with 
countervailing tariffs and/or production subsidies on the 
strategic argument for export subsidies, and also proved the 
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the standard 
model of international trade under oligopoly. This chapter 
will briefly summarise the main results of this thesis, and 
then draw out any general conclusions.
Chapter 1 surveyed the literature on the new international 
economics and strategic trade policy, and in particular on 
trade and trade policy under oligopoly. Firstly, chapter 1 
considered the literature on intra-industry trade and the 
gains from trade. It was shown that intra-industry trade in 
identical products may occur under oligopoly, and that 
countries may gain from such trade due to its 
pro-competitive effect. Secondly, chapter 1 considered the 
strategic argument for profit shifting export subsidies 
advanced by Brander and Spencer (1985), and the many 
criticisms of the profit shifting argument were discussed. 
Finally, chapter 1 considered the use of strategic import 
policies such as import tariffs and production subsidies. 
These policies can be used to shift profits from foreign to 
domestic firms, to improve the terms of trade, and to 
correct domestic distortions. It was shown that Dixit (1988) 
incorrectly derived the optimal tariff for the case when
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domestic production is uneconomic, and this error was 
corrected.
Chapter 2 analysed the effect of retaliation on the profit 
shifting argument for export subsidies in a Cournot 
oligopoly model with linear demand and nationally 
differentiated products. Trade policy was modelled as a 
multistage game in which the foreign country set its export 
subsidy in the first stage and the domestic country 
responded with an import tariff and/or production subsidy in 
the second stage. When the domestic country pursues a policy 
of laissez-faire, it was shown that a foreign export subsidy 
may reduce domestic welfare. However, when the domestic 
country pursues an optimal trade policy, a foreign export 
subsidy will always increase domestic welfare. The optimal 
domestic response to a foreign export subsidy under linear 
demand and product differentiation has been derived by Dixit 
(1988) , and in chapter 2 this analysis was extended by 
considering the optimal export subsidy for the foreign 
country when faced with such a domestic response. When the 
domestic country uses an import tariff and a production 
subsidy, the optimal domestic response is to increase the 
tariff and reduce the production subsidy. Only a partially 
countervailing tariff is justified, the optimal 
countervailing tariff fraction is less than or equal to a 
half. When the foreign country anticipates the response of 
the domestic country, the optimal foreign policy is an
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export tax. Retaliation negates the profit shifting argument 
for an export subsidy. When the domestic country uses only 
an import tariff, the optimal domestic response is a less 
than fully countervailing tariff. The optimal countervailing 
tariff fraction is less than a half. When the foreign 
country anticipates the response by the domestic country, 
the optimal foreign policy is an export tax. Again, 
retaliation negates the profit shifting argument for an 
export subsidy. The results when the domestic country uses 
only a production subsidy are ambiguous. Chapter 2 also 
analysed the effect of retaliation in a Bertrand duopoly 
model with linear demand and product differentiation. It was 
shown that the optimal countervailing tariff fraction is 
smaller under Bertrand than under Cournot duopoly. And, it 
was shown that when the domestic country responds with a 
countervailing tariff, or a countervailing tariff and 
production subsidy, the optimal foreign policy is an export 
tax.
Chapter 3 proved the existence and uniqueness of the Cournot 
equilibrium in the Dixit (1984) model of international trade 
under oligopoly, and derived the comparative static results 
for the effects of trade policy. The question of the 
existence of equilibrium in models of international trade 
under oligopoly has largely been ignored. The proof of 
existence used in chapter 3 did not make the usual 
assumption that profit functions are concave. Instead, the
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proof adapted the method employed by McManus (1962, 1964)
and used a weaker "aggregate concavity" assumption. A simple 
proof was used to establish the uniqueness of the 
equilibrium. Then, the assumptions required to prove the 
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium were used to sign 
the comparative static results for the effects of trade 
policy. It was shown that these assumptions allow domestic 
output and foreign exports to be strategic substitutes or 
complements. The comparative static results derived in 
chapter 3 were used in chapter 4 to analyse the effects of 
retaliation.
Chapter 4 analysed the effect of retaliation on the profit 
shifting argument for export subsidies using the homogeneous 
product Cournot oligopoly model of chapter 3. As in 
chapter 2 trade policy was modelled as a multistage game. 
Chapter 4 extended the results of Dixit (1988) and chapter 2 
by considering general demand functions rather than just 
linear demands. When the domestic country pursues a policy 
of laissez-faire, it was shown that a foreign export subsidy 
may reduce domestic welfare. However, when the domestic 
country pursues an optimal trade policy, a foreign export 
subsidy will always increase domestic welfare. When the 
domestic country uses an import tariff and a production 
subsidy, the optimal domestic response to a foreign export 
subsidy is generally to increase the tariff and reduce the 
production subsidy. The optimal countervailing tariff
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fraction is less (greater) than a half if demand is convex 
(concave). When the foreign country anticipates the response 
of the domestic country, the optimal foreign policy is an 
export subsidy if demand is non-linear. There is a profit 
shifting argument for an export subsidy despite retaliation. 
When the domestic country uses only an import tariff, the 
optimal domestic response is a less than fully 
countervailing tariff. The countervailing tariff fraction is 
less than one. When the foreign country anticipates the 
response of the domestic country, the optimal foreign policy 
is usually an export tax. Retaliation with a countervailing 
tariff will usually negate the profit shifting argument for 
an export subsidy. The results when the domestic country 
uses only a production subsidy are ambiguous.
Chapter 5 analysed the effect of retaliation in a 
homogeneous product Cournot oligopoly model where the 
foreign country can use an export subsidy to deter the entry 
of domestic firms. This chapter considered the Nash 
equilibrium in trade policies, where the domestic and 
foreign countries set their trade policies independently and 
simultaneously, and the Stackelberg equilibrium, where the 
foreign country has a first mover advantage. In the absence 
of any domestic trade policy, the optimal foreign policy is 
to subsidise exports so that no domestic firms will enter 
the industry and the foreign firms capture the entire 
market. This is a strong argument for a strategic export
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subsidy, but it ignores the effect of retaliation by the 
domestic country. At the Nash equilibrium in trade policies, 
when the domestic country uses only a tariff, there is a 
foreign export subsidy which is fully countervailed by a
domestic tariff and the domestic country extracts all the 
producer surplus from the foreign country. At the 
Stackelberg equilibrium, the optimal domestic response to a 
foreign export subsidy is a partially countervailing tariff. 
The optimal countervailing tariff fraction is a half. When 
the foreign country anticipates the response of the domestic 
country, it will commit itself not to subsidise exports. The 
optimal export subsidy is zero when faced with retaliation. 
At the Nash equilibrium, when the domestic country can use 
an import tariff and a production subsidy, there is a 
foreign export subsidy which is fully countervailed by a
domestic tariff and a production subsidy (tax) and the
domestic country extracts all the producer surplus from the 
foreign country. There is a production subsidy (tax) if
demand is convex (concave). At the Stackelberg equilibrium, 
the optimal domestic response to a foreign export subsidy is 
generally to increase the tariff and to increase (reduce) 
the production subsidy if demand is convex (concave). The 
optimal countervailing tariff fraction is less (greater) 
than a half if demand is convex (concave) . When the foreign 
country anticipates the response of the domestic country, it 
will subsidise exports if foreign firms have a cost 
advantage. An export subsidy can increase welfare despite
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retaliation. Chapter 5 also considered the effect of 
introducing product differentiation into the analysis using 
a model with linear demand and nationally differentiated 
products. Then, the optimal foreign policy when faced with 
retaliation is an export tax.
Modelling trade policy as a multistage game seems to provide 
a reasonable analysis of export subsidies and countervailing 
tariffs. Firstly, the structure of the game with the foreign 
country having a first mover advantage reflects the GATT 
rules on countervailing duties. The domestic country can 
only impose definitive countervailing duties after a formal, 
and usually lengthy, investigation has established foreign 
subsidisation, and therefore the foreign country does have a 
first mover advantage. Secondly, the alternative would be to 
model trade policy as a simultaneous move game as in 
chapter 5, but this ignores the essence of retaliation which 
is that the domestic country responds to the foreign export 
subsidy. A multistage game gives the model some dynamics, 
and allows the domestic country to respond to the foreign 
export subsidy. Finally, the multistage game modelling of 
trade policy yields plausible results.
The modelling of trade policy as a multistage game, where 
the foreign country has a first mover advantage, yields a 
number of general conclusions:
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Firstly, if the domestic country pursues an optimal trade 
policy then a foreign export subsidy will always increase 
domestic welfare. A country will not be harmed by foreign 
subsidies if its trade policy is set optimally. It is often 
argued that countervailing duties are intended to deter 
foreign subsidies, but if a country pursues an optimal trade 
policy it will not want to deter foreign subsidies.
Secondly, the optimal domestic response to a foreign export 
subsidy is generally a partially countervailing tariff. When 
the domestic country uses only a tariff, its optimal 
response is always a less than fully countervailing tariff. 
This is obviously relevant to policy making since countries 
generally impose fully countervailing duties. The results of 
this thesis suggest that if governments are maximising 
economic welfare then they will never use fully 
countervailing duties.
Finally, a foreign export subsidy will usually reduce 
foreign welfare if the domestic country retaliates with a 
countervailing tariff. It is possible that the foreign 
country may gain from an export subsidy despite retaliation, 
when the domestic country responds with a countervailing 
tariff and production subsidy. However, in practice, 
countries only use countervailing tariffs in response to 
foreign export subsidies, and then an export subsidy will 
usually reduce foreign welfare. Therefore, retaliation with
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a countervailing tariff negates the profit shifting argument 
for an export subsidy. This is yet another argument against 
the use of profit shifting export subsidies.
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Mathematical Appendix A
In this appendix the compartive static results used in 
chapter four, section 4.4, for the effect of the foreign 
export subsidy on the optimal domestic import tariff and 
production subsidy will be derived. From equation (4.19) the 
first order conditions for a welfare maximum are
aw , ap x ay ax
— - = x i  + ( P - c )  —  + t —  = o
St a t )
(Al)
at at
aw ap ay ax
— - = -x —  + ( P - c )  —  + t —  = o 
as as 1 as as
(A2)
The second order conditions for a welfare maximum are
a2w
at'
< 0
a2w
as'
< o
h =
a2w
at'
a2w
atas
a2w
asat
a2w
as'
> o (A3)
The comparative static results are obtained by totally 
differentiating the first order conditions, (Al) and (A2), 
which yields
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a2wi a2wi dt a2w i
at2 asat de dedt
a2w i a2wi ds a2w i
at as as2 de deds
To obtain the second order partial derivatives substitute 
the comparative static results from chapter three into 
equation (Al) then yields
5W 1 l _
at A
 ^tm ((n+1) P7 +nyP") - nm(P7+yP77) (P-c^
+ mxP7 ((n+1 ) P7+QP77) J (A5)
To obtain av^/at2 differentiate awi/at with respect to t, 
and evaluating at a welfare maximum, yields
a2w i r dQ ay
r -  [m( (n+1) P7+nyP") + tm( (n+1) P77+nyP777) —  + tmP"at2 A L at at
dQ dQ ay
nm(P7+yP77)P7 --- nm(P,/+yP,//) (P-c )  (P-c )mP" —
at 1 at 1 at
dQ ax
+ mxP7 ((n+2)P77+QP777 ) —  + P7 ((n+1) P'+QP") —
at at
dQ n
+ mxP77 ((n+1) P7 +QP77) —
at J
Using the comparative static results from chapter three
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together with the optimal import tariff and production 
subsidy from (4.20) and after some simplification, yields
a2W mP7 r
 - = —  ((n+l)P7+nyP77) ((n+m+1)P7+QP") - nmxP7 (P"+yP777)
3t2 A2 L
+ mxP77 (P7 +mxP77) + nmxP77 (P7 +yP77) - nmP7 (P7+yP")
+ mxP7 ((n+2)P77+QP777 ) + ((n+l)P7+nyP77) ((n+1) P7+QP77)
— = —  (2n2+4n+2) (P7)2 + 4(n+l)QP7P77 + 2Q2(P77)2
at2 A2 L
Factorising then yields
a2W mP7 r
— = —  2 ((n+1) P'+QP77)2 + m[ (P7) 2+ mx2(P7 P777 -2 (P77)2) ]
at2 A2 L
Which is equivalent to the form given in the text
Multiplying out the terms then yields
a2W mP7
Where Z = (P7)2 + mx2(P7P777 - 2(P77)2) > 0
To obtain a2W /asat differentiate 6Wi/5t with respect to s, 
and evaluating at a welfare maximum, yields
a w  l r dQ dY dQ
   = - tm( (n+1) P77+nyP777) —  + tmP77 nm(P7+yP77) P7 —
asat a *- as as as
dQ ay ax
- nm(P,,+yP/,/) (P-c )  (P-c )mP77 —  + P7 ((n+1) P'+QP") —
1 as 1 as as
dQ dQ 1
+ mxP' ((n+2) P^+QP"7) —  + mxP" ((n+1) P'+QP") —
as as J
Using the comparative static results from chapter three 
together with the optimal import tariff and production 
subsidy from (4.20), and after some simplification yields
a2W nmP' r
   =   -nxP7 (P^+yP"7) - xP77 (P7 +mxP77)
asat A2 L
+ xP77( (m+l)P7+mxP77) - nP7 (P7+yP77) + xP7 ((n+2) P77+QP777 ) 
+ ((n+l)P7+QP77) (P7+xP77) + xP7 ((n+l)P7+QP77)
Which simplifies to
a2W nmP7 r
   = --- (2n+l) (P7) 2+ 2QP7 P77 - mx2(P7P777 -2 (P77)2)
asat a 2 L
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Which is equivalent to the form given in the text
a2W nmP' i_ _ ___
asat A2
[ 2P7 ((n+l)P7+QP77) - Z J  (A7)
To obtain a2W i/aeat differentiate dW^/dt with respect to e, 
and evauating at a welfare maximum, yields
a2w i r dQ ay aQ
1  =  - [  + A L
tm( (n+1) P77+nyP777) —  + tmP" nm (P7 +yP") P7 —
aeat  de de de
dQ dY ax
nm(P77+yP77 7 ) (P-c )  (P-c )mP" —  + P7 ((n+1) P'+QP") —
1 de 1 de de
dQ dQ
+ mxP'((n+2)P/,+QP,//) —  + mxP7'( (n+1) P'+QP") —
de de ^
Using the comparative static results from chapter three 
together with the optimal import tariff and production 
subsidy from (4.20) and after some simplification, yields
a2w -mP7
nmxP7 (P77+yP777 ) - mxP77 (P7 +mxP77) + nmxP77 (P7 +yP77)
aeat A
- nm (P7 +yP77) + mxP7 ((n+2) P77+QP77 7 ) + mxP77((n+l)P'+QP") 1
Which simplifies to
a w  -mP7 r
 - = —  ((n+l)P7+QP77) ((n-m+l)P7+QP77)
aeat A2 L
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+ mxP" ((n+m+1) P' +QP") + m[ (Py) 2-h mx2(P' P"'-2 (P")2] J
Which is equivalent to the form given in the text
a2W -mP'1  =  _  r
+ A 2 L ((n+l)P'+QP") ((n-m+l)P'+QP")aeat '
+ mxP"((n+m+1 ) P'+QP") + mZ J  (A8 )
Substitute the comparative static results from chapter 
three into (A2) yields
aw ir i
— - = - nmx(P')2+ tnm(P' +xP") - n((m+1)P'+mxP")(P-c ) (A9)
as a L 1 J
To obtain a2W i/atas differentiate aWj/as with respect to t, 
and evaluating at a welfare maximum, yields
a2w i r dQ ax aQ
   = - 2nmxP'P" —  + n(P') 2 —  + tnm(P"+xP'") —
at as a l at at at
ax aQ
+ tnP" —  + nm(P'+xP") - n(P-c ) ((m+1) P"+mxP"') —
at 1 at
ax aQ
-n(P-c )P" n( (m+1) P'+mxP") P' —
1 at at J
Using the comparative static results from chapter three 
together with the optimal import tariff and production
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subsidy from (4.20) and after some simplification yields
a2w nmP'
1 [ 2mxP,P,/ + ((n+l)P'+nyP") (P'-xP")
atas A2
- mxP' (P"+xP"') + mx2(P")2 - ((m+1) P'+mxP")P' J
Which simplifies to
a2W nmP' i_ _ ___
atas A2
£ 2P'((n+1) P'+QP") - [(P' )2+ mx2(P'P'"- 2(P")2)]J
Which is equivalent to the form given in the text
a2W nmP' i_ ___
atas A2
 ^2P' ((n+1) P'+QP") - Z J  (A10)
To obtain a2W i/as2 differentiate awi/3s with respect to s, 
and evaluating at a welfare maximum, yields
a2w i r aQ ax aQ
   = - 2nmxP'P" —  + n(P')2 —  + tnm(P"+xP'") —
as2 a as as as
ax dQ
+ tnP" n(P-c ) ((m+l)P"+mxP'") —
as 1 as
ax aQ
-n(P-c )P" n( (m+1) P'+mxP")P' —
1 as as J
Using the comparative static results from chapter three
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together with the optimal import tariff and production 
subsidy from (4.20), and after some simplification yields
a2W n2P'
1 [ 2mxP/P// + mP'(P'+xP") - mx (P' +mxP") (P"+xP"')
as2 A2
- mxP"(P/+xP") + mx2P,,((m+l)P//+mxP///) - ((m+1) P'+mxP") P' J
This simplifies to
a w n P' r n
 - =   (2m+l) (P')2 + mx2(P,P///- 2(P')2)
as2 A 2 L J
Which is equivalent to the form given in the text
a2W n2P' r
1 - 2m(P/)2 + Z (All)
as2 A2
To obtain a W i/ae3s differentiate 3Wi/as with respect to e, 
and evaluating at a welfare maximum, yields
a w  i r aQ ax aQ
   = - 2nmxP/P,/ —  + n(P7) 2 —  + tnm(P^+xP'") —
aeas aL de de de
ax aQ
+ tnP" n(P-c ) ((m+lJP^+mxP'7') —
de 1 de
dX dQ n
-n(P-c )P" n( (m+1)P'+mxP")P' —
1 de de J
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Using the comparative static results from chapter three 
together with the optimal import tariff and production 
subsidy from (4.20), and after some simplification yields
a2W -nmP' r
   = --- -2mxP'P" + P' ((n+l)P'+nyP")
deds A2 L
+ mx (P' +mxP") (P"+xP"') - xP"( (n+l)P'+nyP")
- mx2P"( (m+l)P"+mxP"') + ((m+1) P'+mxP") P' J
This simplifies to 
a2W -nmP'r
 - = --- P' ((n-m+1) P'+QP") - xP"( (n+m+1) P'+QP")
aeas A2 L
- [(P')2+ mx2(P/P///- 2 (P")2) ] J
Which is equivalent to the form given in the text 
a2W -nmP' f
 - = --- P' ((n-m+1) P'+QP") - xP"( (n+m+1) P'+QP") - Z (A12)
aeas A2 L J
These results can now be used to evaluate the determinants 
required to derive the comparative static results. Firstly, 
the Hessian determinant
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H =
a2 w
at'
a2 w
atas
a2w
asat
a2 w
as'
a2w a2w a2w a2w
1 1  1 1
at2 as2 atas asat
Substitute the second order partial derivatives into the 
above yields
H =
n2m(P')2
[( 2 ((n+1) P'+QP")2 + mZ j  |  2m(P')2 + Z
- m| 2P' ((n+1)P'+QP") - Z n
2n2mZ(P') 2
((n+l)P'+QP") + 2mP'((n+1) P'+QP") + (mP
')2 ]
2n mZ(P')
((n+m+1)P'+QP")2 1
2n2mZ
H = (A13)
Similarly
H =t
a2 w
aeat
a2 w
deds
a2w
asat
a2w
a s'
a2 w a2w a2 w a2w
 i_ i  i_ i_
aeat as aeas asat
Substitute the second order partial derivatives into the
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above yields
2 . —. # . 2 n m(P')
H = -----
t .4 [(((n+1)P'+QP")((n-m+1)P'+QP")
+ mxP"( (n+m+1) P'+QP") + m z j | 2 m ( P ' ) 2+ z j  - m|p'((n-m+1) P'+QP")  
- xP"( (n+m+1) P ' + Q P " ) -  z j  ^ 2 P '((n+1) P'+QP") -  z j j
n2m(P') 2
[((n+m+1) P'+QP") (2mxP'P" + Z)]
2n m 
H = ---
t .2
2mxP'P" + Z (A14)
Similarly
H =
s
a2w
at'
a2w
a2w
aeat
a2w
deds deds
a2w a2w a2w a2w
 i  i_  i_____
at aeas aeat atas
Substitute the second order partial derivatives into the 
above yields
n2m (P') 2
H = -----
s .4 [(2 ((n+1) P'+QP") + mZ P'((n-m+1) P'+QP")] (p  i
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- xP" ((n+m+1) P7 +QP") ((n+1) P'+QP") ((n-m+1) P'+QP77)
+ mxP77( (n+m+1)P'+QP77) + mZ 2P7 ((n+1)P'+QP77) - Zj( p. )]
n2m(P') 2
((n+m+1) P'+QP") 2xP"( (n+1) P'+QP") + Z)]
2n m 
H = ---
s A 2
2xP"((n+1)P'+QP") + Z (A15)
It is now possible to obtain the comparative static results. 
Using Cramer's rule the effect of a change in the foreign 
export subsidy on the optimal import tariff is from (A4)
dt 1 
de H
a2w
aeat
a2w
deds
a2w
asat
a2w
as'
Using the determinants in (A13) and (A14) yields
dt 1 mxP7 P7 
de 2 Z
(A16)
Similarly, using Cramer's rule the effect of a change in the 
foreign export subsidy on the optimal import tariff is from 
(A4)
258
a2w a2w
 i_ _   i_
at2 aeat
a2w a2w i_ _  i_
atas aeas
Using the determinants in (A13) and (A14) yields
ds -m f 1 xP"( (n+l)P' + QP")
   -  + -------------------
de n L 2 Z J
ds 1 
de H
(A17)
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Mathematical Appendix B
In this appendix the second order partial derivatives used 
in chapter four, section 4.5, will be derived. The first 
derivative of the domestic welfare function with respect to 
t is
aw ay , ap  ^ ax
—  = (P-C.) —  + X 1 -------+ t —  (B1>
at at  ^ at } at
Using the comparative static results in chapter three yields
aw m j- -i
— - = - yP' (nP'+nyP") +xP' ((n+1) P'+QP") +t( (n+1) P'+nyP") (B2) 
at A l -1
To obtain a2W i/at2 differentiate 3Wj/at with respect to t, 
evaluating at a welfare maximum, where the above term in 
square brackets is zero, yields
a w m r aQ ay ay
   = - yP' (nP/,+nyP,,/) —  + yP'P" —  + (nP'+nyP") P' —
at2 A L at at at
dQ dQ
+ (nP' +nyP7/) yP" —  + xP'((n+2) P,,+QP,//) —
at at
ax aQ
+ ((n+1) P'+QP") P7 —  + ((n+1) P'+QP")xP" —
at at
aQ ay
+ t ((n+1) P"+nyP"') —  + tP" —  + ((n+1) P'+nyP")
at at J
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Using the comparative static results from chapter three 
together with the optimal tariff from (4.34) yields
/32 TiJ m O '
____r»/ /  t- \ / /  i ..ri/// \ it ■  tW /n/ i ..rt//\ / /__i -1 \ r\// ■ \-mnyP7 (P77+yP777) N + mnyP7 (P7+yP77) ((n+1) P77+nyP777)
- mxP"( (n+1) P'+QP") (nP7+nyP77) - mxP" ((n+1) P'+QP77 )N 
- mn2yP7 (P7 +yP")2 + mxP7 ((n+1) P'+QP77) ((n+1) P77+nyP777 )
- mxP7 ((n+l)P'+nyP77) ((n+2)P77+QP777 ) + ((n+m+1) P'+QP")N2
   = —  + --- ((n-m+l)P7+nyP77)N2 + (n+l)mP'Z +
at2 A A N  L
(mxP77) 2 (nP'+2N) + 3mxP"N2 + ny2mP7 (P7 P/7/-2 (P77)2)
Which reduces to the expression in the text
a2W mN mP7 r
   = —  + --- ((n-m+1 )P7+nyP77)N2 + B
at2 A A2N L
Where Z, N and B are defined as,
+ mn(P7+yP77)2N - ((n+1) P7+QP7/)N2
Further simplification then yields
a2W mN mP7
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Z = [(P7)2+ mx2(P7P777 - 2 (P77)2) ] > 0 
N = (n+1) P7 + nyP" < 0
B = m(n+l) P7 Z+ (mxP77) 2(nP7+2N) +3mxP77N2+mny2P7 (P7P777 -2 (P77)2) 
(-) (-) (-/+) (-/+)
To obtain a^/aeat differentiate 5Wi/at with respect to e, 
evaluating at a welfare maximum, yields
a2w m r dQ ay ay
   = - yP'(nP77+nyP777 ) —  + yP7P77 —  + (nP7+nyP77)P7 —
aeat A L ae ae ae
dQ dQ
+ (nP7+nyP77)yP7 —  + xP7 ((n+2) P77+QP777 ) —
ae ae
ax aQ
+ ((n+l)P7+QP77)P7 —  + ((n+l)P7+QP77)xP7 —
ae ae
dQ dY
+ t ((n+1) P77+nyP777 ) —  + tP77 —
ae ae J
Using the comparative static results from chapter three 
together with the optimal tariff from (4.34) yields
a2W mP7 r
   = — —  -mnyP7 (P77+yP7 7 ) N + mnyP7 (P7+yP77) ((n+1) P77+nyP7 7 )
aeat a n L
+ mn(P7+yP77)2N - ((n+1) P7+QP77)N2
- mxP77 ((n+1) P7 +QP77) (nP7 +nyP77) - mxP77 ((n+1) P7+QP77) N
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- mn2yP77(P7+yP77)2 + mxP7 ((n+1) P'+QP") ((n+1) P,/+nyP,,/)
- mxP' ((n+1) P' +nyP77) ((n+2) P77+QP777)
Simplification then yields
a W -mP7 r
   = --- ((n-m+1) P7+nyP77)N + (n+l)mP7Z + (mxP77) (nP7+2N)
aeat A2N L
+ 3mxP77N2 + ny2mP7 (P7P777 -2 (P77)2)
Which reduces to the expression given in the text,
a2w -mP7 r
 - = --- ((n-m+1) P7+nyP77)N2 + B
aeat A2n l
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Mathematical Appendix C
This appendix derives the second order partial derivatives 
used in chapter four, section 4.6. Using the comparative 
static results from chapter three in (4.43), the first 
derivative of the domestic welfare function is
aw n r
— - = - X(P')2 - (P-c )((m+1) P'+mxP") (Cl)
as A L 1 J
The second partial derivative a2W i/as2 is obtained by 
differentiating 3Wi/as with respect to s, and evaluating at 
a welfare maximum, yields
a2W n  i _ _
as2 a
ax aQ aQ
(P')2 —  + 2XP'P" ((m+1) P'+mxP") —
ds ds ds
dQ ax
-(P-C ) ((m+l) P"+mxP'" )  (P-C )P" —
1 as 1 as
Substitute the comparative static results and the optimal 
P-ci from (4.44) into the above and rearranging gives
a2Wi n2(P')2 
as2 A2m
(mP'+mxP") ((m+1) P'+mxP") -2mxP" ((m+1) P'+mxP")
+ ((m+1) P'+mxP")2 + mxP' ((m+1) P"+mxP'") - mxP" (mP'+mxP" ) J
After some simplification this yields the expression given
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in the text
a2wt n2(P7)2 
as2 A2
  [" M2 + m2 (P7)2 + mZ 1 (C2)
m l  J
Where,
M = (m+1)P'+mxP" < 0 
Z = (P')2 + mx2(P7P777 -2 (P77)2) > 0
To obtain a2W i/aeas differentiate aWi/3s with respect to s, 
and evaluating at a welfare maximum, yields
a2W n i_ _ _
deds A
dX dQ dQ
(P7) —  + 2XP/P,/-----((m+1) P'+mxP") —
de de de
dQ dX
-(P-c ) ((m+1) P"+mxP"7)  (P-c )P" —
1 de 1 de
Substitute the comparative static results and the optimal 
P-ci from (4.44) into the above and rearranging gives
a2W n2(P7)2 r
1 - ((n+1) P7 +nyP") ((m+1) P7 +mxP") + ((m+1) P7 +mxP")2
aeas A2M
7 +nyP") j+2mxP" ((m+1) P'+mxP") +mxP7 ((m+1) P"+mxP777) -mxP" ((n+1) P
After some simplification this yields the expression given 
in the text
d2W i n2 (P7) 2 
deds A2M
[ M2 + m2(P7)2 + mZ - (m+1) A J  (C3)
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